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ABSTRACT 
The Developing 8 (D-8) is a group of predominantly Muslim developing 
countries that are all members of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), which 
have formed an economic alliance. It consists of Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, 
Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey. The group was established after an 
announcement in Istanbul Turkey on June 15, 1997. The group is designed to gradually 
reduce tariffs on specific goods between member-states, with a supervisory committee 
overseeing the process. The purpose of the group is to reduce barriers to free trade 
between member states, as well as promote inter-state cooperation.  
 Despite the important role of D-8 countries, the empirical literature analyzing 
the trade of D-8 members with each other is still rather limited. Thus, it is interesting 
to investigate the trade among these countries in depth. This dissertation investigates 
the intra-trade of the preferential trade agreement among the D-8 countries by looking 
at the possibility of full-fledged trade liberalization through the expansion of the 
coverage of the preferential tariff reduction. This study applies the gravity modeling 
approach using panel data in two stages – before and after formation of D-8 
cooperation –for a quantitative analysis of the economic effects of a preferential trade 
arrangement between the contracting countries. An important aim of the research is to 
appraise whether there will be significant gains in intra-trade amongst the D-8 
member countries when tariff barriers and enhancement measures are being entirely 
dismantled. 
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 The composition of trade determines the level of bilateral matching of 
commodities of an exporter with the demands of an importer. Obviously, the gravity 
model does not take into account commodity composition. Instead, we employ the 
trade intensity index to show the effect of commodity composition on bilateral trade. 
Using the decomposition method, similar to Drysdale (1967), we aim to show how 
much of the trade volume effect is due to complementarity (compositional effect) and 
country bias (average resistance). It is expected that an index that captures the 
composition of trade could provide better understanding of the effect of trade costs on 
bilateral trade flows. 
The results indicate that all the variables used in the model have the expected 
sign and are significant. In summary, the results signify that while D-8 intra-trade is 
expected to increase very substantially, not all countries will experience a welfare 
gain under a free trade arrangement. Likewise, the impact on the economic sector 
differs substantially across countries. The findings of this thesis may serve as 
recommendations for policy makers to improve the bilateral trade flows amongst the D-
8 countries as important trading partners. 
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ABSTRAK 
Kumpulan Lapan Negara Membangun (D-8) merupakan kumpulan negara-
negara Islam membangun di mana kesemuanya adalah anggota Pertubuhan Persidangan 
Islam (OIC),  telah membentuk satu pakatan ekonomi. Ia terdiri daripada Bangladesh, 
Mesir, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan dan Turki. Kumpulan ini telah 
ditubuhkan selepas pengumuman di Istanbul Turki pada 15 Jun, 1997. Kumpulan ini  
merancang untuk secara beransur-ansur mengurangkan tarif ke atas barang-barang 
tertentu antara negara-negara anggota, dengan sebuah jawatankuasa bertanggungjawab 
menyelia proses tersebut. Kumpulan ini bertujuan untuk mengurangkan halangan 
kepada perdagangan bebas antara negara anggota, serta menggalakkan kerjasama antara 
negara. 
  Walaupun negara-negara D-8 memainkan peranan penting dalam dunia 
perdagangan, tetapi sorotan kajian empirik yang menganalisis perdagangan antara 
negara-negara D-8   masih agak terhad. Oleh yang demikian, adalah penting satu kajian 
yang lebih mendalam mengenai  perdagangan di kalangan negara-negara ini dilakukan. 
Disertasi ini mengkaji perjanjian keutamaan perdagangan di kalangan negara- negara D-
8 dengan melihat pada kemungkinan liberalisasi sepenuhnya melalui peningkataan 
liputan pengurangan tarif keutamaan. Kajian ini menggunakan pendekatan model graviti 
serta menggunakan data panel dalam dua peringkat - sebelum dan selepas pembentukan 
D-8 - untuk analisis kuantitatif kesan ekonomi dari perjanjian perdagangan keutamaan 
di antara negara-negara yang terlibat. Satu matlamat penting kajian adalah untuk 
menilai sama ada akan wujud keuntungan yang ketara dalam perdagangan di kalangan 
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negara yang menganggotai D-8 apabila halangan tarif dan langkah-langkah peningkatan 
sepenuhnya dihapuskan. 
 Komposisi perdagangan menentukan tahap padanan dua hala komoditi 
pengeksport dengan permintaan pengimport. Jelas sekali, model graviti tidak 
mengambil kira komposisi komoditi. Sebaliknya, kita menggunakan indeks intensiti 
perdagangan untuk menunjukkan kesan komposisi komoditi terhadap perdagangan dua 
hala. Dengan menggunakan kaedah penguraian, sepertimana Drysdale (1967), kami 
berhasrat untuk menunjukkan berapa banyak kesan jumlah dagangan adalah berpunca 
dari saling melengkapi (kesan komposisi) dan bias negara (rintangan purata). Adalah 
dijangkakan bahawa indeks yang mengambil kira komposisi perdagangan boleh 
memberi kefahaman yang lebih baik mengenai kesan kos perdagangan terhadap aliran 
perdagangan dua hala. 
Keputusan kajian menunjukkan bahawa semua pembolehubah dalam model 
yang digunakan mempunyai tanda sebagaimana yang  dijangka dan ianya signifikan. 
Secara ringkasnya, keputusan menunjukkan bahawa walaupun perdagangan di kalangan 
negara-negara D-8 dijangka meningkat dengan ketara, tetapi tidak semua negara akan 
mengalami faedah kebajikan di bawah perjanjian perdagangan bebas. Begitu juga, kesan 
ke atas sektor ekonomi berbeza dengan ketara di antara negara. Penemuan tesis ini 
boleh dimajukan sebagai cadangan  kepada penggubal dasar untuk meningkatkan aliran 
perdagangan dua hala di kalangan negara-negara D-8, sebagai rakan dagangan yang 
penting. 
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CHAPTER 1                                                                         
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Despite the apparent orientation of the world economy and markets towards 
globalization, it is obvious that this process is dominated by the trend of regionalization 
and large economic blocs. Nowadays, although multilateral trade liberalization is observed to 
move under the principles of the WTO, regionalization, as a fundamental strategy for the 
expansion of trade among both developed and developing countries, has been strengthened. 
These do not set up mutually exclusive phenomena and neither are they conflicting. 
Needless to say, this inclination towards groupings is dictated by the fierce 
competition on the world scale, both economically and politically. Almost all of these 
economic blocs comprise countries with many similarities in their socio-economic and 
political structure as well as cultural set-up, geographical proximity, and apparent vested 
mutual interests. 
The satisfactory outcomes resulting for the member countries from the formation 
of the EU and the joining of the eastern and central European countries in the EU led the 
attention of other countries to the EU. It was because the EU was considered as a 
successful pattern which could gain remarkable achievements in economic growth, and 
could obtain a greater share as far as global trade and production were concerned 
(SESRTCIC, 2003). Moreover, the objectives of the EU members were questioned 
because of the establishment of the Single European Market and its consequences on 
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both the global economy and the individual economies of non-member states. The United 
States (US) and Japan were among the first nations whose reactions were observed. In spite 
of the fact the US was not previously in agreement with regionalization, it is now a member 
of both NAFTA and APEC. In other words, in order to save its economic and 
commercial status by accessing the regional markets, the strategy of multiple 
memberships was followed by the US. 
In conjunction with the multiple membership strategy adopted by the US, the 
developed countries have paid due attention to regionalization along with their 
attempts regarding multilateral trade negotiations. In such a global environment, the 
Eighth Session of the Islamic Summit Conference (IS), held in Tehran, Islamic Republic 
of Iran, in December 1997, adopted a resolution on the Islamic Common Market. Inter 
alia, it urged “related bodies and institutions in the OIC, concerned regional and national 
institutions, and public and private sectors in Islamic countries to study the implications 
of establishing an Islamic Common Market among member states” (ICDT, 2008). 
It was in 1974 at the Second Islamic Summit that the idea to establish an Islamic 
Common Market among the members of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) 
was first suggested. It was believed that the idea must be considered as a long-term 
objective demanding due attention and a comprehensive scrutiny. As an ultimate goal 
the establishment of an Islamic Common Market was implicitly referred to in the 
subsequent Islamic Summits and the Islamic Conferences of Foreign Ministers (ICFM). 
Meanwhile, the OIC countries realized at an early stage the basic need to enhance their 
efforts of cooperation to move towards this objective through strengthening their 
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economic and trade relations and overcoming all weaknesses which could jeopardize 
further trade and economic collaboration. 
The acceptance of the Plan of Action
1
 (POA 1981) to expand economic and 
commercial activities among the OIC members was the most important attempt aiming 
at the intra-OIC economic and trade cooperation, which was followed by establishing the 
Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation (COMCEC) to pursue 
the plan. Since the adoption of POA, the significant political and economic changes 
across the world have revised the plan and a new POA was adopted in 1994 including a 
strategy and a mechanism of follow-up and implementation (Alpay et al. 2011). 
However, due to the slow progress in its implementation, the POA has remained a 
problematic issue for the OIC members since then. 
 The Developing 8 (D-8) is made up from a group of Muslim developing 
countries, and all are members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC); 
collectively, they have formed an economic alliance composed of Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Iran, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria and Turkey. D-8 was established in Istanbul, Turkey 
after an announcement on the 15th of June 1997. This agreement (D-8 PTA) is meant to 
gradually reduce the tariffs on specific goods between the member-states, which would 
be supervised by a committee to oversee the process. The agreement is aimed at 
reducing the barriers between the member-states and promoting inter-state cooperation 
among them.  
                                                 
1
 The Plan of Action constitutes, at the level of sectors and areas of co-operation, a policy document with 
detailed indicative action programs, to serve as an operational complement of the Strategy to Strengthen 
Economic Co-operation among the OIC Member States. 
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The objectives of the D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation are to 
improve the position of member states in the global economy, diversify and create new 
opportunities in trade relations, enhance participation in decision-making on an 
international level, and improve standards of living (D-8Secretariat, 2008).The D-8 
countries comprise some 961 million people or around 15percent of the world’s 
population, creating a huge market, with a dynamic labor force. The population has rich 
mineral, energy and agricultural resources; promising tourism capacity; and competitive 
operational costs, added to which proper planning would enhance trade between the 
members. Half of the members are cited within the top 25 merchandise exporters of the 
world.
1
 Two of them are members of the G-20.
2
 All the D-8 countries are important 
players in their respective regions. Around 45 percent of the total exports of the 57 
membered OIC are realized by the 8 countries of the organization. The D-8 countries, 
when calculated together, compromise 55 percent of the total GDP of the OIC countries. 
Despite the global financial crisis, the trade volume among the member states of 
the D-8 rose from $35 billion in 2006 to$78 billion in 2008.In addition, according to the 
latest available statistics, the D-8 countries’ total trade volume had reached $1.15 
trillion by 2009, of which the intra trade volume was $67 billion, that is, 6.08percent of 
D-8’s total trade volume, which indicated a significant rise, compared to previous years. 
However, that is far behind D-8’s potential. According to the D-8 roadmap, trade 
volume among member countries will increase to 15 to 20 percent of the organization’s 
total trade by 2018. 
                                                 
1
 Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey and Iran 
2
 Indonesia and Turkey 
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 The entry into force of a PTA would be a key step for further development of 
D-8 intra-trade by means of both quantity and diversity. In other words, the enforcement 
of a PTA would cause the member exporters to benefit from preferential tariff 
treatments provided for some items in the members’ market; moreover, it provides the 
exporters with advantages out of the competition over similar products introduced in 
non-member countries. 
The harmony between setting up a trading bloc and the economic vision ofD-8 
countries and the priorities they follow is very well suited. This has been summarized 
well as follows: “Three of the D-8 member countries –Turkey, Malaysia and Indonesia–
are major emerging markets with high growth prospects. Four others –Iran, Egypt, 
Nigeria and Pakistan– are striving to unshackle their economies from state control. The 
eighth, Bangladesh, is climbing from the bottom rung of the world's economic ladder” 
(Aral, 2005). 
The beginning rationale behind the establishment of D-8 was not the founding of 
a bloc that would challenge existing international norms and institutions. Instead, 
economic and trade cooperation was the main concern of the founders of D-8. As a 
matter of fact, D-8 was not a reaction against imperialism, it was the result of original 
motivations shared among the member countries. A reasonable degree of 
complementarity among the founding states in respect of raw materials and industrial 
products has surely increased the likelihood of D-8’s sustainability. 
The study of the impetus that led member countries to contribute to the 
formation of D-8 shows that the members’ interest in material rewards motivated most 
of them to take respective measures. The establishment of a new international 
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organization that could contribute to deepening the relationship among Muslim states 
was also observed as members’ intent. Especially, this was observed from Erbakan and 
his colleagues. Among others, escaping international isolation through D-8 channels led 
some of the governments to participate (Aral, 2005). 
Despite the important role of D-8 countries, the empirical literature analyzing D-
8 member’s trade with each other is still rather limited. Thus, it is interesting to 
investigate the trade among these countries in depth. This thesis applies the gravity 
model to investigate the bilateral trade flows in two stages before and after formation of 
D-8 cooperation amongst Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, 
Pakistan and Turkey. The purpose of the thesis is three-fold: to identify significant 
factors influencing the levels of trade among D-8, and to test whether there will be 
significant gains in intra-trade and welfare amongst the D-8 member countries, and also 
whether trade among them fully exploits their potential or there is still room for more 
trade. The findings of this thesis may serve as recommendations for policy makers to 
improve the bilateral trade flows amongst D-8, as important trading partners. 
1.2 Significance of Study 
According to the WTO (2010) there are over 220 Preferential Trade Agreements 
(PTAs) in force today whose extent and coverage are different from one another. The 
differences include flows of trade, membership, and population. Normally, each country 
belongs to six different PTAs, except for Mongolia, which does not belong to any PTA. 
Within the last twenty years, there has been a remarkable increase in the number 
of PTAs and the share of preferential trade in world trade. At least 197 PTAs have come 
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into existence between 1990 and 2010, which set up 32% of world trade. The number 
exceeds the total number of PTAs signed in the previous 50 years (numbering 23) 
(Medvedev, 2010; WTO, 2011). Moreover, a growing number of these PTAs are signed 
among developing countries, reaching a total of 110 during this period (compared to 78 for 
South-North and 9 for North-North PTAs). This growing importance of PTAs in world 
trade re-ignited the academic interest on the subject. Nevertheless, despite the significant 
increase in South-South trade integration and their share in world trade, academic research 
on the determinants and desirability of PTAs remains divided (Bhagwati, 1998; Panagariya, 
2000; Baier and Bergstrand, 2004; Magee 2008). The trade literature has long argued that 
PTAs can benefit member states through economies of scale and comparative advantage, as 
well as higher competition (Schiff, 2003). However, these arguments are generally reserved 
for North-North and South-North but not South-South PTAs (Demir and Dahi, 2011). 
In 2011, all countries of the European continent are currently members of an 
entirely common market and some of these countries have stepped into the stage of 
monetary union. The North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA) was established by 
Canada, Mexico, and USA. The countries in South America formed (MERCOSUR) and 
several common markets or customs unions or Free Trade Areas. There are also many 
ongoing plans in Africa; prominent examples include the Group of Three, and South 
Africa Customs Union (SACU).South-south co-operation has also been strengthened 
through the measures taken recently by South Africa, India, and Brazil. Some plans 
have even been presented to form a customs union among Israel, Jordan and Palestine 
(Yildiz and Nath, 2010). 
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Asia has been an important participant in these trends. The region has witnessed 
an upswing in bilateral, regional, and cross-regional agreements. As of January 2010, 61 
FTAs had been concluded in Asia; up from only 3 in 2000, with another 86 new 
agreements either under negotiation or proposed, thus clearly putting Asia at the 
forefront of PTA activity (Wignaraja and Lazaro, 2010). In the Middle East, Iran is a 
member of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), along with nine other 
countries. These countries have limited economic cooperation with very limited 
economic privileges. Relatively, the Arab countries in the Persian Gulf, which are 
members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, have progressed more. Some of the Eastern 
Asian countries are members of ASEAN Union (Association of South Eastern Asian 
Nations), which is an economic integration plan and South Asia Free Trade Area 
(SAFTA). 
In the present conditions, the economic integration plans have changed into one 
of the most important tools for economic development, trade development, defending 
against regional protectionism, increasing economic power of the group of states, 
attracting foreign investments, using large markets of the union, economies of scale, 
increasing economic efficiency, expanding exports and foreign trade, reducing the 
interference of national governments in the economy and increasing the role of 
transnational organizations, importance of international organizations and their privilege 
over national organizations, and, finally, the establishment of monetary unions or 
economic unions for political or religious reasons. 
As regards the Islamic countries, there have been several attempts for economic 
integration. All Muslim countries are members of the Organization of the Islamic 
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Conference (OIC).This consists of five major sub-groupings; namely, the Arab Maghreb 
Union (AMU), Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU), Persian Gulf Co-operation 
Council (GCC), Economic Co-operation Organization (ECO) and Developing 8 
countries (D-8).The Islamic Conference Organization is pursuing the plan for creation 
of an Islamic common market, however, the plan has not yet reached a final conclusion. 
It is important for the OIC to ensure that the D-8 experiment will succeed, as the eight 
countries account for roughly 80 percent of the world’s Muslim population, 
notwithstanding the fact that they only represent less than one-seventh of the 54 
members of the organization (Hassan, 2003). The D-8, as the main Islamic economic 
co-operation, after successful experimentation, can be extended eventually to all other 
OIC members. 
The development of the EU and the regionalized growth, which has led to the 
growth of regional economic blocs has undesirable consequences for OIC members. 
These schemes cannot be ignored by OIC members because Europe and North America 
make up the major export markets for OIC members. The most important effect of the 
EU is on goods and services markets, and on investment and technology transfer. 
Regional schemes would provide the members with exclusive access to one another's 
markets. As such, countries that are not a member would witness restriction on access to 
the market.  
The consequences brought up by the developments referred to above, highlight 
the significance of more constructive co-operation and collaboration among the OIC 
members that require more access to a polarized market. To this end, the establishment 
or reactivation of regional integration schemes seems to be among the first priorities. 
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Although Islam, as the main source, has interwoven D-8 members as a group, 
the diversity in the economic structure, political systems, development level, andsocio-
cultural circumstances of D-8 is not unknown.  This diversity has been claimed to be the 
first barrier for the improvement of economic cooperation, which is believed will 
provide great exchanges of goods, capital, entrepreneurship, labor, and technology 
among members, as well as provide a common tariff wall against third parties 
(Zeinelabdin and Ugurel, 1998). 
Although diversity in D-8 members is believed to be problematic, the researcher 
believes that it could be a strengthening characteristic, if it is thought of positively and 
manipulated appropriately. Contrary to EC members, membership of low, middle, and 
high income countries are observed in the D-8 group; however, the cultural and socio-
economical similarities shared by D-8 members, as the similarities shared by the EC, 
NAFTA and APEC countries, is one of the advantages of D-8 countries. Therefore, D-8 
members can take great economic benefit from trade liberalization in the region. Hence, 
the research is going to provide significant implications as far as policy making 
regarding the D-8 members economic co-operation alternatives are concerned. 
 
Intra-D-8 trade could not be beneficial for D-8 members as much as trading with 
non-member countries, causing marginal growth in intra-D-8 trade compared to the 
trade with the rest of the world. Intra-D-8 trade suffered from the tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers, low level of services and information on trade, and the current trade structure. 
Moreover, some of D-8 countries fail to create persuasive economic relations with 
regional partners, mainly due to their unstable and limited export capabilities. To this 
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we can add D-8 countries weak relationship with other members, because of fulfilling 
their import and export demands with non-members. 
The marginalization of D-8 members along with some other developing 
countries because of the competitive atmosphere brought about by globalization and 
regionalization, has accentuated the establishment of an Islamic Common Market. 
Furthermore, the variety of protectionist practices performed by the major economic 
blocks of the developed countries necessitates the adoption of a contributive policy by 
developing countries. The idea to set up the D-8 free trade area or any other form of 
economic integration seems to be vital for the OIC countries as the main step toward an 
Islamic Common Market. This would help them to be on the safe side when dealing with the 
blocks of industrialized countries, which are economically powerful, and would minimize the 
possibilities of more marginalization (Dabour, 2004). 
It is usually agreed that the national markets for most developing countries are 
too small for the establishment of plants of optimum size and for the realization of 
economies of scale. Hence, the enlargement of the markets and their protection are seen 
as prerequisites for a more rapid industrial development. This brings us to the question 
as to how far a customs union among the D-8 countries is a feasible option. While 
addressing this question, it is feasible to carry out a broad assessment on characteristic 
features of groups of countries that could either gain or lose from a customs union. 
Great achievements await D-8 members in Intra D-8 trade, in the case where member 
countries complement one another in different aspects, and if they exchange and share 
their experiences and strengths. In this regard, multiple opportunities are available to D-
8 countries to strengthen cooperation, trade and investment among them in various 
fields including human and rural development, tourism, energy, and agriculture; this is 
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definitely contributive both to promoting the economies and to the economic integration 
of D-8countries. 
However, among D-8 countries, Bangladesh has a GDP of $1400 m. and a per 
capita income of $1000. It is not very likely that this country could develop 
manufacturing industries to stand successfully in an intra-union competition. A system 
of compensation would have to be devised to help if a customs union is formed among 
such countries. As regards oil-rich countries, such as, Iran and Egypt, with a per capita 
income of $6000 or more, they have large financial means, which could allow them to 
give strong fiscal incentives, subsidies and other governmental support to their 
industries. In their case intra-group trade liberalization could be to their advantage. 
Here it is sufficient to show that it is highly probable that the establishment of a 
free trade area or customs union would lead to a very uneven distribution of the costs 
and benefits among different countries of D-8. Therefore, it becomes necessary to look 
after the interests of those countries that are in danger of losing their manufacturing 
industrial capacity. This brings us to the question of studying the possible impact of 
forming a free trade area or a customs union among D-8 member countries. 
 This is why the economic integration is considered as one of the most important 
subjects for the present economic research. Considering the wide dimensions of the 
issue, detailed research has been done (and is still being done) about its miscellaneous 
aspects. The subject of regional economic cooperation is very important for Individual 
D-8 members. In other words, the enforcement of PTA would cause the member 
exporters to benefit from preferential tariff treatments provided for some items in 
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members’ market; moreover, it provides the exporters with advantages out of the 
competition over similar products introduced in non-member countries. 
In the Malaysian context, although Malaysia’s largest trading partners are China, 
Singapore and Japan, it is government policy to expand its export market through the 
search for new markets by creating a bilateral or multilateral trade area. For example, 
the government is committed to the development of D-8 PTA. This is proven by its 
trade data. 
The United States economic sanctions have important policy implications for 
Iran. Diversifying to find alternative export markets and develop new export markets is 
critical to avoid dependence on the West. As a first step, the D-8 PTA provides a new 
market alternative when other OIC countries participate in the future. In addition, in the 
Middle East, at least it can solve many existing political problems of the region. 
Although the discussion of the political issues is outside the scope of this dissertation, 
we have investigated its economic aspects, which are significantly important, because a 
serious decision has been made for regional economic cooperation in the Middle East 
and Central Asia, and between the Islamic Conference Organization member states; 
however, various countries have posed many economic questions and ambiguities, for 
which no answer has yet been provided. The present dissertation is an effort to respond 
to some of these questions.  Other D-8 members also have their individual interests, 
which we will discuss in the following chapter. 
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1.3 Research Questions 
This research endeavors to determine: can the economic integration plan be used 
as a policy for the development of exports or does such growth depend on more liberal 
exports and imports? The theory and experimental research of the present dissertation 
have been designed to answer these questions. To this end, we have to discover in what 
form and to what extent the effects of trade diversion and trade creation can occur, what 
kind of influence the protection levels can have on the degree of these effects, and 
finally, what kind of changes in a trade policy will effect a better result. Therefore, we 
can summarize the questions of the present dissertation to fill the research gap and to 
reach the research objectives as follows:  
1. Does the D-8 PTA make sense in the first place? 
2. Is the share of D-8 countries trade among themselves more than the 
proportion of their share of world trade? And, if so, on average, do D-8 
members trade more with each other than the world does? Is the intensity 
of trade among members more than their interest in trading with the rest of 
the world? 
3. Does the export profile of the source overlap the import profile of the 
destination among D-8 countries? In other words, does the export pattern 
of one D-8 country match the import pattern of another? Will the trade 
profiles become more or less compatible over time? Does the trade among 
the D-8 members fully exploit its potential? 
4. Will economic integration between D-8be beneficial for all member 
countries as a group? And, will the members gain more from D-8?  
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5. What is the net welfare effect of forming D-8 on Iran’s trade? Did the 
membership of Iran in D-8causetrade creation or trade diversion? 
Regarding the first, second and third questions, trade indicators including trade 
intensity, trade complementarity, and trade bias are estimated. Naturally, because of the 
solely experimental nature of the research about them, the theoretical assumptions will 
neither be possible nor have an analytical value. Regarding these questions, we only 
have to look at the answer to the experimental tests. We will consider the fourth 
question using the gravity model estimated with panel data. To do this, the theoretical 
aspects of gravity models have been extracted and proven. In order to answer question 
five, trade creation and diversion are estimated using trade creation and diversion 
indices. 
1.4 Research objectives 
 The key objectives of this dissertation are: 
 In view of the fact that the empirical aspect of economic integration 
in D-8 literature has been somewhat ignored, attempts will be made 
to discuss some significant factors that affect trade among these 
countries. 
 The study also deals with the influential factors in bilateral trade with 
reference to member states economic structure to offer appropriate 
policies to improve the bilateral trade among D-8 countries. 
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 This research endeavors to determine whether we can use the 
economic integration plan as a policy for development of economic 
growth and whether such growth depends on more liberal export and 
import flows. 
 Discover in what form and to what extent the effects of trade 
diversion and trade creation can occur, what kind of influence the 
protection levels can have on the degree of these effects, and, finally, 
what kind of changes in trade policy will lead to a better result. 
1.5 Research Hypotheses 
The testable hypotheses of the present dissertation are outlined as follows:  
H1: D-8 country members have more intensity to intra trade rather than 
trade with the rest of the world. 
H2: D-8 countries have high bilateral trade potential. In other words, 
they could be compatible trade partners. 
H3: Forming D-8 and expanding the bilateral trade among member states 
is beneficial for all the member countries as a group. 
H4: Access to member countries’ markets is not restricted in D-8 and 
they could gain advantage from bilateral trade partnership. 
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1.6 Research Methodology 
The theory of Customs Unions was pioneered by Jacob Viner’s1 (1950) 
groundbreaking work. He invented the two concepts of "the effect of trade creation" and 
"the effect of trade diversion" in a partial equilibrium model; based on the model, he 
showed that we cannot definitely conclude whether or not the formation of a customs 
union, or economic integration, leads to these two effects and ensures higher efficiency 
of allocation. Trade diversion is the shift of production from efficient external suppliers 
to inefficient members. In contrast, trade creation is the shift of production from 
inefficient domestic providers to efficient RTA members. While trade creation is 
associated with the standard gains from trade, trade diversion can make a trade 
agreement harmful for both members and nonmembers (Freund and Ornelas, 2010). 
Therefore, there are some doubts regarding the effect of economic integration 
plans on economic development, because it might be the effect of trade diversion that 
reduces the welfare, rather than the effect of trade creation increasing the welfare, and, 
accordingly, the principal goal, i.e. efficient allocation of resources as a foundation for 
long-term economic growth and development, may not achieved.  
However, a few years later, Lipsey (1957) and Gehrles (1956) were able to show 
in a general equilibrium model that the effect of trade diversion may increase welfare. 
Melvin (1969) and Bhagwati (1971) also achieved similar results with the general 
                                                 
1
The Viner approach is 'static' because it only concerns the welfare effects of a once-for-all FTA or CU formation 
instead of considering "time-path' questions. It is a 'benign-government' approach because the formation of the FTA 
or CU is exogenously specified and the incentives to form them so that they are endogenously determined (as in 
Krishna (1993)) are not modeled. See Bhagwati (1993) for these analytical distinctions (Krishna and Bhagwati, 
1997). 
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equilibrium model. Therefore, the first conflicts regarding the notion of customs unions 
began in the 1950s.  
Cooper and Massel (1965a) reasoned that any country upon liberalization of 
general and multilateral trade, instead of economic integration plans, can achieve the 
same effect from trade creation, without having to suffer the effect of trade diversion. In 
other words, if instead of discriminatively reducing the tariffs, we reduce them for all 
countries, i.e. we unilaterally embark on trade liberalization; we will sustain no welfare 
losses; and, hence, free trade has an advantage over regional economic integration.  
An analysis carried out by Lipsey-Gehrles and Melvin-Bhagwati revealed that in 
specific cases in the general equilibrium model, the effect of trade diversion can 
increase the welfare, while in other cases it can reduce it. Cooper-Massel's article 
remained unrivalled for 15 years and showed that the free trade a country starts 
unilaterally has an advantage over a customs union. This was until Wonnocot and 
Wonnocot (1981), who used a general equilibrium model to show that with regard to the 
conditions under which the third countries set tariffs with existing transportation 
expenses, the customs union or integration plan can have an advantage over unilateral 
free trade. A few years later, they faced a protest from Berglas (1983). Berglas argued 
that the Wonnocots had failed to consider two principal assumptions in their analysis; 
therefore, according to their model we are not able to come up with the result that the 
customs union or integration plan has priority over unilateral free trade. El-Agra (1984) 
reasoned that Wonnocots' analysis is not complete because it rules out foreign common 
tariffs set by customs union member states against third countries.  
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In addition, numerous experimental researches were carried out about the effects 
of the formation of customs unions around the world, for example, the formation of the 
European Economic Community at the end of the 1950s, or other integration plans 
among developing countries in Latin America and Asia (e.g. MERCOSUR or ASEAN). 
The research specifically revealed that the integration plans in developing countries 
have been generally associated with the significant effects of trade diversion. The same 
issue was discussed as one of the major reasons for the breakup of most initial 
integration plans among the developing countries.  
In 1980, the European Economic Community expanded its realm when Greece, 
and later, Portugal and Spain, joined the Community. Subsequently, the issue of 
customs unions and economic blocs formed in this way maintained a significant 
importance and expansion in the economic literature.  Gradually, the number of 
economic integration plans among developing countries also increased.  In the 1990s, 
two developed countries (Canada and the USA) formed the North American Free Trade 
Area (NAFTA) with Mexico as a developing country. Following the membership of 
Austria, Sweden, Norway and Finland, the European Economic Community expanded 
further. Currently, the Eastern European Countries are gradually joining the European 
Community and MERCOSUR and ASEAN were reinforced and a large number of 
additional integration plans were also established in Latin America and Africa. Most of 
the experimental or theoretical literature so created, deal with its effects on the 
economic development of these countries; the most recent ones include Soesastro and 
Hew (2011) in respect of ASEAN countries.  
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In 1965, Cooper and Massel presented the first official theory on economic 
integration of developing countries. As argued by Robson (1987), the subsequent 
literature about developing countries was mostly based on this foundation concerning 
how the savings resulting from scale or difference of private and social costs of 
production can be used as a basic reasoning in favor of the formation of customs unions 
among developing countries. However, Cooper and Massel's theory only discussed the 
transfer of industries from northern countries to southern countries and how they can be 
protected within an economic integration plan; particularly, it stressed that it is cheaper 
to pay subsidies (production or exports) to industries of developing countries than 
support them through tariffs or non-tariff barriers.  
Cooper-Massel's reasoning (1965b) was presented when the developing 
countries had not yet been industrialized, or were in the primary stages of being 
industrialized and there was no trading of industrial goods between them. In the 1980s, 
some developing countries, including newly industrialized countries in East Asia, 
embarked on trading their industrial goods. Therefore, according to the new theories of 
international trade, especially the trading of similar industrial goods or intra industry 
trade, the establishment of integration plans among developing countries was likely to 
lead to high trade creation and low trade diversion, and, in general, it might increase the 
efficiency of allocation in these countries. This reasoning was posted by Ahmad (1991).  
Bhagwati and Panagarya (1998) argued that the establishment of integration 
plans is an introduction for multilateral trade liberalization in the world, and that it will 
finally change the whole world into one Free Trade Area. These theoretical 
developments once again increased the importance of economic integration for 
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countries, particularly for developing countries. Specifically, Mrazova (2009) indicated 
that trade deviation would be decreased, in the case where competition among 
oligopolistic corporations experience a lower degree; this can also lead to higher Kemp-
Wan external tariffs. Therefore, it is more convenient to fulfill the Kemp-Wan 
requirement by reducing the degree of competition in market. 
The customs union theory was used in order to discuss the nature and 
consequences of the formation of a customs union or a common market, especially the 
European Economic Community (EC), which was established in the 1950s. Based on 
the said theory, we are not able to theoretically issue a definite judgment about the 
effects of customs union formation. Only the experimental measurement or 
experimental tests will clarify its effects. Thus, researchers or policymakers are not able 
to judge in advance whether the customs union should be formed, and predict the 
related effects. This question has to be answered experimentally. 
As a result, when the issue of economic integration between developing countries 
and its feasibility are to be considered as the subject of research, the researcher must 
directly involve himself in experimental modeling. Because of the countries’ resistance 
towards unilateral trade liberalization, the researcher has to show whether a specific 
economic integration plans has led (or will lead) to the effect of trade diversion. The 
answer is basically experimental. Regarding the economic integration of developing 
countries, several models and theories have been developed (we will discuss them in the 
review of literature), and plenty of empirical articles relating to the economic 
integration plans between both developed and developing counties have been published, 
they have been discussed the allocated static effects, and, as we will see later, there have 
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been doubts about the methodology and the findings in most of them. This is because 
the gravity models that have been applied have been criticized from many aspects, and 
the use of partial equilibrium models for the calculation of the effects of trade creation 
and trade diversion, or the use of computable general equilibrium models, do not place 
the policymakers in a reliable situation, because the simulation of these effects is simply 
inadequate to determine whether or not a customs union should be formed.  
In the experimental approach, several methods have been used to research the 
quantitative effects. First of all, we have to mention the partial equilibrium methods, 
through two methods for measuring these effects after the establishment of the 
integration plan or ex-post. These methods include income elasticity methods attributed 
to Balassa (1989), and the share of imports in apparent consumption. In these two 
methods, the effects are measured after the integration plan has been developed.  
In the partial equilibrium method (Ex-ante), or before formation, the effects of 
trade diversion and trade creation are measured by employing a simple simulation 
method based on the own-price elasticities and the elasticities of substitution of different 
goods in the market of member states (Plummber, 1991a).  
The general equilibrium models are also repeatedly used for researching the 
quantitative effects of integration plans, in which a mathematical model from the 
relevant economy is solved in numerical form based on the theory of Walrasian General 
Equilibrium and the effects on welfare and production are measured.  
Another frequently used method is the gravity models, in which the trade 
counter, or the mutual trade streams of the countries area function of the activity 
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alternatives of the two countries, i.e. income or GDP, population, distance, and Dummy 
variables like religious, language and cultural similarities, and the Dummy alternative 
related to the existence of an integration plan between two pairs of countries.  
From an econometric point of view, the application of these models is associated 
with great success, and we can use them to estimate the countertrade potentialities, or 
counter-export potential power of two pairs of countries towards each other. The first 
users of these models were Tinbergen (1962) and later Linneman (1966), and, since 
then, these models have been built for a large number of countries and regions.  
To sum up, in this study, according to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, with two 
countries (Helpman and Krugman, 1987) a primary substantiation of the gravity model 
is presented. In the next step, through an economic model extracted from national 
accounting framework, a more generalized gravity model is presented. The mutual 
exports of the two countries have been extracted as a function of their GDP, and, more 
important, their protectionism against each other and against the rest of the world. 
The form of the gravity model extracted from this theoretical substantiation is 
different from its previous forms in that it directly incorporates the Linder effect. After 
studying the Linder effect, we will develop the model and relate it to the levels of 
imports (and exports) instead of the levels of national income. With this work, the 
theoretical contribution of the present dissertation to the literature on economic 
integration becomes evident. 
The method used in this dissertation is, to some extent, different. This dissertation is 
going to determine how it can incorporate the economic integration with multilateral 
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liberalization of trade, and make a judgment about it, and then test it experimentally. To 
this end, a generalization of the gravity model is presented. Therefore, the theoretical 
aspect is developed first, and then the experimental test is performed. In this work, we 
have followed the conventional tradition in orthodox economics, i.e. “mathematical 
modeling based on main economic relations, extraction of logical derivatives from the 
mathematical model, and then experimental testing of these derivatives”. 
In this study, it is important to link the relation of the counter exports of the 
developing 8 countries to each other, and present it in a theoretical model.  This is to 
show the effects of protectionism of the member states on each other, and of the 
member states against the rest of the world, as well as the trade with third party 
countries, following which we judge the economic integration and trade liberalization. 
The mathematical generalization of the gravity model enables us to do this and its 
experimental testing will make it possible to verify or reject it. In other words, in the 
generalization of the gravity model and in planning the theoretical foundation for it, and 
for economic integration of the developing countries, the relation of the mutual imports 
of two member states, and the relation of exports of third countries to the said two 
countries, is directly obtained from generalization of the gravity model. The last point, 
along with the mathematical generalization, refers to this important reality that it is 
possible to liberalize trade with the rest of the world (in addition to the formation of an 
economic integration plan) and increase the exports of each member state through other 
means of protection (for example paying subsidies) rather than tariffs. This concept is 
shown throughout this study by the term "Customs Union for Exports". 
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Accordingly, we review a selection of some of the most important indicators. 
This is used to provide insights into the effect of regional trading arrangements among 
member states, and also to describe and assess the state of trade flows and trade patterns 
of D-8 members. These flows and patterns are monitored over time or across regions. 
Regarding other questions, the understanding is straightforward and simple, and 
we will discuss them in the relevant chapter, Chapter IV.  
1.7 Economic Integration and Welfare 
The issue of welfare costs becomes clearer when we analyze the partial 
equilibrium or general equilibrium of protection against imports, and then the reduced 
support as a result of regional economic integration. From a microeconomic point of 
view, these costs are the degree of desirability lost due to higher prices resulting from 
protectionism, and the volume of resources that are inefficiently allocated to the 
production of protected goods (tariff and non-tariff) because of higher prices. The first 
is called social waste and the second is called waste of resources. These are the effects 
of setting the tariffs.   
At this level, a fundamental question exists: "Does regional economic 
integration increase the efficiency of allocated resources in member states through the 
formation of a customs union? In other words, does it increase the welfare in member 
states?"  
If the answer to this question is absolutely "yes", then the level of welfare and 
efficiency of allocation will increase throughout the whole world. As a result, the 
regional and global liberalization are located in one line. In this case, the rational 
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consequence of any type of liberalization consists of a greater combination of the 
markets at the international level: the market is globalized. However, the answer is not 
always and absolutely "yes".  
In order for an agreement to improve welfare for sure, there must be a few 
conditions. According to Kemp and Wan (1976), when the adaptation of external tariffs 
is performed in a way that establishing a Customs union is not influential on trade with 
nonmembers, the contribution of the union to enhancing welfare would be guaranteed. 
In other words, by keeping the external trade at a constant level through the adaptation 
of appropriate tariffs, the trade between members is considered as trade creation 
(Freund and Ornelas, 2010). In this way, the nonmembers will not be affected by the 
union. As a general result, the union lump-sum transfers in an appropriate way can even 
make members better-off; moreover, this is extendable to imperfect competition 
(Mrazova, 2009), to free trade areas (Panagariya and Krishna, 2002), and to partial 
liberalization contexts (Neary, 1998). 
Following the regional liberalization, the imports by one member state, for 
example, from another member state, will increase and the imported goods will 
substitute the production of inefficient domestic goods of the first country. In this case, 
the efficiency of allocation (welfare) will increase in the first country. However, it is 
possible that the goods of the second country are still more expensive than the goods of 
the countries that have not joined the integration plan, and that they produce more 
efficient goods (with less costs or at lower prices); and, that they are subjected to tariffs 
that make the prices in the market of the first country higher than the prices in these 
countries. In these circumstances, the more expensive goods of the member country will 
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substitute the internationally cheaper goods in the market of the first country, and this 
substitution will reduce the level of welfare in the first country. This second negative 
effect may completely neutralize or even exceed the first positive effect (increased 
imports from the member state). The first positive effect is called "Trade Creation" and 
the second negative effect is called "Trade Diversion". In this case, the efficiency of 
allocation (welfare) in the first country (and as a result in the world) is entirely reduced. 
Therefore, the theory cannot give an effective answer to the question: "the welfare may 
decrease or increase." Hence, it is the subject of experimental research to specify which 
case is more likely to happen.   
Following the above analysis, the next research question is immediately set 
forth: "if it is not clear whether the level of welfare in the countries, and in the whole 
world, increases or decreases, why do the countries insist on following regional 
integration plans?" Various research answers may be given to this question, but from an 
economic theory point of view, the more justifiable answer is that since the countries do 
not have or are not willing to have stimulus (for various reasons) to unilaterally embark 
on trade liberalization, the regional liberalization would be the next solution that 
contributes to the pursuit of more liberal trade policies in the world. As a result, the 
regional integration is finally connected to the economic integration of the whole world 
(Bhagwati and Panagarya, 1996).  
In summary, a regional economic integration will progress economic and social 
welfare if: (a) a great deal of specialization is produced by members of a bloc; (b) a 
remarkable reduction is observed in tariffs and non-tariff barriers; (c) the development 
of trade agreements lead to a reduction in tariffs and non-tariff barriers with third 
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parties; (d) trade agreements provide the chance for any other country that is interested 
to participate, in order to increase the scope of net welfare; (e) trade agreements provide 
an opportunity with member states to begin and increase their liberalization actions; and 
(f) trade agreements not only play a restrictive role regarding the application of biased 
trade policies but also neutralize the protectionist effects of archaic rules that downgrade 
trade competition(Hassan et al., 2003). 
We can now make the first conclusion of this part of the report: according to the 
conventional economic theory, the increase of allocation efficiency is used as a basis for 
economic development. In other words, the more efficient resources are allocated and 
the less social costs are incurred for industrialization, the higher will be the economic 
growth and the more leveled will be the economic development route. This point is the 
general axis of the predominant viewpoint about economic development that has been 
strengthened with the achievements of newly industrialized states. Thus, the 
conventional economic theory sets forth the following viewpoints about the effects of 
economic integration:  
1- The integration plan member countries are unified to form bigger markets, and, 
each state, without losing their industrial production, will allow other countries 
to become industrialized (Johnson, 1965).  
2- The increased efficiency of allocation constitutes the principal part of economic 
development long-term strategy (Fontaine, 1992). In such circumstances, the 
monetary and financial policies, or macro policies of all the countries are set as 
to prevent the relative prices to fall into disarray. We have already stated that the 
member states must pursue coordinated policies of macroeconomics so that the 
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interest rate and inflation rate converge towards one single rate, or a specified 
range of such rates.  
3- Considering that the role of conventional economic theory emphasizes that the 
role of the settlement of trade disputes resulted from importation substitution 
policies in the advancement of economic development (that was begun with 
such pioneers as Viner (1953), and Bauer and Yamey (1957)) and emphasizes 
the advantage of the free market system that provides the efficient development 
of resources and economic growth, and escaping from the deficiencies of 
government domination on economy (Hunt, 1989), the economic integration 
provides an environment for the development of exports and the reduction of the 
government anti-market interference. 
4- The customs union will enable the industries to maintain savings resulting from 
scale (including the level of enterprise or level of industry). Thus, concurrent 
with dynamic effects of economic integration, to move on a long-term average 
cost curve will contribute to developing countries industries being more 
competitive. 
5- If a customs union is formed that does not deviate the trade, the countries have 
reached their goal as an increase of the allocation efficiency; and if we can 
ensure that the trade liberalization plan along with formation of customs office 
contribute to the increase of countries exports (especially in developing 
countries), the efficiency of allocation will certainly increase in the whole world; 
thereby, export-dependent growth will be a tool for achieving economic 
development (theory of the developed in this dissertation). 
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6- Finally, if the developing countries are able to maintain equilibrium in the 
balance of their payments during regional and multilateral trade liberalization, or 
if they are able to pass the primary imbalances, and increase employment, they 
will achieve a balanced and stable growth.  
In other words, economic theory and economic experimental research seek to 
answer whether the efficiency of allocation after the formation of an economic 
integration plan will increase or decrease. This has been the subject of broad economic 
surveys since the publication of Viner's book (1950). Baldwin and Wyplosz (2006), 
Lombaerde (2006), El-Agraa (1999), Jovanovic (2005, 2006), and Robson (2006) 
provide overviews of economic integration theory. 
The savings resulting from scale are the basis of one of the arguments that believes 
the formation of customs union among developing countries is useful; the economic 
model has been presented on this basis. 
The fifth viewpoint is the main subject of this dissertation, which will be 
discussed by presenting an infrastructural economic theory model and generalizations 
from the gravity model (in the form of mathematical substantiation) and will be tested 
experimentally, based on this model. 
There has been a radical increase in the number of PTAs across countries since 
the 1990s, with the South-South PTAs
1
 accounting for the majority of them. A similar 
trend took place with regard to the share of developing countries in the world trade of 
manufactured goods. Between 1978 and 2005 the share of the South in world 
                                                 
1
 Trading bloc formation among developing countries 
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manufactured exports increased from 5 percent to 32 percent, while that of South-South 
manufactured exports reached 16 percent from 2percent. During this period the annual 
growth rate of real South-South manufactured exports was significantly higher than the 
world average, reaching 14percent as opposed to 6percent for the latter. Furthermore, as 
of 2005, 51percent of developing country manufactures exports were exported to other 
developing countries (Demir and Dahi, 2011a). 
Nevertheless, despite the significant increase in South-South trade integration 
and their share in world trade, academic research on the determinants and desirability of 
PTAs remains divided (Bhagwati, 1998; Panagariya, 2000; Baier and Bergstrand, 2004). 
The trade literature has long argued that PTAs can benefit member states through 
economies of scale and comparative advantage, as well as higher competition (Schiff, 
2003). However, these arguments are generally reserved for North-North and South-
North but not South-South PTAs. First, it is argued that similar production and trade 
structures in the South make it more difficult to benefit from economies of scale. 
Second, given the lower industrial development and research and development activities 
in the South, greater technology diffusion for the Southern countries can be reaped from 
South-North integration (Schiff and Wang, 2008). Third, the more advanced members 
are argued to be the likely winners in the South-South integration, thanks to their higher 
industrial and institutional development. As a result, lower income Southern countries 
might be better-off, entering South-North PTAs. It is also claimed that industries with 
long term development potential are more likely to move to the bigger and richer 
members, leading to divergence once the barriers are lowered (or removed) under 
South-South PTAs (Puga and Venables, 1997; Venables, 2003; Schiff, 2003).  
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In contrast, the classical trade and development literature has a more positive 
view of South-South PTAs, focusing on their developmental benefits through infant 
industry development, economies of scale, and decoupling rather than on the static 
welfare gains (from trade creation and diversion), or the “stumbling block/building 
block” dichotomy (Myrdal, 1956; Lipsey, 1960; Linder et al., 1967; Lewis, 1980).As 
reported by Myrdal (1956), the South regional integration is contributive to developing 
countries during industrialization to settle their concern regarding local market size 
limitations. Accordingly, given the strongly skill biased structure of output expansion in 
international trade (Antweiler and Trefler, 2002), market size increase will contribute to 
developing countries to both enjoy scale effects and to improve the skill content of their 
exports while reducing the cost of intermediaries, which can help stimulate increasing 
export penetration into Northern markets in industrial goods (Fugazza and Robert-
Nicoud, 2006). Likewise, Lewis (1980), and, more recently, UNCTAD (2005), World 
Bank (2008) and (Demir and Dahi, 2012) also pointed out that South-South trade would 
decrease the dependence of the South on North in terms of growth, leading perhaps to 
decoupling from Northern business cycles. Furthermore, because of the higher 
technology and capital intensives, the structure of South-South trade is believed to be 
beneficial in the long term for developing countries (Amsden, 1987; Lall and Ghosh, 
1989; Demir and Dahi, 2011). Moreover, a better technology transfer may result from 
similar patterns of production and resource bases (Amsden, 1980, 1987; UNIDO, 2005; 
World Bank, 2006). 
In addition to the debate above, the effects of PTAs on the structure of trade are 
of particular importance for long term development and growth. Development 
economics and the new trade theory provide strong evidence that not all trade is equal 
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and what you export matters for long term economic performance (An and Iyigun, 
2004; Hausmann et al., 2007).According to Hausmann et al. (2007), the possibility of 
achieving great innovations and human capital accumulation and to find new ways of 
development is higher from export in more technology intensive industries, compared to 
lower technology and labor intensive ones. 
Turning to the empirical work on PTAs, the majority of research reports a 
significantly positive effect of PTAs on member trade. Cipollina and Salvatici (2010) 
reviewed 85 papers including 1,827 point estimates on the effects of PTAs and find that 
the mean effect is 0.59 (or an 80percent increase in trade) while the median is 0.38 (or a 
46percent increase in trade). While the range of coefficient estimates is quite large (-
9.01 - 15.41), only 312 estimates out of 1,827 reported negative effects. Nevertheless, 
despite the diversity of research, there are only a few studies that compare the 
heterogeneous effects of PTAs between developing countries. Among the few, 
Kowalski and Shepherd (2006) argued that South-South trade barrier reduction 
generates a significant increase in South-South exports, while no such effect is present 
in the case of North-South, South-North, or North-North trade. At the regional level, 
Soloaga and Winters (2001) reported the heterogeneous effects of nine PTAs on intra-
bloc trade during 1980-1996. All Latin American PTAs are found to have positive and 
significant effects on members’ trade. 
In this dissertation, the gravity model has been used to test the hypotheses and 
understand the formation of an economic integration plan including D-8 countries. To 
make it more explicit, the current dissertation considers the following questions: what 
influence could the formation of an economic integration plan with the participation of 
 57 
 
Iran and other D-8 countries have on their economies? And, what would be the extent of 
the effects of trade creation and trade diversion?  
Following what we already discussed, we will set forth the issue in another way: 
Iran and other states located in the west and east of Asia have achieved appropriate 
industrial foundations, but the degree of this achievement is different. For example, the 
level of industrialization in Iran is not comparable with Egypt, and the level of 
industrialization in Asian eastern countries is also different from the above-said 
countries. However, the level allows these countries to enter into Intra-Industry Trade, 
which reduces the scope of the trade diversion effect.  
Therefore, the present study endeavors to both build an experimental model for 
the D-8 member’s economy, that has not been yet developed, using new methods, and 
also to investigate the counter effects of economic growth and trade on each other 
within a regional framework or economic integration. In this model, the orientation of 
trade policies of these countries will be analyzed. This analysis will also specify the 
scope of the effects of trade creation and trade diversion. By the word "new", we mean 
application of newer gravity models in a specified way; which is discussed following 
the previous criticism from traditional gravity models. Another role of this dissertation 
is to present generalizations or substantiations from the gravity model and build the 
related theoretical foundation, following which several new alternatives will be added to 
the gravity model; moreover, new theories will be proposed and examined in addition to 
what had been considered in the dissertation at the beginning of the work.  
Simply, we can discuss the issue in this way: in addition to trade creation and 
diversion, the formation of an integration plan will rapidly boost the volume of trade 
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and imports.  We have to determine the scope of these effects; at present, this issue is 
the most important concern of the policymakers, for which no investigations have been 
carried out within the economic integration plan.  
1.8 Research Organization 
After this introductory section, to investigate the trade relations among the D-8 
countries, in chapter two, we will look over D-8 prospects and review a selection of the 
most important economic trade indicators and individual member’s motivation to join 
the integration plan. This can be used to provide insights into the effect of regional 
trading arrangements among D-8.In Chapter three, the literature on economic 
integration is reviewed and developed, first as a general discussion, and then 
particularly for developing countries. We try to focus on those aspects that are related to 
the questions set forth in the present dissertation and its hypotheses. In Chapter four, we 
will discuss the theoretical framework and the economic model. In this Chapter, the 
gravity relation is proved using two methods and the economic theory of economic 
integration and trade liberalization of exports customs union are presented. In Chapter 
five, we will specify and evaluate the gravity model and trade intensity indices in order 
to test the hypotheses presented in the dissertation. Chapter six is dedicated to reaching 
a conclusion and rendering some policymaking advice. At the end, it gives concluding 
remarks on the topic. 
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CHAPTER 2                                                                  
DEVELOPING EIGHT COUNTRIES (D-8) 
2.1 Introduction 
The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) with its 57 members is 
the second largest inter-governmental organization after the United Nations (UN). 
Countries from four continents and different locations set up the OIC. As such, the 
OIC countries as a group account for one sixth of the world area and more than one 
fifth of the total world population. A considerable number of the OIC countries are 
among developing nations, and the various economic conditions of these countries 
make the group a heterogeneous one as far as economic conditions are concerned.   
The divergent economic nature of the OIC members has a heterogeneous 
structure.  Twenty-two of the OIC members are among the world’s forty-nine least-
developed countries (SESRIC, 2010), and the development of these members is 
dependent mostly on the export of agricultural commodities. Nineteen members of the 
OIC are among countries that have a good capacity for exporting fuel, and, 
consequently, the future development of these members is mostly based on the 
production and export of oil and gas. This context has led to a deep gap among the OIC 
members, dividing them into poor and rich countries. According to the World Bank 
classification twenty-two OIC nations are categorized as low income nations, twenty-
eight nations as middle income nations, twenty nations as lower middle income, and 
eight members as upper middle income.  However, just seven nations from high 
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income nations belong to the OIC (SESRIC, 2010)
1
. Accordingly, a considerable 
amount of both income and trade of the OIC group is dependent on just a few 
members.  In 2009, around seventy percent of the OIC income as well as some 
seventy-three percent of the group export were dependent on just ten members. 
The potential economic capacity of the OIC members in terms of energy and 
mining and agriculture make the group a large strategic trade area. However, this 
potentiality has not changed to acceptable developments in terms of economics and 
humanity in many of the OIC members, and, further, in the OIC as a group.  As of 
2009, the OIC collectively stands for 22.5 percent of the world population, 7.2 percent 
of world GDP, 10.4 percent of world total merchandise exports, (see Figure 2.1) and 12 
percent of intra trade (measured in current US Dollars). However, when compared to 
the EU, which comprises only 8 percent of the world population, it commands a world 
trade share of 35 percent and an impressive intra trade of 60 percent. Furthermore, 
the OIC imports increased from an average of $364.4 billion in the 1990s to an average 
of $594.8 billion in the 2000s, which represents an increase of 63 percent. The OIC 
share in world imports followed the same trend, increasing 55 percent compared to the 
1990s 
                                                 
1
Income classification of countries is based on GNI per capita of the year 2008. High Income Countries: 
$11,906 or more; Middle Income Countries: between $976 and $11,905; Upper Middle Income 
Countries: between $3,856 and $11,905; Lower Middle Income Countries: between $976 and $3,855; 
Low Income Countries: $975 or less. 
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Figure  2-1 Share of OIC Countries in the World’s Population, Output and Exports (Percent) 
Data Source: (SESRIC, 2010) 
 
Intra-OIC trade stands at only about 12 percent of the total trade. However, in 
recent years there have been clear efforts to enhance trade among OIC member 
states. Especially relevant is the OIC Ten-Year Program of Action, adopted in 2005, 
which identified increased economic cooperation among OIC members as a key 
strategy for higher economic growth and welfare (Acar et al., 2009). So far a dozen 
member states have signed the Protocol on Preferential Tariff Scheme (PRETAS)
1
, 
which proposes a preferential trade regime among the member countries is effective 
as of January, 2009. A special grouping within OIC –the so-called D-8 (developing 8) 
group – was established in 1997 to strengthen economic relationships and to provide 
the impetus for greater economic integration within the larger OIC community. 
                                                 
1
 Namely: Bangladesh, Cameroon, Egypt, Guinea, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Senegal, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda and United Arab Emirates. 
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2.1.1 OIC Institutionalizing Cooperation with D-8 
The Developing 8 (D-8) comprises 8 developing countries with large 
Muslim populations that have formed a freer trade alliance, all of which are OIC 
members. Among its objectives are to create new opportunities and to enhance intra-
trade relations while providing better standards of living amongst its citizens. 
The hard fact is that Muslim countries do not trade with or invest in each other’s 
economies the way they do with the industrialized or other developing countries. 
Ironically, when seen from the standpoint of the ownership of global crucial 
resources, the OIC’s potential is impressive with more than 70 percent of the oil and 
nearly 50 percent of the natural gas reserves of the world. Among the D-8, six of the 
eight countries, namely, Malaysia, Indonesia, Iran, Egypt, Nigeria and Turkey are 
crude oil producers. According to the data for the Association of Petroleum Producers 
Countries (OPEC), in 2006, they contributed about 12 per cent of total world crude oil 
production. 
The D-8 group comprises eight major countries within OIC –Bangladesh, Egypt, 
Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey. The D-8 member countries 
have signed a Preferential Trade Agreement on 14 May 2006 at the fifth D-8 Summit 
at Bali, Indonesia with the aim of strengthening intra-trade and their economic 
relationships for improvements in living standards as well as for world harmony and 
stability. Various sectors have been identified for cooperation and project 
development in this trade agreement. These include intra-trade, industry, 
telecommunications and information, finance, banking and privatization, rural 
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development, science and technology, poverty alleviation and human resources 
development, agriculture, energy, environment and health (D-8 Secretariat, 1997). 
Of the many objectives, the aims of the D-8 countries are to make a full use of 
their member’s potentials. The D-8 countries are countries with rich natural resources, 
populated, with a distinctive, abundant and beautiful landscape attracting tourism, and 
have economic potential with historical and similar religious values. There is a vast 
potential for development due to a large land mass, plentiful inexpensive and skilled 
workers, human capital and a market consisting of a billion people. Increased 
cooperation of intra trade between members is one of the objectives of D-8 countries.  
As such, intra-trade between the D-8 countries have increased significantly from 
US$14.5 million to US$78 billion from the year 1997 to 2008, accounting for more than 
a 200% increase.
1
Basic data in respect of the D-8 countries gathered from the D-8 
Secretariat are shown in Table 2-1. 
Table  2-1 Some Basic Information about "D-8" Member Countries (D-8 Secretariat) 
D-8  
Countries 
Region Income level 
Regional Trade 
Agreements 
 
The Date of 
Membership 
In OIC 
 
The Date of 
Membership 
In GATT 
 
The Date of 
Membership 
In WTO 
Bangladesh South Asia Low income SAARC 1974 1972 1955 
Egypt 
Middle East 
& North 
Africa 
Lower 
middle 
income 
AEC-AMU 1969 1990 1955 
Indonesia 
East Asia & 
Pacific 
Lower 
middle 
income 
ASEAN-EAEC 1969 1950 1955 
Iran Middle East  
Upper middle 
income 
ECO 1969 - Observer 
Malaysia 
East Asia & 
Pacific 
Upper middle 
income 
ASEAN-EAEC 1969 1957 1955 
Nigeria 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
Lower 
middle 
income 
AEC-ECOWAS 1986 1960 1955 
Pakistan South Asia 
Lower 
middle 
income 
ECO-SAARC 1969 1948 1955 
Turkey 
Europe & 
Central 
Asia 
Upper middle 
income 
ECO-BSEC 1969 1951 1955 
                                                 
1
Data Source: (SESRIC, 2010) 
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In order to facilitate joint cooperation and bilateral exchanges between the two 
organizations, the Secretary General of OIC, and the Secretary General of D-8 signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) during the 26th Session of COMCEC in 
Istanbul, Republic of Turkey, on 7 October 2010. 
The two organizations share common economic objectives and are desirous of 
collaborating in such areas as agriculture and food security, trade, energy and micro-
finance. It is envisaged that collaboration between the two organizations would 
promote synergies and optimization of resources, while avoiding duplication and over-
lapping. In this context, the MoU seeks to encourage the development of joint 
programs and projects in all sectors through utilization of the human and material 
resources of both organizations. They are also poised to exchange experience and 
expertise to ensure the speedy implementation of their various economic development 
programs. 
The OIC General Secretariat has communicated to the D-8 ideas on some 
priority areas that require the attention of both sides, including development of 
strategic agricultural commodities, such as cotton, wheat, and maize, in the form of 
joint studies and partnership funding; infrastructure development and appropriate 
technology transfer; joint staging of trade fairs/ B2B forums; trade and tariff 
preferential; trade financing schemes/aid for trade programs;  capacity building on 
multilateral trade negotiation; export credit and insurance; joint organization of tourism 
investment forum; joint implementation of cross boarder projects on rehabilitation and 
conservation of parks, museums, monuments, historical sites, etc. 
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Figure  2-2 Top 10 OIC Countries in terms of Gross Domestic Product, 2009* 
 
Data Source: (SESRIC, 2010) 
* The numbers in brackets represent the percentage share of the country in total GDP of the OIC.  
Observations reveal that the total output (GDP) of the OIC members is 
dependent on a few members. The top 10 OIC producing countries (Figure 2.2) 
produced 70.9 percent of the total OIC output in 2009, though they accounted for 56.9 
percent of the total OIC population. The list of the top ten OIC countries in terms of 
gross domestic product 2009 includes seven D-8countrymembers take account of 
Bangladesh which produced more than 55 percent of the total OIC output. Taking this 
into account, it seems that the overall performance of the OIC countries as a group is 
highly influenced by the developments of these countries, which are either oil 
exporting or middle/high income countries (Figure2.2).  
On the other hand, it is observed that the D-8 countries, as a group, were able to 
maintain higher growth rates in average real GDP per capita than their average 
population growth rates in the period 2005-2008. To some extent, this can be considered 
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as a sign of improvement in the standard of living in the D-8 community. Averaging at 
3.2 percent in this period, the growth in real GDP per capita of the D-8 countries was 
recorded at 4.1 percent in 2005, yet it slowed down to 2.5 percent in 2008 and stayed 
constant in 2009 (Figure 2.3). Although the D-8 countries, as a group, maintained a 
good pace with the world average and even performed better than the developed 
countries in the period under consideration, their performance, in terms of growth in 
real GDP per capita, remained poorer than that of the developing countries as a whole. 
Projections for 2010 signal for an average of 3.4 percent increase in real GDP per capita 
for D-8. 
 
Figure  2-3 Real GDP Per Capita, Annual Growth Rate (Percent) 
Data Source: SESRIC, BASEIND Database; IMF, WEO Database, 2011. 
 
The list of the top ten growing OIC countries in 2009 includes Nigeria and 
Bangladesh, both with growth rates ranging between 5 and 10 percent. Together with 
Egypt these threeD-8 countries were among the top 25 fastest growing economies in 
the world in 2009.
1
 
                                                 
1
 Calculations are based on data from IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database of April 2010. 
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Against this background, the rest of this chapter examines in detail the trends in 
the major economic indicators of the D-8 countries as a group during the latest six-year 
period for which the relevant data are available and compares them to their 
counterparts in both the developing and developed countries as well as the world 
economy as a whole. 
2.2 Motivation of Individual D-8 Member States 
Three distinct reasons motivate the formation of integration. Firstly, integration 
is contributive to small countries to remove barriers resulting from domestic small 
markets. Secondly, integration helps small countries to take advantage of increased 
domestic and foreign investment, scale economies, and stronger competition. Thirdly, 
through integrating labor markets and removing the constraints of enterprises 
investment, economic integration is helpful to avoid poor growth. The amount of 
institutionalization and formalization is a decisive factor based on which economic 
regional integration generates single market economies; the single market economies 
enjoy a series of features including a harmonized application of standards and norms or 
aligned rules for foreign investors and common procedures of jurisprudence and 
administration. Investment stimulation can be resulted from the creation of these solid 
and effective frameworks (GTZ, 2008). 
As nations start a negotiation as an interconnected group, strategic gains play a 
significant role in trade agreements of a multilateral nature. A lot of states do not have 
enough capacity, which causes international negotiations and appropriate time for the 
states to cooperate and strengthen their bargaining capabilities and visibility.  
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Regional public items that are not adequately known individually find a place to 
be introduced and tackled as a result of integration. The adoption of a regional approach 
that is well integrated and addresses regional public goods provision, can lead to gains 
in both development and the environment. Moreover, conflict among regional states 
will be reduced as economic integration among neighbor countries can bring about 
bilateral interests resulting from the economic ties.  Accordingly, economic integration 
in a region can provide further support for current peace building attempts and the 
management of regional goods. The compensation for the weak development of 
multilateral trade regimes can also be provided by an increase in the economic 
cooperation among regional countries (GTZ, 2008). 
Another advantage of regional integration is growth spillovers coming from 
across borders. When member states’ bazaars are reachable more conveniently, the long 
term growth development of states will be interrelated.  Domestic growth will be 
strengthened as a result of member states growth, and, consequently, will benefit other 
members. Since 1970 to 2000, the spillover of growth was reported to be 13.6% to 
15.3% for membership in a common regional trade agreement (RTA) among neighbors; 
so, “every percentage point increase in the average growth rate of RTA partners brought 
a growth bonus of 0.14% to supplement domestic growth” (GTZ 2008). Associated with 
this is a spatial multiplier of 1.14 to 1.18, with regional integration increasing the 
effectiveness of growth-promoting domestic policies by 14 to 18%. Europe and East 
Asia with the strongest regional integration have even witnessed larger benefits within 
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the previous few decades. The countries in these areas have enjoyed a growth spillover 
of 15.3% to 17%
1
 since 1970 to 2000. 
2.2.1 Turkey 
Turkey's economic development has great significance given its size, its 
strategic role in the region and as the largest economy in, and leading member of, the 
Organization of Islamic Countries. Turkey has been introduced as one of the ten most 
progressive economies by the Department of Commerce (DOC) in the United States; it 
has also been identified by the World Bank as one of the ten states that will most 
possibly move into the top tier of the world economy (Council, 2008).Turkey's 
development is also significant as it is the only D-8 member country represented in the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and a candidate 
for European Union membership. In 2008, Turkey ranked as the 17th largest economy 
in the world with a nominal GDP of US$734.9 billion. The World Bank classifies 
Turkey, with a GDP per capita of US$9,942 (in current US$) in 2008, as a high 
middle-income country. 
Recently, Turkey developed a private sector with a rapid growth; Turkey is 
known as a pioneer producer across the world in terms of textiles, construction 
materials, automotive and transportation equipment, agricultural products, consumer 
electronics, apparel, and home appliances. As for agriculture some 9% GDP is reported 
for Turkey, for industry 26%, and for services 65% GDP is reported for Turkey. 
                                                 
1
World Development Report 2009 "Reshaping Economic Geography” 
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Turkey made remarkable progress in economic management between 2002 and 2007, 
greatly improving macroeconomic stability, and facilitating strong economic growth. 
Trade volume is one of the most important factors enabling global economic 
integration. Turkey has one of the largest international trade volumes among the D-8 
Member countries. Exports and imports of Turkey reached US$132 billion and 
US$202 billion, respectively, in 2008. Turkey’s exports, which fell by around 23% in 
2009, and confidence are recovering, but there also are concerns about inflation. 
Exports grew by 6.4% in the fourth quarter of 2009 but so did imports, which rose by 
10.5% in the same period and 28.3% in February of 2010. As a result, the current 
account deficit was 33.8% higher in February 2010 compared to a year earlier. The 
recovery is becoming broader based with consumer and investor confidence 
improving, unemployment stabilizing (at 14.5% in February 2010 compared with 
16.1% in mid-2009), foreign inflows recovering, and industrial output rising (Aral, 
2005). 
Both D-8 Group and Turkey will benefit from this reverse linkage, through 
interventions proposed within the reverse linkage framework. The benefits to Turkey 
include: (a) business opportunities for Turkish firms, (ii) enhanced image of Turkey in 
D-8 and OIC member countries, (iii) new export markets for Turkish goods and 
services (Aral, 2005). Turkey enhanced opportunities for investment and trade in the 
Southeast Asian countries, potential opportunities for Turkish contractors and 
consultancy companies in D-8 Member Countries. 
Erbakan believes that the establishment of the D-8 could revitalize the ties 
between the Islamic world and Turkey.  To Erbakan, the unity of Muslims across the 
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world is one of the primary goals that the D-8 is committed to achieve. The impetus 
behind this goal, as believed by Erbakan, was for Turkey to consider itself as the leader 
of a reunion among Muslim countries.  However, Turkey did not deal with the goal 
adequately and in time it disappointed the international system. One of the encouraging 
impetuses for Turkey to introduce its products in the new markets was Erbakan’s desire, 
which was of great significance.  
2.2.2 Iran 
Since the Islamic revolution, Iran has suffered from the strangulatory policies 
imposed by the United States that target the country’s economy and politics (Aral, 
2005). The external strangulation led Iran to investigate all the opportunities through 
which the country could find new markets for its products and develop its technology.  
Iran’s economy is critically dependent on oil. Therefore, the government is 
doing its best to find other sectors to improve its investment revenue. Among the sectors 
in which the government is investing are the automobile industry, nuclear power, 
aerospace, petrochemicals, and consumer electronics. Moreover, Iran has great potential 
in the development of information and technology, mining, and tourism. In Iran 
farming, small workshops and services have set up private businesses (Ehteshami, 
2002).  
Although at the moment Iran is the 18
th
 largest economy worldwide 
by purchasing power parity (PPP), by 2015 the country is expected to move to twelfth 
place (Ahmadi and Mohebb, 2012).  The nature of the economy in Iran is transitional, 
consisting of a large public sector with around half of the economy being centrally 
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planned. The economy also enjoys a diversionary nature, which enriches Tehran Stock 
Exchange by more than forty industries. While Iran suffered from international 
sanctions imposed because of its nuclear program, the country was among the few 
prominent countries with a positive growth even in the 2008 global financial crisis and 
its subsequent consequences.   
Abbas Maleki, the then deputy foreign minister (1977), reported that Iran aims at 
expanding its friendly relations with neighbor countries in the Persian Gulf, Caucasus, 
Afghanistan and Central Asia. The other policy that Iran is following is developing 
relations with Muslim nations in Russia and South-East Asia. The third policy which 
Iran was interested in consisted of the developing countries. Since Muslim countries set 
up D-8, and the group’s priorities supported Third World demands aiming at a fairer 
distribution of resources worldwide, D-8 priorities were very much in keeping with 
Iran’s plans and priorities.  
In 1997 when the D-8 was proclaimed to the world, Iran was the subject of 
USA’s “dual containment” policy alongside Iraq, an initiative launched in 1993. From 
the United States’ perspective, Iran was a threatening country not only to the region but 
also to the world, and, consequently, was considered as a “rogue state”. Therefore, since 
1994, companies that had investment of more than a certain level determined by the US, 
were subjected to the US sanctions. In 1997, when the imposed war against Iran was 
over, Iran was able to concentrate on economic growth, because of the stability that had 
returned to the country’s borders. In addition, Iran was also interested in finding new 
markets for its considerable resources of oil and gas. Accordingly, Iran’s different 
interests were enriched by D-8: first, D-8 could be read as a sign of support that the 
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Islamic world extended to Iran against the latter’s strangulation by the US as a result of 
the economic embargo; secondly, D-8 provided a new market for Iran’s major products, 
that is, oil and gas; thirdly, Iran’s integration into the region was enhanced by its 
membership ofD-8 alongside such Middle Eastern countries as Turkey and Egypt.  
2.2.3 Egypt 
The structure of the Egyptian economy is one of the most diversified and developed 
within the sub regions of Africa and the Middle East. It comprises a large industrial 
sector with a fast evolving service sector. Although the Egyptian economy traditionally 
hinged on agriculture, due to its rapid growth and industrialization; its share was 
reduced to 13.1% of GDP in 2010. According to the African Development Bank (2010), 
more than 90% of the Egyptian workforce was employed in the agricultural sector in the 
1970s, while, presently, it can only boast 32% of the labor force. Approximately 17% 
are employed in the industrial sector, which constitutes 37% of GDP. Egyptian 
companies range from electricity, steel, oil exploration and refining, domestic goods, 
automobiles and chemicals. The IT industry has received appreciable growth. The 
largest contributor to the Egyptian economy is the service sector, contributing in excess 
of 49%. This, however, offers employment to about 50% of the population. 
Construction, canal trade, tourism and the administrative sector are the major service 
sector areas. In the Middle East and North Africa, Egypt has the most stable economy 
with a growth that has averaged 4-5% in the last quarter century. 
 As one of the strong voices and most populous Arab nations, Egypt was pleased 
to take its rightful place in the D-8, and did not hide its lack of strong feeling against 
Turkey’s influential role in the materialization of the project. However, Egypt had many 
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misgivings concerning Turkey and its motivation in the context of D-8; it was sad about 
the military cooperation between Turkey and Israel, and Turkey’s military presence in 
Northern Iraq, as well as being suspicious of the motives of Turkey (Aral, 2005). Egypt 
hoped that the D-8 could perhaps resolve the deep financial and social crisis that it 
suffered. Through D-8, Egypt has improved its ties with Iran, which were severed in 
1980, a year after the Iranian revolution. 
2.2.4 Indonesia 
Indonesia is one of the upcoming world market economies and the largest in 
South East Asia. It is also one of major economies of G-20. Indonesia has a market 
economy in which the government plays a pivotal role. In view of the consequences 
surrounding the financial and economic crisis, which started mid-1997, the government 
took control of a major portion of private sector assets, engaging in the buying of non 
performing bank loans and corporate assets through the debt returning process 
(ACICIS, 2011). The country’s economy was restricted and has passed through another 
period of rapid economic growth. Since 1988, exports have grown more than seven 
times in Indonesia attaining up to157.7 billion USD in 2010.  The recent non-oil/gas 
export drive, seems to be mainly due to the increase in the share of other main 
commodities including palm oil, coal and copper. Indonesia’s intra-trade with D-8 
members increased from 21% in 2005 to 25.4%, or 13.97 million USD in 2010, 
compared to Japan,12.4%, and China, 9%, as its major trading partners (Aral, 2005). 
The relatively low intra-trade volume with members of D-8 results in lower value in 
trade complementarities and intra industry volumes of trade. In the past five years, the 
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income and services deficit has been compensated by the surplus from goods and 
remittances.  
However, notwithstanding the trade surplus recovery, which was estimated at 22 
billion USD in 2010, the growth of Indonesia’s exports averaged at 145 from 2005 to 
2010 (World Economic Outlook, 2011). Indonesia’s major exports include textiles, 
palm oil products electrical appliances and metal products, as manufactured goods, 
while coal and copper are mined products, and coffee, cocoa, and shrimps are 
agriculture and marine products. This approach was validated because Indonesia 
represented a major 24.5% overall D-8 intra trade in 2010.  
Using the IMF directive on trade statistics and Dinar Standard Analysis, a look at 
the totality of trade exports and imports from 2005 to 2010 for Indonesia was 
undertaken. It was observed that during the said period, it attained a significantly higher 
trade growth with the D-8 country members compared to the rest of the world. Between 
2005 and2010 imports from the member countries of D-8 to Indonesia increased 
(CAGR) 21.5% compared to 15% with the rest of the world. Indonesia’s trade with the 
D-8 members had increased compared to the rest of the world. The trend in Indonesia is 
a reflection of the overall low percentage of trade between D-8 countries. According to 
the Islamic development banks’ annual report 2010, Indonesia’s overall share of trade 
with otherD-8 members was a mere 7% (Islamic Development Bank, 2011). 
The most populous of the D-8 members is Indonesia, its per capita income in 
1996 stood at roughly 1000 USD. However, it had a diversified economy as would be 
expected of a nation with a population of 200 million and sizeable territory. During the 
inauguration of D-8 in 1997, Indonesia, headed by Suharto’s quasi-autocratic rule, was 
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at the point of collapse economically. In the late 1980s, Indonesia significantly changed 
its regulatory framework to encourage economic growth driven by private investment, 
both domestic and foreign. TheD-8then offered it partial relief from isolation, which it 
had borne for some time. It hoped to reap benefits economically due to the large market 
offered by trade agreements with the D-8 (Wie, 2006). 
2.2.5 Malaysia 
Malaysia’s economy has improved greatly, from being relatively state driven to a newly 
industrialized market economy. Malaysia plays a significant but declining role in 
leading economic activity through the micro economic plans. Malaysia’s economy was 
the third largest in South East Asia in 2007 and 29
th
 largest economy in the world, 
adjudged by the purchasing power; its gross domestic product in 2008 was 22.2 billion 
USD, with a growth rate of 5% to 7% since 2007. Malaysia’s GDP per capita in 2009 
was USD 14,900.  The nominal GDP in 2009 was USD383.6 billion and nominal per 
capita GDP was USD 8,100. South East Asian nations experienced an economic boom 
and Malaysia underwent rapid development during the twentieth-century with a GDP 
per capita of 14,800 USD and is considered a newly industrialized country. 
Among the D-8 countries, Malaysia is the least populous with a population of about 27 
million. Malaysia has received promising economic growth since the 1970s. The 
Muslim population is dominant in Malaysia at nearly 60% and the Malays are the major 
ethnic group identifying with Islam. As one of the countries that control the Straits of 
Malacca, International trade plays a pivotal role in the drive to the country’s economy. 
Malaysia is the world’s largest Islamic banking and financial center. Malaysia hopes to 
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benefit from an outlet for its regular and competitive industrial exports while obtaining 
cheap raw materials and labor from the D-8. 
2.2.6 Bangladesh 
Since their independence from Pakistan in 1971, Bangladesh has faced huge 
political and economic problems. It was and still is among the world’s poorest countries 
with a per capita income of around 260 USD in 1996. The market based economy of 
Bangladesh is rapidly developing. It was estimated that the per capita income for 
Bangladesh in 2010 was USD1.700 (adjusted by parity with purchasing power). 
According to reports from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in 2010 Bangladesh 
was ranked 47
thas world’s largest economy among the N-11 Goldman Sachs and D-8 
economies with a gross domestic product of USD 269 billion. In recent years, economic 
growth recorded 6-7% p.a. More than a half of the GDP is for the service sector, a 
considerable number of the population of Bangladeshis employed in the agricultural 
sector with RMG, fish, leather, vegetables, textiles, ceramics among other major 
produce. It is important to state that Bangladesh has been taking an active role at 
meetings between the least developed economies and the United Nations. As published 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bangladesh, the initiating principles of the foreign 
policy of Bangladesh at contrary to theD-8 objectives. “Support oppressed peoples 
throughout the world” waging a just struggle against imperialism colonialism or 
racialism and the State shall endeavor to consolidate, preserve and strengthen fraternal 
relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic solidarity.” As it is the most poor of 
the D-8 members, Bangladesh hoped to obtain financial and economic assistance from 
the rich D-8 members. 
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2.2.7 Pakistan 
Pakistan is one of the foundation members of D-8 and has played a significant 
role in its socio economic development. Presently, the population of Pakistan stands at 
173.5 million and it is the sixth most populous country in the world. The main natural 
resources are arable land, hydroelectricity water and natural gas. About 28% of the land 
area in Pakistan is under cultivation. The major crops are wheat, sugarcane, cotton, rice, 
millet, vegetables and fruits. In 2000, Pakistan experienced high volatile economic 
growth caused by external and internal shocks, from the peak level of 9% in 2004/05 to 
2007/08 and 1.2% in 2009/10 to 41%. Although over the years Pakistan’s external 
image has improved, the current account balance has been pressured due to high energy 
prices and reconstruction following flooding. There has been a significant improvement 
in its current account deficit from the highest level of 8.7% of GDP in 2007/08 to 2.3% 
in 2009/10,which is expected to increase gradually to 4.4% of GDP by 2016 (IMF WEO 
April 2011) due to the improved demand for the import of basic commodities and 
construction materials. Goods exported as a percentage of GDP declined from 13.2% in 
2004/05 to 11.0% in 2007/10 while imports increased from 17.1% in 2004/05 to the 
maximum level of 24.4% in 2007/08 and later declined to 19.8% in 2009/10 leaving a 
trade deficit of6.5% of GDP in 2009/10. 
With a GDP per capita of less than 500 USD in 1996, Pakistan was among the poorest 
of D-8 member countries. D-8 however, reinforced Pakistan’s ties with the Islamic 
world which partially substituted its lack and isolation caused by financial and 
economic hardship. About 10% of Pakistan’s international trade lies within the 
developing group. However, the balance of trade is in favor of the trading partners. On 
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average, Pakistan extends to nearly 1 billion USD on import payments to the D-8 group. 
When a country faces a negative balance of trade with respect of another, engaging in a 
free trade agreement worsens the deficit. From Pakistan’s point of view, if Malaysia and 
Indonesia are not part of the calculation, Pakistan’s trade balance amounts to roughly 
3.5 billion USD for the past 5 years with D-8 members. Therefore, it would be more 
reasonable for Pakistan to negotiate with Egypt, Bangladesh, Iran and Nigeria for free 
trade agreements (Aral, 2005). However, PTAs offer more than just timely availability 
of essential commodities, deep relationship between the participating countries. 
Therefore, commerce policymakers need to consider whether strengthening trade 
relations trump balancing trade. In addition, the trade competitiveness for Pakistan and 
Turkey needs to be improved, contrary to the conventional market in Europe and the 
US. 
2.2.8 Nigeria 
Nigeria is Africa’s largest democracy with a population of well over 155 million. 
It has the second largest economy in Africa, and being an oil rich country is known as 
the “land of opportunity” due to its huge economic potential. In 1994, Nigeria made 
laws to liberalize its trade regime and to get rid of some of its barriers to foreign 
investment. From the emergence of the military regime in Nigeria onwards, it was more 
or less cut off from the international community before the emergence of D-8 in 1997. 
D-8, however, gave some recognition to the Nigerian regime out of its respect for the 
Islamic world. Nigeria was among the poorest D-8 members with a per capita income of 
around 300 USD in 1996. Therefore, it hoped to benefit from financial and economic 
backup from wealthier D-8 members (Aral, 2005). Nigeria saw the D-8 as a useful 
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enough avenue to echo concerns for poor African nations including the demand for debt 
relief. 
2.2.9 Challenges and Opportunities for Cooperation 
The goals and motivations for each member of D-8, as examined above, showed 
that they do not represent a united front with clear, well defined and unified objectives. 
Rather than the members of D-8 representing the general will of the foundation 
members, each has its own reason to be part of the scheme. It is a fact that D-8 members 
like to take more prominent roles in the Islamic world. Moreover, they would like to 
feel exuberance in terms of prospects concerning trade expansion, financial and 
economic ties for D-8 members. It is therefore thought that members would be satisfied 
when the Islamic world gets a share of the world’s resources instead of the small 
proportion the figures suggest. However, the good will did not translate into a common 
language of shared organizational principles, plan of action and the measures to achieve 
them. The goals and motivation of D-8 members make it clear that it was designed to 
constitute a major future for an Islamic common market (Aral, 2005). Erbakan 
repeatedly suggested that D-8 members were open to newcomers, and that it was not 
meant to serve as an alternative to other international organizations. However, D-8 
resembles the group of non-Allied Nations as they emphasized justice, freedom and 
peace instead of oppression and economic exploitation; such discourse was not matched 
with radical strategies designed to lay down the foundation of a new economic and 
political bloc. Neither the terms nor the mechanism envisioned by D-8 occasioned such 
an eventuality. D-8, apart from imposing economic cooperation and stimulating trade 
among member states, rested on the principles of the economies of scale that promote 
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specialization in areas that member states feel themselves to hold an advantage. D-8 
members hoped to lessen the income and technology disparity among themselves using 
the D-8 scheme and for the more advanced world economies. In the Istanbul declaration 
in 1997, a product of the inaugural D-8 summit identified the major goals and areas of 
communication by the D-8 as well as the principles on which the cooperation was based 
(D-8Secretariat, 2010). In line with these principles, the main objective of the D-8 
declaration for socio-economic development include: dialogue as against confrontation, 
justice in place of double standards, peace instead of conflicts, cooperation instead of 
exploitation, democracy in place of oppression, and equity instead of discrimination. As 
a result of the desire to improve the volume of trade insufficiency among country 
members of D-8 and improve the group’s world trade exports, recognizing the need to 
overcome trade barrier difficulties facing member states formed the basis of the summit 
meetings of 1997, 1999, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. Member countries 
reaffirmed their commitment to pursue the goals set out in previous declarations. This 
year’s summit will reinforce and polish the economic cooperation of member countries 
by sharing expertise in the field of energy, tourism, transport, infrastructural 
development, etc. Such cooperation is aimed at improving the well being of the people 
in the global economy. Moreover, it will assist in boosting participation of member 
countries in the decision making process at the international level. The coming together 
of the D-8 was necessary due to the fact that it failed to cater to the needs of the 
developing countries, for example, the Dhaka declaration showed the displeasure of 
member states with the world’s trade regime because it failed to fully consider the need 
of developing countries. The Cairo Declaration registered the call for the abrogation of 
the protectionist policy of trade for developed economies while it underlined the need 
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for stronger cooperation and increased international financial system in a democratic 
and transparent manner by ensuring the participation of developing countries. Criticism 
of such a prevailing economic and financial system as well as a call for action was not 
couched in the confrontational language that smacked of anti-Westernization. The 
choice of D-8 members’ terms and agreement declaration of inter alia, was a reminder 
to the developed economies that they should be more concerned with the plight of the 
developing world; however, restructuring of things was not sought. In an effort to 
achieve economic integration, the difficulties faced by the D-8 member countries 
include: 
A) Stronger coordination of regional investment. This, however, is important in 
reduction of production cost through the establishment of regional industries, 
integration gains, equal distribution and creation of equal economy among member 
nations.  
B) The need to compensate member countries that have suffered losses in the entry 
stage. Economic integration was meant to mediate the gap in the economic divide 
among member states. The measures of financial compensation should be put in place to 
compensate economically weaker members. As most of the D-8 is emerging economies, 
it is difficult to compensate members without external help.  The drive towards a 
gradual handover of power by member countries to take economic and social decisions 
at the regional level involves the agreement to stop all tariffs on each other’s exports 
and follow a common policy tariff for their imports from other parts of the world, as 
well as allowing a free flow of goods and services and other factors of production (Aral, 
2005). 
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2.2.10 D-8 Roadmap 2008-2018 
The D-8 PTA which was agreed at the Fifth council of the D-8 summit in Bali, 
Indonesia in 2006aimed to give special attention to tariff reduction on selected goods 
for member countries. PTS is basic for the formation of free trade agreement (FTA). 
The implementation procedure for D-8 PTA is similar to the concept for the formation 
of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). A focus on the Islamic Nation’s FTA, initially 
chaired by Malaysia at the sixth summit, discussed in detail the D-8 PTA, which mainly 
included the rules of origin (ROO) and operational certification procedure (OCP) for 
ROO. Finalizing the steps of OCP and ROO are necessary for D-8 PTA implementation 
so that tariff reduction policies for member countries are carried out on schedule. 
At the Kuala Lumpur summit of July 2008, the D-8 adopted a roadmap for economic 
cooperation for the decade (2008-2018), as the vision or guide to programs and 
activities for the next ten years. This roadmap is as follows: 
“At the end of D-8 cooperation 2008 to 2018, the dynamism of socio economic 
cooperation will achieve significant economic development by improving intra trade 
social welfare” (D-8 Secretariat, 2008). 
The scope for D-8 activities from 2008 to 2018 and the guide for the mobilization of 
resources and support for the general community of D-8, include the private sector and 
economic groups cooperation initiative. The roadmap as endorsed in Kuala Lumpur 
summit aims at encouraging greater economic integration for member states and 
assisting in the mobilization of resources from the governmental and private sectors, for 
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D-8 project implementation. After 2010 summit, the Abuja declaration was released, 
which addressed issues that help cushion the effects and challenges facing D-8 member 
countries during the world economic recession, climate change, world energy question 
and global warming as they affect agriculture and food security, transport and world 
trade concerns. D-8 potential sectors to the D-8 Priority list of Area Cooperation in five 
sector such as Trade, Agriculture and Food Security, Industrial Cooperation and SMEs, 
Transportation, Energy and Minerals (Figure 2.4). 
 
Figure  2-4 The Priority List of Areas of Cooperation 
                                     Sources: (Harun, 2010). 
An above figure as over view for the relationship between D-8 PTAs and the potential 
sector. That particular analysis sector, basically as a main stream for D-8 PTAs as well 
as D-8 Ten Years Road Maps. 
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2.3 Economic Indicators of D-8 Member Nations 
There are various static factors to examine that impinge on the ability of D-8 
countries to be an effective force in promoting mutual and beneficial trade amongst 
each other. With the criteria of theoretically favoring the formation of a customs union 
between the D-8 countries in the preceding section, therefore, consequently allowing 
examining the extent of D-8 countries satisfying this criteria. 
Table  2-2 Main Economic Indicators for Individual "D-8" Member Countries (WTO) 2010 
Country  
Population 
 
(million) 
GNI 
 per capita 
in PPP  
 (US$) 
GDP Growth 
Value added 
(% of GDP) GDP  
(US 
billion$) 
Agriculture Industry Services 
2009 2008 
1983-
1993 
1993-
2003 
2003-
2009 
1983 2003 2009 1983 2003 2009 1983 2003 2009 2009 
Bangladesh 162.2 1,450 3.8 5.1 6.2 30.7 21.8 18.6 21.9 26.3 28.6 47.4 52 52.8 89,3 
Egypt 83 5,470 4.2 4.6 5.7 19.6 16.1 11.5 30 34.6 35 50.4 49.2 53.5 188,3 
Indonesia 230 3,590 7.1 2 5.5 22.9 16.6 14 39.8 43.6 47 37.3 39.9 39 540,2 
Iran 73 11,240 2.2 3.7 4.6 18.1 11.3 10.5 34.9 41.2 44.5 47 47.6 45 331 
Malaysia 27.4 13,730 7 4.7 4.5 20 9.7 8.7 38.5 48.5 55.4 41.5 41,8 35.9 191,6 
Nigeria 154.7 1,980 4.9 2.9 6.3 33.2 26.4 32.8 29.7 49.5 40.6 37 24.2 26.6 169 
Pakistan 169.7 2,590 5.8 3.4 5.5 30.3 23.3 20.8 22.1 23.5 24.3 47.7 53.2 54.9 166,5 
Turkey 74.8 13,420 5 2.7 4.2 21.4 13.4 9 25 21.9 28 53.6 50.7 63 617,1 
Total D-8 978.8 53,470 5 3.64 5.31 - - - - - - - - - 2293 
World 6,775.2 10,414 - - - - - - - - - - - - 58,228,200 
 
Customs union theory claims that the larger the collective range of countries, 
the larger is the possibility of trade creation. Although D-8 consists of countries that 
together are smaller than the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the 
European Union (EU), it is large enough to be an efficient customs union. The World 
Bank (2009) data on the D-8 countries population and gross national income (GNI) 
comprise 15% of the world’s population with the Gross National Income (GNI) per 
capita of US$53.5 million in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms. Despite the 
absence of objective criteria to consider the optimal number of countries involved or 
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the size of total market for the countries, the D-8 still appears to overtake the 
experiment in this matter. The main economic indicators for the individual D-8 
member countries are given in Table 2-2. 
2.4 Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments 
The steady expansion in the trade of world merchandise was interrupted by the 
global financial and economic crisis, which started in mid-2008. As a result, the trade 
of merchandise witnessed a declining trend across the globe in 2009. According to the 
latest estimates, after bottoming out in 2009, the trade of world merchandise started to 
recover in 2010 and increased to $30.5 trillion compared to $25.1 trillion in 2009. In 
line with the global trend, the total trade of merchandise for D-8 member countries also 
rebounded to $711 billion in 2010. However, despite this impressive recovery, it 
remained below the pre-crisis level of $734 Billion in 2008. During the period under 
consideration, the share of D-8 in world trade increased from 4 percent in 2006 to 5 
percent in 2010. However, the share of D-8 in OIC trade remained at 45 percent in 
2010 (WTO, 2011). 
2.4.1 Exports of Merchandise 
Figure 2.5 demonstrates that the total exports of merchandise for the D-8 
countries increased significantly to reach $711 billion in 2008 before declining to $560 
billion in 2009. The share of D-8 countries in the world export market increased from 4 
percent in 2005 to 5 percent in 2010. In this 5-year period, the share of D-8 countries in 
the OIC export market averaged at 44 percent. Their share in the total exports of OIC 
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countries also peaked in 2009 at 45 percent, however, in 2010, it declined to 42 
percent. 
                      Billion USD                                                     Percent 
 
 
Figure  2-5 Export of Merchandise 
Data Source: SESRIC, BASEIND Database; IMF, WEO Database, 2011. 
Although the exports of OIC countries grew at a higher rate than those of all other 
groups of countries in 2008 (due to sharp increase in oil prices) this trend was reversed 
in 2009, which was mainly due to the decline in demand for oil caused by the economic 
crisis (Figure 2.5). In 2009, the exports of both developing 8 and other developing 
countries declined substantially, 23.3 percent and 24.5 percent, respectively; however, 
the decline in exports of OIC countries was much deeper (32.9 percent), which explains 
the decrease in their share both in the world export market and in the total exports of 
developing countries in that year. This clearly shows how heavily the exports of OIC 
countries, the majority of which consist of oil, are dependent on fluctuations in oil 
prices. However, the recovery in global economic activity in 2010 resulted in a steeper 
growth in the exports of member countries (32.2 percent). 
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(Annual % change, at current prices) 
 
Figure  2-6 Export of Merchandise 
Data Source: SESRIC, BASEIND Database; IMF, WEO Database, 2011. 
Observationally, the bulk of merchandise exports of the OIC countries are 
greatly dependent on a few countries, as in the case of the output. The top 10 exporting 
member countries, which are almost the same top 10 countries in terms of production, 
accounted for 74.5 percent of the total merchandise exports of the OIC countries in 
2010 (Figure 2.6). Malaysia, with more than $200 billion of exports took the lead and 
Indonesia, Turkey, Iran and Nigeria, each as top 10 OIC exporting countries, as well as 
Bangladesh, Egypt and Pakistan, together, accounted for over 44percent of the total 
exports of OIC countries. Over the years, the current account balance to GDP ratio has 
declined across the regions (Figure 2.7). 
 
                                    The percentage share of the country in total exports of OIC 
Figure  2-7 Top 10 OIC Exporting Countries, 2010 
Data Source: SESRIC, BASEIND Database; IMF, WEO Database, 2011. 
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2.4.2 Imports of Merchandise 
A similar pattern is observed in the case of the import performance of the D-8 
countries. Within the time span under investigation, the total imports of merchandise 
for the D-8 countries increased significantly during the first four years before declining 
to $594.3 billion in 2009. In 2010, the imports of member countries climbed back to 
$721 billion in 2010 (Figure 2.8). However, unlike the case of exports, the share of D-8 
countries in global merchandise imports continued to increase throughout the period in 
consideration and reached 7 percent in 2010. Their share in the total imports of the 
developing countries witnessed a mixed trend reaching 14 percent in 2009 before 
declining to 13 per cent in 2010. 
Overall, the exports and imports of D-8 countries as well as the other groups of 
countries declined in 2009 due to the global crisis and recovered substantially in 2010. 
The share of D-8 countries in total exports of developing countries and in the global 
exports declined in 2009, whereas their respective shares in imports continued to 
increase. This indicates that the exports of D-8 countries were more affected than their 
imports compared to other countries. It is worth noting here that the shares of the D-8 
countries in the imports of both the world and the developing countries are more than 
their respective shares in the case of the exports. 
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                                Billion USD                                        Percent 
 
 
Figure  2-8 Imports of Merchandise 
Data Source: SESRIC, BASEIND Database; IMF, WEO Database, 2011. 
During the period 2005 through 2010, the D-8 countries recorded the highest 
average growth rate of imports in 2008 (Figure 2.8). That year, the imports of D-8 
countries grew by 26 percent, which was higher than both the average for other 
developing countries (23.8 percent) and the world average (15.4 percent). In 2009, 
imports declined all over the world and also in D-8 countries as a result of the 
slowdown in economic activity. 
The imports of OIC countries fell by 19.2 percent while the decline in both 
other developing countries and developed countries was even deeper, 20.3 and 24.1 
percent, respectively. In 2010, all groups witnessed a significant improvement in 
imports. D-8 imports increased by 21.3 percent compared to 21.8 percent for the world, 
17.6 percent for developed countries and 29.9 percent for developing countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 91 
 
(Annual % change, at current prices)  
 
Figure  2-9 Imports of Merchandise 
Data Source: SESRIC, BASEIND Database; IMF, WEO Database, 2011. 
As in the case of exports, the imports of merchandise for OIC countries are also 
greatly dependent on a few countries. The top 10 OIC importing nations in 2010 are 
shown in Figure 2.9. Accordingly, Malaysia took the lead as the top OIC importer 
country, with $189 billion of imports, which corresponded to 23 percent of the total 
imports of D-8 and 12.6 percent of the total imports of OIC countries. The imports of 
Malaysia, together with Turkey, Indonesia, Iran, Egypt, Pakistan and Bangladesh 
accounted for 48 percent of the total OIC imports (Figure 2.10).  
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                                    The percentage share of the country in total import of OIC 
Figure  2-10 Top 10 OIC Importing Countries, 2010 
Data Source: SESRIC, BASEIND Database; IMF, WEO Database, 2011. 
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2.4.3 Trade Balance 
The OIC countries recorded a trade balance surplus in each year from 2005 
through 2010 (Figure 2.11). The highest trade surplus of the OIC group ($379 billion) 
was recorded in 2008 while the lowest ($53 billion) was recorded in 2009. The trade 
balance surpluses of D-8 countries –recorded at $24.3 billion in 2005– also melted 
down in 2008 and became negative. The trade balance surpluses of other developing 
countries –recorded at $170 billion in 2006– also melted down to $27 billion in 2009 
before recording a deficit of $16 billion in 2010. In contrast, the group of developed 
countries experienced trade deficits in all years of the period under consideration, 
although it declined to $454 billion in 2009. However, as exports and imports 
recovered from their depressed levels of 2009, the trade deficit for developed countries 
increased to $676 billion in 2010. 
                             Billion USD    
 
Figure  2-11 Trade balance surplus 
Data Source: SESRIC, BASEIND Database; IMF, WEO Database, 2011. 
 
During the period under consideration, the trade balance to GDP ratio declined 
across the regions. For D-8 member countries, the trade balance surplus accounted for 
only 3.6 percent of GDP in 2010 compared to 8.7 percent in 2006. On the other hand, 
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the trade deficit for other developing countries accounted for 0.1 percent of their GDP 
in 2010 compared to the trade surplus, which accounted for 1.6 percent in 2006; in 
comparison the trade deficit for developed countries accounted for only 1.6 percent of 
their GDP in 2010 compared to 2.1 percent in 2006. 
2.4.4 Current Account 
A similar trend can be observed for current account balance of the D-8 
countries (Figure 2.12). Similar to the other developing countries, D-8 countries had 
current account surpluses for all the years of the period under consideration. However, 
these surpluses decreased significantly in 2008 before registering some improvement 
in 2009. 
                            Billion USD 
 
Figure  2-12 Current account balances of the D-8 countries 
Data Source: SESRIC, BASEIND Database; IMF, WEO Database, 2011. 
 
After exceeding $349 billion in 2007, the current account surpluses of the other 
developing countries witnessed a continuous decline in the subsequent years and 
dropped to $214 billion in 2010. In contrast, the surpluses of the D-8 countries surged 
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to $93 billion in 2009 from the level of $42 billion in 2008. Over the years, the current 
account balance to GDP ratio declined across the regions. 
For D-8 member countries, the current account balance surplus accounted for 
only 3.3 percent of GDP in 2010 compared to 10.2 percent in 2006. Similarly, the 
current account surplus in other developing countries accounted for 1.3 percent of their 
GDP in 2010,comparedto3.5 percent in 2006; whereas the current account deficit in 
developed countries accounted for only 0.2 per cent of their GDP compared to 1.2 
percent in 2006 (WTO, 2011).   
2.4.5 Integration plans, Instruments and Intra-D-8 Merchandise Trade 
After witnessing an increasing trend over the past 20 years, intra- D-8 trade 
volume declined to $67 billion in 2009. However, in parallel with the improvement in 
trade all over the world, it rebounded to $101 billion in 2010. Throughout the period 
under consideration, the share of intra-D-8 trade in D-8 total trade continued to 
increase and intra-D-8 trade accounted for 7 percent of member countries total trade in 
2010, corresponding to an increase of 2 percentage points from 2009. In the period 
2006-2008, intra-D-8 exports increased from $24.3 billion to $39 billion, which was 
reflected in an increasing share in total exports of D-8 countries from 4.5 percent in 
2006 to 5.3 percent in 2008. 
In 2009, however, despite the decline in intra-D-8 exports volume to $31 billion, the 
share of intra-D-8 exports in total exports of D-8 countries slightly increased to 5.5 
percent, indicating that D-8 countries’ exports to non-D-8 countries fell more than the 
exports to D-8 countries. In 2010, although intra-D-8 exports recovered back to $48.5 
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billion, their share in D-8 total exports witnessed increased slightly to7 percentage 
points.  
                           Billion USD                                          Percent 
 
Figure  2-13 Intra-D-8 Merchandise Trade 
Data Source: SESRIC, BASEIND Database; IMF, WEO Database, 2011. 
Similarly, intra-D-8 imports increased to $47 billion in 2008 compared to $25 
billion in 2006, corresponding to an increase of the share in their total D-8 imports 
from 5 percent to 6.3 percent. In 2009, however, the decline in intra-D-8 imports to 
$35.8 billion led to a decline in this share to 6 percent. In 2010, intra-D-8 imports 
started to increase again and reached to $52.6 billion corresponding to 7.3 percent of 
D-8 total imports (Figure 2.13). 
According to the latest available statistics (2008), total trade volume among D-8 
countries was 78.3 billion USD while total trade of D-8 countries to the world was 1.3 
trillion USD. The share of intra trade in total trade of D-8 countries is 6.08% at the 
moment. In light of the objectives and goals that D-8 set forth in the Roadmap, intra-
trade will be 15-20% of total trade by 2018. With the D-8 Preferential Trade 
Agreement, Customs and Visa Agreements coming into force as well as enhanced 
cooperation among D-8 private sector, particularly in Working Group meetings, the 
share of intra-trade will increase to the levels stated in the Roadmap.  
 96 
 
Statistics show that Malaysia ranked first, Turkey second and Indonesia was in 
third place in terms of their total trade performance among D-8 countries. However, 
when we assess the intra-D-8 trade, Indonesia ranked first (16 bl. USD), Malaysia was 
second (15 bl. USD), and Turkey was in third place (14 billion USD) in 2007. 
Table 2-3 depicts the intra trade levels among the D-8 countries in 
comparison with other OIC countries (ROIC) and the Rest-of-the-World (ROW) 
aggregate. It clearly indicates that intra trade among D-8 countries has been 
dismally minute ranging mainly from 6 percent of their respective total trade. 
However, trade with ROW is overwhelmingly high at about 90 percent on average. 
Among the D-8 countries, Indonesia-Malaysia trade has been the top trading pair. 
Malaysian trade with Indonesia accounts for 1.7 percent of total trade while 
Indonesian trade with Malaysia is somewhat larger at 3.9 percent. Pakistan is the 
second biggest Malaysian trade partner followed by Turkey.  
The second top trading pair within the D-8 grouping is between Iran and Turkey. 
Iran’s trade with Turkey comprises 3.5 percent of its total trade. All other bilateral trade 
between the D-8 countries has only been ‘microscopic’; mainly less than 1 percent of each 
country’s total trade. As noted at the outset, it will be interesting to examine whether 
the removal of trade impediments, particularly tariff barriers will substantially enhance 
intra-trade among D-8 countries. 
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Table  2-3 Decomposition of Trade among D-8, ROIC and ROW (percentage) GTAP V7 
database 
Country Partner Country Tota
l Malaysi
a 
Iran 
Tur
key 
Indone
sia 
Niger
ia 
Pakist
an 
Banglade
sh 
Egy
pt 
ROI
C 
ROW 
Malaysia 
0 
0.2
5 
0.36 1.69 0.06 0.47 0.26 0.24 3.07 93.59 100 
Iran 0.45 0 3.47 0.37 0.04 0.7 0.27 0.04 7.48 87.17 100 
Turkey 0.31 
1.0
5 
0 0.25 0.14 0.16 0.07 0.51 
13.2
2 
84.3 100 
Indonesia 3.88 
0.2
5 
0.57 0 0.21 0.53 0.41 0.26 3.42 90.47 100 
Nigeria 0.06 
0.0
2 
0.05 0.35 0 0.08 0.02 0.02 1.42 97.97 100 
Pakistan 0.57 
0.7
1 
1.45 0.49 1.88 0 1.4 0.14 
11.2
8 
82.08 100 
Banglades
h 
0.23 
0.4
1 
0.72 0.21 0.04 0.47   0 0.13 2.57 95.24 100 
Egypt 0.43 
0.0
8 
1.32 0.44 0.17 0.35 0.09 0 
12.6
4 
84.49 100 
ROIC 0.47 
1.4
4 
1.89 0.63 0.1 1.15 0.18 0.32 7.37 86.44 100 
ROW 1.04 
0.3
3 
0.89 0.73 0.2 0.2 0.11 0.21 3.77 92.52 100 
 
 
Table  2-4 D-8 Intra-Trade, Trade Analysis System ON Personal Computer (PC /TAS, 2008) 
Country Exports Imports Trade Volume Trade Balance 
Bangladesh 
401.11 1,810.66 2,211.79 -1,409.57 
Egypt 1,553.21 2,615.32 4,168.53 -1,062.11 
Indonesia 10,847.55 10,832.39 21,679.94 -1,5.16 
Iran 6 , 1 2 2 . 0 0  1,357.07 6,479.07 3,764.95 
Malaysia 11 , 026 . 55  8,488.15 19,513 .68 2,637.42 
Nigeria 310.98 301 .5  612.71 9.25 
Pakistan 1,645.56 4,110.92 5,756.48 -2,465.56 
Turkey 4,342.00 13,618.00 17,960.00 -9,276.00 
D-8 Intra Trade 35,247.96 43,134.24 78,382.20 -7,916.6 
D-8 Total 
Trade 
658,841.22 630,719.30 1,289,560.52 28,121.92 
Share (percent) 5.35 6.48 6.08 -28.15 
 98 
 
 
With the exception of Iran, D-8 countries are largely dependent on the US 
market. US exports to Nigeria is the highest, almost 50 percent of total exports. This 
was followed by Egypt (32 percent), Bangladesh (26 percent), Pakistan (24 percent), 
Malaysia (20 percent) and Indonesia (13 percent). 
Turkish exports to the US are the lowest (four percent). This is because the bulk 
of Turkish exports are to the European Union (EU), which is 35 percent of exports. In 
fact, Turkey will become a member of the EU member in the future. 
For Iran, the US has imposed economic sanctions on it. However, the main 
export markets are Japan (24 percent), China (23 percent) and EU (20 percent). This 
means that Iran is still able to develop its economy despite the US imposing unilateral 
economic sanctions (Table 2-3 and Table 2-4). 
The US economic sanctions have important policy implications for 
Iran. Diversifying to find alternative export markets and developing new export markets 
is critical to avoid dependence on the West. As a first step, the D-8 PTA will provide a 
new market alternative when the other OIC countries participate in the future. 
In the Malaysian context, it is government policy to expand its export market 
through the search for new markets by creating a bilateral or multilateral trade area. For 
example, the government is committed to the development of D-8 PTA. This is proven 
by its trade data. 
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In 2008, the total trade with other D-8 was about 19,576.6 million dollars from 
15,916.03 million dollars in 2007. Exports and imports increased respectively to 
11,071.83 million dollars and 8,504.77 million dollars, with other members of the D-8, 
in favor of Malaysia. Thus, the D-8 PTA is the best platform for the government to 
improve the country through foreign exchange earnings. Therefore, the OIC is the best 
platform to consolidate and expand its free trade area and D-8 PTA is the first step 
towards that. 
2.4.6 Trade and Development  
 In 2005, the Trade and Development Index (DCIT-TDI 2005) was introduced in 
Developing Countries for International Trade.  The index is a helpful instrument for 
assessing and making new policies in developing countries; it sets up a framework 
through which developing countries can improve the requirements for the development 
of both the economy and the society. In the context of globalization, the index also 
provides the framework through which developing countries can find an opportunity to 
improve a beneficial interplay of mutual nature between development and trade.     
 “Analysis through the TDI framework brings country-specific constraints to the 
forefront by simultaneously identifying structural, institutional, financial, trade and 
development policies that allow developing countries to maximize benefits and 
minimize costs from trade liberalization and globalization” (Mercredi, 2007). 
Trade could be conducive to development with regard to the conditions in which 
trade is going on and with regard to the objectives that trade is going to achieve. There 
has been no growth for any nation that lacks trade. Moreover, the significance of trade 
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in development is more conspicuous, while economies are more open than before 
against the globalization backdrop.  
TDI would be useful providing that the following three functions can be 
integrated: monitoring the trade and development performance of countries; diagnosing 
and identifying the factors affecting their performance; and providing a policy tool for 
national and international action to keep trade focused on development and poverty 
reduction. “The trade and development index is an attempt by the UNCTAD secretariat 
to capture the complex interaction between trade and development and, in the process, 
to monitor the trade and development performance of countries… The TDI is designed 
as a mechanism for monitoring the trade and development performance of countries, a 
diagnostic device to identify factors affecting such performance, and a policy tool to 
help stimulate and promote national and international policies and actions” 
(Panitchpakdi, 2005). 
Table  2-5 Trade and Development Index(World Bank, 2011). 
Country Trade and Development Index TDI rank 
Bangladesh 294 93 
Egypt 409 79 
Indonesia 413 78 
Iran  458 63 
Malaysia 631 28 
Nigeria 172 108 
Pakistan 275 95 
Turkey 431 73 
 
The estimates and corresponding ranking of the Trade and Development Index 
(TDI) for the D-8 countries are shown in the above table. As can be seen, Malaysia is in 
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the top 30 in the world and the TDI scores for Turkey, Egypt, Indonesia, and Iran are 
particularly close. 
An increase in the TDI results in a decrease in the variation between different 
dimensions. To put it more simply, a good score on trade policies by a country, 
corresponds to a good score in terms of institutional and structural priorities in the 
country.  
As stated by the chief of UNCTAD’s Trade Analysis Branch, Khalil Rahman, 
this is the key finding. That is to say, for a country to be right in a dimension, it has to 
be good in all. As indicated by the results obtained by TDI, less variability in the 
contribution of specific components is observed among countries with a high TDI score; 
however, this variability is increased for countries with a lower TDI score.   As a rule of 
thumb, one can conclude that the stability of policies is more influential than any 
temporary good action in a specific area. Accordingly, for D-8 members with a low 
score, to be successful, they need to have multiple objectives in a framework that leads 
to a coherent trade and development strategy; in other words, such restricted objectives 
as trade liberalization, while other goals are not considered, would lead to insignificant 
development gains, if any. As the analysis indicates, significant variation highlights the 
key role played by country-specific approaches to trade, development and poverty 
reduction strategies (Table 2.5). 
2.4.7 Economic Freedom  
 The Heritage Foundation along with the Wall Street Journal developed 
the Index of Economic Freedom that consists of ten economic measurements. The 
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objective that is supposed to be achieved by the index is the measurement of economic 
freedom among the countries across the world.  
The Index’s definition of economic freedom is as follows: “The highest form of 
economic freedom provides an absolute right of property ownership, fully realized 
freedoms of movement for labor, capital, and goods, and an absolute absence of 
coercion or constraint of economic liberty beyond the extent necessary for citizens to 
protect and maintain liberty itself” (Miller and Kim, 2011). 
According to the index countries are evaluated based on a ten-factor criterion 
related to economic freedom through the statistics obtained from such organizations as 
the Economic Intelligence Unit, the World Bank, and the IMF.  The factors include 
freedom in the areas of finance, trade, labor, investment, monetary, fiscal, business, and 
such factors as government size, property rights, and freedom from corruption.  
Each factor is given a score ranging from 0 to 100, in which the maximum 
freedom in a factor gets 100. Then the average score out of the total scores obtained 
from the ten scores is calculated. A score of 100 indicates an economic situation or a 
series of policies that are contributive to economic freedom. 
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Table  2-6 Index of Economic Freedom (World Bank, 2011). 
Country 
Index of Economic 
Freedom  
World Rankings 
FREEDOM 
SCORE 
CHANGE FROM 
PREVIOUS 
Bangladesh 137 51.1 +3.6 
Egypt 94 59.0 +1.0 
Indonesia 114 55.5 +2.1 
Iran 168 43.4 -1.2 
Malaysia 59 64.8 +0.2 
Nigeria 106 56.8 +1.7 
Pakistan 117 55.2 -1.8 
Turkey 67 63.8 +2.2 
 
Table  2-7 Distribution of Global Economic Freedom 
0-49.9 50-59.9 60.69.9 70-79.9 
80-
100 
REPRESSED 
MOSTLY 
UNFREE 
MODERATELY 
FREE 
MOSTLY 
FREE 
FREE 
 
The newest rankings indicate that global trade freedom is the highest that it has 
ever been. It is interesting that those nations that have more degrees of trade freedom, 
also have a greater degree of economic prosperity. However, the newest average score 
forD-8 members indicated a minor development (Table 2.6 and Table 2.7). As can be 
seen, the economies of Malaysia and Turkey are moderately free in contrast to most of 
the other D-8 members. Therefore, D-8 countries should reduce trade barriers that 
protect politically powerful elites at the expense of the general population. In fact, more 
income, more employment, and more equality will result from trade with a greater 
degree of freedom. 
2.4.8 Ease of Doing Business  
 The World Bank put forward the Ease of Doing Business Index. According to 
the index, the regulatory context is contributing to beginning and inaugurating local 
3 
Name 
3 
Name 
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firms, when the ranking is high on the index. The index indicates the nation’s percentile 
rank on nine topics, which consist of a number of indicators, in which each one receives 
equal weight. 
The main function of the Ease of Doing Business index is measuring the regulations 
that are directly influential on business; it is not supposed to measure other factors, such 
as infrastructural quality, a country’s proximity to large markets, crime, or inflation. 
Accordingly, the rank of a country on the index depends on the average of ten factors as 
follows: 
1. “Starting a Business – procedures, time, cost and minimum capital to open a 
new business; 
2. Dealing with construction permits – procedures, time and cost to build a 
warehouse; 
3. Employing workers – difficulty of hiring index, rigidity of hours of index, 
difficulty of redundancy index, rigidity of employment index, redundancy costs; 
4. Registering property – procedures, time and cost to register commercial real 
estate; 
5. Getting credit – strength of legal rights index, depth of credit information index; 
6. Protecting investors – indices on the extent of disclosure, extent of director 
liability and ease of shareholder suits; 
7. Paying taxes – number of taxes paid, hours per year spent preparing tax returns 
and total tax payable as share of gross profit; 
8. Trading across borders – number of documents, cost and time necessary to 
export and import; 
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9. Enforcing contracts – procedures, time and cost to enforce a debt contract; 
10. Closing a business – index of recovery rate, which is a function of time, cost and 
other factors, such as lending rate and the likelihood of the company continuing 
to operate” (World bank, 2011). 
Table  2-8 Ease of Doing Business(World Bank, 2011). 
Country 
Ease of Doing Business 
2010 2011 REFORMS 
Bangladesh 111 107 2 
Egypt 99 94 2 
Indonesia 115 121 3 
Iran 131 129 3 
Malaysia 23 21 3 
Nigeria 134 137 0 
Pakistan 75 83 1 
Turkey 60 65 0 
 The previous 5 years indicate that some eighty-five percent of economies across 
the world have facilitated the operation of local entrepreneurs; amongD-8 members only 
Malaysia is ranked at the top according to the index (Table 2-8). When the ranking 
improves, it shows that the business improvement is because of the accurate 
institutional strengthening in the public and private sectors. The launch of business was 
facilitated in Malaysia through providing more services online; this was also 
complemented by a reduction in the time and cost to transfer property through online 
stamping.  
A low rank on the index indicates that the local firm start-up for other D-8-
countries is not appropriate in terms of regulatory environment. A business reform 
facilitates doing business; it is also effective on the other important factors of the index.  
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CHAPTER 3                                                            
LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
Both static and dynamic consequences can be observed as the result of entry into 
a regional integration scheme. While resource allocation for changing relative prices 
leads to static consequences, dynamic consequences stem from efficiency changes, 
taking advantage from economies of scale, and investment as well as level of growth. 
While the static consequences of trade integration seem to have a lot of 
theoretical literature, particularly on customs unions, a greater review of the static 
consequences stemming from the effects of regional integration is one of the priorities 
of this chapter. Moreover, since changes resulting from the dynamic consequences are 
cumulative and cover all adjustments, they are considered as important in this chapter 
and due attention is paid to them. In spite of the significance of dynamic factors, they 
have not been treated as a single adequate model because they are too complicated to 
model. However, developments observed in recent theories provide an opportunity for 
us to deal with some of the important issues. Therefore, in the following section the 
static effects are presented, before the chapter devotes a section to dynamic 
consequences (Negasi, 2009). 
In the present thesis, emphasis is given to whether or not free trade is preferable 
to a customs union, and, in the next level, the consequences of the trade diversion effect 
on welfare. In order to make a perfect differentiation of the theory presented in this 
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dissertation from the current theories, and also the consequences of generalization and 
substantiation of the gravity model, which will be presented in Chapter IV, the 
evaluation of the model and tracking its restrictions become of significant importance. 
As a result, a continuation of the discussion is more dependent on the advancements and 
the texts that have moved in this direction.  
3.2 Theory and Models 
The definition of economic integration is presented in the following subsection 
followed by the theoretical considerations of economic integration. Furthermore, due 
attention is given to the factors that contribute to the feasibility and value of integration 
from a theoretical point of view. 
3.2.1 Economic Integration– Definition 
Any activity through which different economies in a region are able to remove 
the limits of free exchange of capital, goods, labor, and services is called regional 
economic integration. As such, reinforcing the flow of goods among the countries of a 
region through reducing or removing non-tariff and tariff restrictions will definitely 
enhance economic integration (Park, 2007). Moreover, regional economic integration 
can be reinforced through reducing or removing the barriers that impede the flow of 
capital, labor, and services internationally. 
Obviously, such a definition and its related explanations have prescribed levels 
to reduce or eliminate the trade barriers. 
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3.2.2 Types of Economic Integration 
Economic integration consists of different sorts and stages. Lombaerde (2006) 
introduced six kinds of integration – Common Market, Preferential Trade Agreement 
(PTA), Customs Union, Monetary Union, Free Trade Area (FTA), and Economic 
Unions. 
1. Preferential trade areas are those in which members use a preferential 
treatment by reducing customs tariffs for designated product categories from the 
member countries relative to all non-member countries. Higher tariffs would remain in 
place for all other non-designated product categories.    
2. In free trade areas the objective of members is developing trade activities 
among member countries by eliminating customs tariffs on the products they produce 
themselves. In order to avoid importing products from non-members, the members 
design and develop complex rules of origin that freeze the penetration of third 
countries’ products into the grouping because of the lowest tariff in the customs of the 
member countries; because such goods may be re-exported to the other member states.   
3. Customs unions seek to eliminate the deficiency of free trade areas by not 
only abolishing/reducing tariffs among member states but also by setting a common 
external tariff policy against third parties. This guarantees the member countries free or 
privileged flow of tradable goods amongst themselves by forming a trade bloc that 
discriminates between member and non-member states. The coordination of policies for 
trade among members is the first priority and the development of rules of origin is not 
considered as a concern. 
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4. In common markets the free flow of services and goods are allowed and 
factors of production among members are provided. In order to militate the 
coordination of industrial and commercial policies, establishing a common external 
tariff against non-members is a policy followed by common markets. Moreover, there 
would be no restriction for those citizens of a common market to work and invest in 
any member country. 
5. Monetary unions establish a central monetary authority to design, develop and 
coordinate the monetary policy for all member states and issue a common currency that 
circulates among the member countries.    
6. Free mobility of capital and labor is among the characteristics of economic 
unions. They also establish common external tariffs among members and provide free 
trade in goods and services; moreover, to form a single economic unit, they harmonize 
national economic policies. The European Union (EU) is the best example whose 
integration efforts have been extended to harmonization of social policies.    
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Table  3-1 Stages of Economic Integration 
Economic 
Integration 
preferential 
trade 
Agreements 
(PTA) 
Free Trade 
Agreements 
(FTA) 
Customs 
Union 
(CU) 
Common 
Market 
(CM) 
Monetary 
Union 
(MU) 
Economic 
Union 
(EU) 
Reduction of 
tariffs and non-
tariff barriers 
among the 
member states 
            
Elimination of 
tariffs and 
quantitative 
restrictions 
imports from 
member states 
-            
Imposition of 
common external 
tariffs on imports 
from third 
countries 
- -         
Removal 
ofbarriers on flow 
of production 
factors 
- - -       
Adopting a 
common currency 
and a common 
central bank 
system 
- - - -     
Common 
monetary and 
fiscal policies, 
regional  
development 
- - - - -   
Source: Extracted from Lombaerde (2006). 
As stated by Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996), and further confirmed by 
Krueger (1997), and Grossman (1995), FTA member countries decline or eliminate 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers for a category of products (if not all), for instance, 
industrial products. In this case, these countries have formed a Free Trade Area (FTA), 
which is the first level of economic integration. In this case, any of the states follow 
their specific trade policy, tariff, and trade barrier against the rest of the world. When 
countries form an FTA, their government lowers tariffs vis-à-vis their FTA partners and 
there is no reciprocity from the non-members. Such external trade liberalization 
following an FTA appears especially important in developing countries (Estevadeordal 
et al., 2008). Examples include the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA), ASEAN-
China , ASEAN-India , South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), Commonwealth of 
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Independent States Free Trade Agreement (CISFTA), and Central European Free Trade 
Agreement (CEFTA). 
In the next step, these countries may abolish the trade barriers on all transacted 
goods and establish a common external tariff (CET) against other countries of the 
world. In this case, the countries have formed a customs union, which is the second 
stage of economic integration. It is called a customs union because the participant 
countries set up a single customs policy and a common base for receiving customs 
duties on imported goods from other states of the world. At international trade rounds 
or conventions, the participating states set up a single unit in trade negotiations 
(Krueger, 1997; 2004). The customs revenue is distributed among the member states, 
according to one single principle, and in the same order specified in the Trade Pact for 
forming the Customs Union, based on the profit or loss made by the countries as a result 
of customs union formation. The European Union-Turkey Customs Union is an example 
of a customs union. 
If the Free Trade Area (FTA) or customs union is not terminated, for whatever 
reason, the countries may also remove the barriers on the movement of the production 
factors, i.e. labor and capital among themselves, and, in this case, a Common Market 
will be formed among them. The movement of production factors between the countries 
will lead to the reallocation of resources and boosting of the economic efficiency within 
the union. Here, we disregard the theories of capital flows and we would like to only 
mention that the shifting of labor and capital is the result of a difference in the salary 
and interest rate existing in different sections of the Common Market. As a result, the 
relocation of enterprises and geographical distribution of capital will happen in the 
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Common Market. In accordance with the new literature, the theory of international trade 
and geographical location of industries will be a function of states’ trade policies. From 
this area, the integration of the theory of geography and theory of international trade 
emerges. It is said that the theory of international trade is actually a part of geographical 
(industrial) theory. Thus, the theory of economic integration has an important 
consequence for the development of economic policy. Paul Krugman (1995) is the 
pioneer of the theory of geography and international trade integration. 
After the common market phase, the member states, if interested, will enter into 
the stage of monetary union and economic union. There exists a conflict of opinions 
regarding which one has greater priority. In the European Union, the monetary union 
has precedence over the economic union. In the present conditions, the European 
countries have formed a monetary union.  
The monetary union is based on two factors: adopting a common currency and a 
common central bank system. Usually a single central bank is formed for the whole 
union (like the European Central Bank) that coordinates the monetary policies of 
member states. The common currency and the central bank of the union will contribute 
to price stability throughout the union. Price stability is the most important target of a 
monetary union. In this case, a coordinated system is established to allocate resources 
throughout the whole union, which facilitates the efficiency of the allocations. The 
interest rates and inflation rate throughout the whole union usually lean towards a 
common rate. The wage rates are also converged in one single rate in the common 
market stage. There is a single price level throughout the whole union and a single 
currency rate (against foreign currencies) is used in the whole union.  
 113 
 
At this stage, it is usually said that the countries lose the independence of their 
monetary policy to the interest of the central bank of the union, which is a transnational 
bureaucratic body, and they do not have full independence to regulate their own 
monetary policies. In case a country infringes the monetary regulations of the whole 
union, it will reach an inflation rate (and, as a result, an interest rate) different from the 
union, which will have a serious consequence for the allocation of resources, efficiency, 
and geographical distribution of that state’s industries. In other words, the economic 
necessities dictate that the countries must reach higher levels of integration. This is the 
core of the functionalists’ theory about the causative necessity for countries of the union 
to move towards higher levels of integration (Hitiris, 1994). 
 In principal, the same explanation is given for the world’s economy. A world 
that is essentially moving towards integration because of economic or technologic 
reasons; economic in terms of “not-to-dos” (what must not be done) and “to-dos” (what 
must be done or policies that must be adopted); and technologic because the efficiency 
of technology in the whole world must be converted into one single currency. The 
difference of technology efficiency in its first stages of creation, will lead to constant 
distribution, or constant shifting of industries in the world and it is more powerful than 
the ambitions of individual governments or national policy-makers. In the next step, the 
rate of efficiency is converged and the industries are redistributed; and, thereafter, 
another technological creation takes place so that the regained energy is grown and 
stored. In fact, it is the same interpretation as we say that necessity means that the 
countries have no other choice but to join this trend.   
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In the stage of economic union, all economic policies of member states are 
unified and the countries, in terms of economic policies, will be like different provinces 
of one country. In this stage, the interest, inflation and wage rates, as well as currency 
rate are equalized in all countries. In other words, the promise of the theory of 
international trade for the equality of the wages of production factors, including labor, 
will be realized after the free trade.  
The issue of wages (or, in general, the income of production factors in the theory 
of international trade) comes with the question of whether, as a result of the integration 
process, wages, or the income of the production factors, or, more importantly, the labor 
income, will become unified. Traditionally, the essential consequence of the theory of 
trade for economic development is that the wages of labor, or income of labor, will be 
equalized throughout the world after liberalization of trade across the whole world, or in 
a more precise interpretation, after the beginning of international trade.  
The certain reality is that after several centuries of international trade growth, 
the labor income in developed and developing countries, has, under no circumstances, 
been converged to form a single rate. Krugman and Venebels (1995) refer to a situation 
in which, in the course of globalization, the wages of developed and developing 
countries first show signs of convergence (though the difference still continues), but 
after a while they become diverged and the wages of developing countries will decrease 
compared to those of developed countries. Krugman (1980) used to show that the 
number of enterprises in a country with wider market scale is more than other countries. 
This is called the “Home Market Effect”. However, under specific hypotheses, the 
Home Market Effect may be reversed (Markusen and Feenstra, 1998; Markusen, 1981). 
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These two theories are followed by important consequences for the development of 
policy in the developing countries. So far, and based on the theoretical foundations 
already mentioned, the globalization process may experience an increase of inequality 
in terms of both labor wages and number and distribution of industries.  
Therefore, we have to discover how an economic integration plan can contribute 
to the developing countries in order to attract more industries, higher employment rates, 
diversification of production and the use of trade as a driving force for growth and 
development. In any of these stages of integration, as already defined, the mutual trade 
of member states will increase and the economic policies will be regulated and 
coordinated throughout these states in a way so as to contribute to the process. In this 
respect, the economic integration plan, besides the strategy of a substitute for imports, 
can be within the access of policymakers of the developing countries, or, for example, 
be considered as a strategy for the development of exports.  
In this way, the question is “to what extent will the integration plan reduce the 
costs for economic development?” The  Import Substitution Strategy requires plenty of 
welfare and social expenditure (such as the costs of social waste and waste of 
resources), and selecting a unilateral trade liberalization policy for the execution of the 
strategy of exports development will also require a huge primary investment and some 
social costs.  
As regards the setting of economic macro-policies, the integration plan member 
states are committed to implement the policies that will develop free trade (at least 
among themselves). If the free trade would have developed multilaterally, this would 
have been desirable from the economic theory point of view, but this may not be the 
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case in regional integration plans, and the same story happens under a microeconomic 
theory point of view. The microeconomic theory of customs union uses the concept of 
welfare costs to create doubts about the desirability of regional integration, which is 
something we will consider in the next chapter. In other words, we cannot always be 
certain in an economic integration plan, whether its advantages will exceed its 
deficiencies, and the volume of trade will deviate as a result of discrimination.  
3.2.3 Theory of Custom Unions 
Hence, we first give a brief history of these texts and then we come to the main 
discussion. A short time after dissemination of the Viner’s effect, Lipsey and Meade 
showed that the theory of customs unions is a state of the general theory “Second Best 
Optimum”.1 According to this theory, when other disturbances remain and we have 
demolished one or more disturbances, we cannot achieve Pareto optimality. Here, other 
disturbances include common external tariff, which is implemented for the rest of the 
world, and the disturbance that the existence of first or second will not lead to general 
optimality, and, for the same reason, we are not able to make a definite judgment 
whether the customs union increases or decreases the welfare. Since no more 
description is provided for this research, we are not going to discuss it anymore. We 
mainly focus on important developments within this analytical framework, including 
articles by Lipsey (1957), Gehrles (1956), Melvin (1969), and Bhagwati (1971), who 
showed that the effect of trade diversion might increase the welfare, and the articles of 
Cooper and Massel (1965a)who showed that we can achieve the effect of trade creation 
                                                 
1
International economic integration is treated as the second best solution, since it provides a degree of trade advanced 
according to stages of economic integration (gradual abolishment of customs tariffs, non-tariff barriers, such as 
registration rights, etc. due to the coherent policy of economic unions). It seems that the first-best option (free trade) 
is achieved as to gains from trade when economic integration reaches a stage of political union (EU in 2009). 
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through the liberalization of unilateral trade, without any need to incur the effect of 
trade diversion. Therefore, free trade is preferable to a customs union. We will then 
present the article of Wonnocot and Wonnocot (1981), who established doubts 
concerning this issue, the criticism set forth by Berglass (1983) over them, and, finally, 
the conclusion of El-Agraa (1999). In the meantime, we will also discuss the important 
advancements made by Johnson (1965) and several other important articles. Then, we 
will discuss the new trade theories and explain the gravity model. 
The significant characteristics of a customs union mentioned in the literature review 
are as follows: 
1. Imports from member states are facilitated by eliminating tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions. 
2. Imports from non-members are exposed to common external tariffs. 
In fact a customs union is differentiated from a free trade area by imposing 
common external tariffs against third countries and free trade; however, each country in 
a free trade area has its tariffs against third parties. Therefore, a free trade area can be 
considered as a variety of a custom union and vice versa.  Although customs unions and 
free trade areas are not entirely similar, the required theoretical framework for 
investigating free trade areas can be extracted from the theory of customs unions. 
3.2.3.1 Partial Equilibrium Model 
Developing specialization and trade are among the potential advantages of a 
customs union. However, welfare implications include positive effects as well as 
negative ones. The positive effects or trade creation is the substitution of reasonable cost 
imports from member states for expensive domestic products (Park, 2006).The 
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replacement of lower cost sources of supply is helpful because it paves the way towards 
freer trade. The case of D-8 is a good instance; importing computer inputs and outputs 
from Malaysia instead of local manufacturing could contribute to Iran to be better-off 
from the one hand, and, from the other hand, Malaysia could be better off when it began 
importing carpets from Iran and stopped its domestic production of carpets. 
Contrary to a customs union, trade diversion is a process through which 
expensive products of member countries are preferred to imports that are produced by 
non-member states at a low cost. The higher tariffs against non-member states 
compared to tariffs of customs union members give rise to this diversion. The 
differential tariff treatment diverts trade away from non-members toward members. One 
of the consequences of trade diversion is its hard effect on welfare because of the shift 
of consumption to sources of supply at higher cost. In this sense, it is a move toward 
protectionism and away from free trade. Again, the D-8 customs union provides a good 
example; the import of mutton from Indonesia instead of New Zealand could lead Iran 
to be worse off. 
Depending on the magnitude of the negative or positive effects, it would be 
possible to estimate whether or not a customs union would result in any net gain. In fact, 
establishing a customs union can be considered as a move that contributes to both 
greater protectionism and freer trade. Consequently, both positive and negative and 
even neutral net effects on welfare could result, based on the creation of trade and 
magnitude of the diversion. The net static welfare effect of a customs union is 
dependent on which of the two effects dominates (Jovanovic, 2006; Viner, 1950). There 
will be an increase in welfare, provided that the effect of trade creation is more than that 
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of the trade diversion. Otherwise, the members will suffer from harmful consequences 
of the formation of a customs union. 
3.2.3.2 Static Factors 
As explained above, the overweight of trade creation on trade diversion will 
determine whether or not a customs union is beneficial. There are a few factors that can 
lead one to compare one-shot changes resulting from the formation of a customs union, 
both prior to its formation and after its formation. The factors that are static in nature are 
not subject to any change in the course of time. More specifically, as explained in El-
Agraa (1984, 1999) and Robson (1998, 2006), a customs union is more likely to raise 
rather than reduce welfare.  
The important characteristics of static factors are as follows: 
1. The larger the size of the market 
2. The higher the pre-union level of tariffs among members, and the lower and 
the less disparate the pre-union level of tariffs against non-members 
3. The greater the pre-union level of intra-regional trade 
4. The more similar the levels of economic development 
5. The closer the members are geographically and the better the transportation 
infrastructure 
6. The greater the substitutability between products of member states and 
products of non-member states 
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7. The smaller the pre-customs union shares of extra-regional trade in total 
trade 
8. The more complementary the economic structures of the member states 
(Park, 2006) 
3.2.3.3 Dynamic Factors 
The creation of a customs union includes the removal of the trade barriers and 
the restructuring of the economy, which will possibly result in dynamic factors. 
Compared to static factors, dynamic factors are not associated with one-shot changes 
observed in welfare, and they emerge in the course of time gradually (Park, 2006).For 
instance, to become more efficient, some companies and industries in a nation may 
become more engaged in competition compared to their counterparts in neighboring 
countries once a customs union is formed; however, such efficiency gains are not 
possible within a day or a week. It is a complicated process to measure dynamic factors 
and they are consequently overlooked most of the time. As reported by Jovanovic 
(2006), Lombaerde (2006), and Lang and Ohr (1995) some of the characteristics of 
dynamic factors are as follows: 
1. More competition, and, consequently, an improvement in efficiency results. 
2. More specialization, economies of scale, and learning-by-doing will result in 
more gains. 
3. Costs of intra-regional transactions are reduced.  
4. Some protection from adverse developments in the world markets. 
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5. Bargaining power in relation to industrialized countries. 
The dynamic cost of polarization must not be ignored, although there are 
potential dynamic benefits. For example, in case countries that integrate to establish a 
customs union that are different in terms of level of income and development, they will 
not receive an equal distribution of gains. The tendency of more developed and 
advanced countries to have a greater share of gains, compared to less developed 
countries, can give rise to tension and resentment among them. Furthermore, when the 
member states have the impression that the losses or benefits of setting up integration 
may only fall upon a nation or a sub-group of the members, they may withdraw or give 
up; accordingly, these instabilities can jeopardize the viability of the union in the course 
of time. 
3.2.3.4 Non-economic Factors 
In addition to the economic factors explained above, the success or failure of 
economic integration is dependent on a lot of non-economic factors. The case of EU 
indicates the significant role played by non-economic variables in economic integration, 
as reported by Baldwin and Wyplosz (2006b), Jovanovic (2005), and Molle (2006). 
Some of the non-economic factors include the common desire shared among countries 
in the region to have equal power, the desire to finish any violence that gives rise to 
tension among the members, responsible politicians who have a good command of the 
common problems that need a common solution, and a shared feeling of vulnerability 
among member countries. The commitment shown by leading politicians to integration 
and cooperation has been considered the most significant non-economic factor so far. In 
other words, a strong dose of will displayed by the politicians of the member countries 
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is the first determinant. Therefore, the success of the EU and NAFTA could have been 
threatened if the members’ governments did not hold a strong political will in this 
regard. This also holds true for D-8 members whose governments’ due political 
commitment to the issue provided the pre-condition for success. 
3.2.4 Cooper and Massel Model 
From the discussion proposed by Cooper and Massel (1965a), it is clear that the 
unilateral liberalization or "free trade" is preferable compared to customs unions, and it 
will undoubtedly lead to an increase in welfare.  
 According to Cooper and Massel (1965a), the effects of customs union welfare 
can be divided into the following parts: the effect of tariff reduction and the effect of 
full trade diversion. 
1. The effect of tariff reduction is the only source for increasing the consumer 
welfare that we can expect from the customs union (it also includes trade 
creation effect and consumption effect). 
2. From a non-discriminative policy point of view, the customs union always leads 
to trade diversion (the tariff reduction effect is however related to non-
discriminative liberalization policy; in comparing the two notions, customs 
union and free trade, the tariff reduction effect is related to free trade). 
3. The free trade viewpoint existing in Viner's analysis does not explain why the 
customs union must be preferred over a non-discriminative trade policy. 
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4. If the goals of tariff-setting are identified, we can find a justification for the 
existence of a customs union, and expand the customs union analysis to more 
diversified subjects (Cooper and Massel, 1965a). 
This analytical tool clearly shows that any increase in the consumer welfare 
following the formation of customs union, whether due to the effect of trade creation, or 
the desirable effect of consumption will totally return to the tariff reduction element. 
As it will be discussed in the next chapter, this conclusion is in coordination 
with and supports the generalization of the relation of gravity and counter exports of the 
countries to each other. The theory of regional integration and trade liberalization 
(globalization) will be correlated and tested in the fourth chapter of theory. Returning to 
the important discussion of Coopers and Massel, according to their model, instead of the 
situation that could be achieved through a non-discriminative reduction of tariff, the 
formation of a customs union will be followed by absolute trade diversion:  
“Utility of the formation of customs union in general (and in comparison with 
the original non-discriminative tariff) depends on the effect of tariff reduction to 
neutralize the effect of pure trade diversion” 
Therefore, the discussion set forth by these two scientists emphasizes that free 
trade is preferable to a customs union. In considering the terms Viner used to describe 
the effect of trade creation (beneficial) and the effect of trade diversion (harmful), and 
also since Viner argues that the original tariffs are an ineffective media for generating 
income for the government (Lipsey (1957) assumed it would be redistributed to the 
consumer), although it is possible that the customs union will yield benefits, perhaps 
 124 
 
more benefit can be gained through reducing the tariffs directly and non-
discriminatively. 
As we can see the nature of analysis is not absolute and the combination of free 
trade with a customs union, cannot reach a final result that supersedes the experience. 
This issue will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.  
3.2.5 Lipsey-Gehrles Model 
In replacing the analytical tools from partial equilibrium to general equilibrium, 
there is a noticeable point, which shows that trade diversion can increase the welfare. 
Lipsey (1957) starts with the important issue that changing of tariffs as a result of union 
formation will change the comparative prices, with two important effects: 1) the 
production effect, because of production relocation and change of the production model; 
2) Consumption effect, because of consumption relocation. Even if the global 
production is stable, the consumption model will change due to comparative price 
alterations.  
However, to describe the effect of customs union as good or bad, we need to 
make a welfare judgment. The effect of customs union on welfare is a combination of 
its effect on location, and, as a result, the cost of global production and on location, and, 
as a result, the utility of global consumption. Especially when the consumption effect 
(as disregarded by Viner) is taken into account, this simple impression that the effect of 
trade creation is good and the effect of trade diversion is bad does not apply any more, 
and although it is essential to differentiate between trade creation and trade diversion in 
order to classify the production change (Production Model) as a result of union 
 125 
 
formation, we cannot derive welfare conclusions from that (another important point 
from the viewpoint of the present dissertation).  
Therefore, we can show that the welfare interest of the trade-deviating customs 
union includes the country whose imports have been diverted, including both the whole 
customs union and the whole world. This is something shown later by Gehrles (1956). 
In the Model presented by these two scientists (Lipsey and Gehrles) the curve 
representing the production-possibility frontier is a straight line. Later, Melvin (1969) 
and Bhagwati (1971) also repeated the discussion and made the same conclusion with a 
concave curve representing the production-possibility frontier in relation to the origin of 
coordinates, showing the cost of increasing opportunity.  
According to Chacholiades (1978), Lipsey (1957) uses the differentiation 
between the two effects to show how the welfare in Country A may actually increase 
following the formation of a customs union. First, the imports of A are more expensive. 
Second, after the formation of the union, the difference between the relation of domestic 
price in country A and the relation of transaction of country A is decreased. Thus, the 
consumers of A are able to make their purchases through a trade relation that is equal to 
the marginal rate of substitution.  The first effect, which is a production change from 
lower cost to higher cost, is undesirable, while the second effect, which is the 
consumption effect, is desirable. The outcome depends on which one of these two 
effects is more powerful.  
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The issue of the change of the world's welfare can be shown by some 
assumptions.  Let us suppose B and C are two countries that form the rest of the world 
in the model; both of them are big and they produce the goods Y and X under the fixed 
opportunity cost. B and C do not have a prohibitive tariff against each other and the 
trade only occurs between A and C. However, C is a producer of the two goods and so 
the trade occurs at a comparative price applicable in country C. After the formation of 
the customs union between A and B, A only transacts with B. So, C incurs no losses as 
a result of the elimination of trade toward which it is indifferent, because the trade has 
occurred under its internal trade relation. In addition, Country B still produces the two 
goods of X and Y, so it gets no benefit from the new trade with A. So, the whole trade 
benefit is achieved by Country A either before or after the formation of the union. If the 
trade deviating customs union increases the welfare in A –as the possibility has shown  
–the welfare in the world will also increase.  
3.2.6 Melvin-Bhagwati Model 
The analysis by Lipsey reveals how Viner disregarded the effect that increases 
the welfare of trade deviating customs union, because he assumed that consumption is a 
fixed coefficient. In other words, he did not consider the substitution in consumption.  
As stated by Bhagwati, considering no substitution in consumption is not an 
adequate condition for the trade union to reduce welfare. In fact, through considering 
consumption substitution, we can show that it could increase the welfare. Production 
diversity can also be regarded as the origin of benefits to be gained from the formation 
of a custom union.  
 127 
 
In Lipsey's analysis, consumption does not change over a straight line from the 
origin of coordinates; this condition shows changeability of consumption and rejects the 
possibility of consumption with a fixed coefficient. Now, consider the condition in 
which imports are also fixed. In this case, the trade deviating customs union again 
reduces the welfare. Bhagwati argues that the consumption condition with a fixed 
coefficient is not an adequate condition for welfare reduction as an effect of trade union. 
The adequate condition is the fixed imports. 
In their article, Bhagwati and Melvin only discussed their constrained models in 
which either the consumption is a fixed coefficient or import. 
If we do not consider the assumption of consumption with a fixed coefficient or fixed 
imports, the new consumption equilibrium, clearly shows that the welfare in Country A 
increased after the formation of the union.  
3.2.7 Wonnocot and Wonnocot Model 
Wonnocot and Wonnocot (1981) basically argue that “the unilateral tariff 
reduction is not preferable to a customs union”, not based on a logical error, but due to a 
series of assumptions that negates the basic benefits of a customs union. For example, in 
the previous analyses, we assumed that Country C does not apply a tariff and also no 
transport costs exist, and we strongly assumed that Country A cannot benefit from 
having access to the market of Country B. Now suppose in Country C (rest of the 
world), a tariff and other trade barriers exist. In such circumstances, the analysis of the 
effects of free trade among the members of the trade union, with the assumption that 
there are no barriers for trading with C, is meaningless. Also it is meaningless if we 
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analyze the customs union, especially if we compare the customs union and unilateral 
tariff reduction, unless we assume that all countries have set tariffs.  
These two scientists argue that if the following hypotheses are rejected, the statement 
that “unilateral tariff reduction is preferable to customs union”, will no longer be 
applicable. In this case we can disregard:  
1. The tariff set by the partner country,  
2. The rest of the world does not set a tariff,  
3. There is no transport cost between the members of customs union and the rest of 
the world (EL-Agraa 1999). 
Their method is not based on the effects of the relation of transaction or 
economies coming from scale, which are two favorable effects of customs union, and 
unless these three hypotheses are left out, their analysis is completely within the general 
equilibrium of two goods and three countries (like the previous analyses). 
With this model we can show that from a customs union we receive a benefit, 
which we cannot receive from a unilateral tariff reduction. Considering the transport 
cost with Country C and the tariffs of Country C, now country C has got two offer 
curves rather than one, while the comparative price in Country C is equal to the slope of 
the trade offer curve of Country C. 
Therefore, the transport cost and tariff in Country C create a gap between the 
offer curves of Country C (in the same way it creates gaps between the internal and 
international prices in the simple supply and demand model). If this gap is large enough 
so that the two countries of A and B do trade "with each other" within this gap before 
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and after the trade union, it seems as if Country C never existed and its predominance 
over trading with A and B disappears. So the issue of formation of customs union 
between A and B that now covers the whole world (or the rest of the world, upon 
leaving out C) is connected to the issue of unilateral free trade. “In this case a CU can 
easily be shown to be beneficial under standard assumptions; both countries have a 
higher welfare” (Wonnocot and Wonnocot, 1981). Both countries have a higher level of 
welfare in a new equilibrium. In addition, for both countries the customs union is 
preferable to the unilateral tariff reduction: In Point E, Country A has a higher level of 
welfare than M and Country B has a higher level of welfare than W (in this case the 
existence of transport cost between the two countries of A and B does not change the 
final result and it has not been considered for simplification purposes).  
Therefore, it seems the article of these two persons is contrary to that of 
Coopers-Massel’s, which remained unrivalled for 15 years and is still used to recognize 
unilateral tariff reduction being preferable to a customs union. However, Bergrlas 
(1983) set forth several criticisms of Wonnocots' article. He emphasized that the 
Wonnocots had forgotten two alternative hypotheses that are implicitly considered in 
the analysis of a customs union: 
1. Trade before and after the formation of customs union, must move in one 
direction, This means the direction of trade must not change with the formation 
of customs union (the analyses by Viner, Coopers and Massel were based on the 
same assumption),  
2. All three countries should have participated in trading.  
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He concluded that we can consider Wonnocots' analysis as a special case, under 
which when the direction of trade changes, the statement "free trade is superior to the 
customs union" might not be applicable anymore; however, the statement that if we 
incorporate the transport cost and tariff, is an incorrect conclusion. Subsequently, 
Wonnocot and Wonnocot (1984) interpreted Berglas's discussion in a way that supports 
a weakened form of the statement that unilateral tariff reduction is sometimes preferable 
to a customs union and a customs union is sometimes preferable to unilateral tariff 
reduction.  
Later, El-Agraa (1984) claimed that the Wonnocots' analysis is incomplete not 
only because of Berglas's argument, but also because of ignoring a common external 
tariff in their analyses.  El-Agraa (1999) showed that when the common external tariff is 
established, Country A will unambiguously receive a loss from the formation of a 
customs union (in comparison to unilateral tariff reduction), and although Country B 
benefits from the customs union, there is no transfer of revenue between the two 
countries (so B compensates losses of A out of its benefits) that could be executed upon 
and along the customs union, and could establish benefits for both countries A and B 
simultaneously from the formation of a customs union. Especially when it is compared 
to when A follows the free trade, after which B implements the optimum policy of 
unilateral liberalization.  
Thus, this case is pure trade diversion, and if there is to be no mechanism for the 
transfer of revenues from B to A, A will have no motivation to form a customs union 
with B, even if it recognizes this as the only trade policy option. However, since it is not 
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reasonable to restrict the scope of economic policymaking options, both countries will 
benefit from unilateral tariff reduction.  
In other words, when in the customs union, there are no possible arrangements 
for the transfer of income that are preferable to a unilateral tariff reduction. From the 
Pareto optimality point of view, although B will gain benefit, and A will receive losses, 
if A applies the optimal policy of unilateral tariff reduction, B is not able to do anything 
better than follow the optimal policy for the two countries.  
The more important issue in El-Agraa's analysis (1999) is that if the common 
external tariff is in any manner bigger than zero, by reducing it to the level of tariff in 
Country A, it will change the internal trade relation to the benefit of A and will have the 
effect of trade creation because the foreign trade of customs union (with the rest of the 
world) grows faster than the reduction of trade within the customs union. In this case, 
Country B will receive welfare loss, and the lower the level of common external tariff, 
the more benefits might be gained by A (the whole discussion is in comparison with the 
case when customs union is formed but common external tariff is not reduced). 
However, as long as the common external tariff is positive, A might receive losses 
through membership in the union (compared to unilateral tariff reduction) and although 
B gains benefit, we cannot find a potential system for the transfer of revenue that could 
benefit both countries.  
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3.2.8 Development of Export, Tariff Negotiations and the Models of Coopers-
Massel and Wonnocot 
According to Coopers-Massel's discussion that each country has a set of 
imported and exported goods, and that it will have the potential for increasing the 
exports of some of its goods (due to comparative advantage theory), and the point that 
although A as an importer will incur losses, but its partner, B, will benefit due to 
increased exports, and A also has some exports to B in return; because for A as an 
importer, the effect of trade diversion will entail loss in the trade relation (change of the 
equilibrium point as the intersection place on the trade offer curves of A and B 
countries, entailing a loss for A, out of which we can measure the trade relation), 
leading to benefits for Country B, as an exporter. Therefore, loss due to the effect of 
trade diversion coming from imports is neutralized with the benefit gained out of 
exports.  
If the loss from trade diversion can be mutually neutralized, then considering a 
series of exported and imported goods, it might be that the net effect is neither zero nor 
negative. Such reasoning provides a basis for the presentation of evidence in favor of a 
Customs Union rather than unilateral tariff reduction. Membership in a customs union 
is, in fact, a method for giving benefit from the positive effect of trade diversion while 
the member state is not faced with problems in trade balance and payment balance (this 
issue, which forms the basis of the first hypothesis in the present dissertation, will be 
discussed in Chapter IV and the effect of trade liberalization on trade balance will be 
estimated). 
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The benefit coming from trade creation makes the resources to be redistributed 
from the production of inefficient goods to the production of exportable goods with 
higher efficiency, the cost of which is comparatively lower than the cost of the world's 
production. In practice, there might be some delays in the relocation of the resources 
due to unilateral tariff reduction, and we might be unable to increase exports along with 
increased imports. Consequently, there might be short-time unemployment, but 
membership in a customs union allows trade to become balanced. It also accelerates the 
redistribution of resources due to the formation of the customs union; the export 
markets are opened for the member state, thereby allowing the reduction of 
unemployment (this is the third hypothesis of the present dissertation, which could be 
confirmed or rejected by estimating the short-term and long-term elasticity of income 
coming from exports and imports).  
Thus, after the formation of a customs union, when the resources are 
redistributed from inefficient industries to efficient industries, the production model will 
match the comparative advantage (or competitive advantage) model of each member 
state and the country will be more prepared to move towards multilateral tariff 
reduction.  
In essence, the discussion matches the articles written by Johnson (1965), 
Bhagwati and Panagarya (1996). Johnson considers the reasoning behind the preference 
for industrialization for each country as a motivation for the formation of a customs 
union, or a reason for its justification. Each country, without losing its industrial 
production, allows the partner country to achieve the industrialization model, and also 
makes itself industrialized. In fact, this preference for industrialization, which shows 
 134 
 
itself in the utility function, will cause a preference for customs unions over free trade. 
Bhagwati and Panagarya (1996) reasoned that taking into consideration Coopers-
Massel's model, Kemp and Van's (1976) model, Brecher and Bhagwati's (1981) model, 
Grossman and Halpman's (1993) model, and Krishna's (1997) model, the regional 
economic integration will finally lead to free trade throughout the world (responding to 
the claim that the world will be divided into regional economic blocs rather than a free 
trade area). 
Hence, the main question is: does the trade diversion cause the reduction of 
welfare in member states? The effect of trade diversion will have a negative impact on 
the importing country, but the exporting country gains profit from higher prices out of 
its exports in such a way that the producers’ surplus will increase (at the same time the 
consumers' surplus welfare will decrease). The net effect in the exporting country might 
be positive or negative. The effect might be negative if at the world's prices, the partner 
country is an importing country. Thus, the net trade diversion may decrease the welfare 
of the two countries, the union and the world.  
The second question is: If the partner country (exporting country) gains profit 
from the effect of trade diversion, is it possible that its benefit is more than the loss of 
the member state (importing country)? The answer is no. So, the net trade diversion 
always has a welfare reducing function.  
Hence, the first country (importing country) may not be willing to form a 
customs union. However, it is possible that the production resources in the importing 
country may not have full movement and the same country may face some short-time 
problems in the trade balance equilibrium (in the case it would unilaterally eliminate the 
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tariffs). In these conditions the importing country may accept the loss from stoppage of 
welfare in order to achieve benefits resulting from the effect of trade creation for its 
exported goods and decide to form a customs union. In addition, in the customs union, 
the exporters might be confident about having access to export markets rather than to 
world markets. In this case, the increase of exports and its adjustment with the relative 
advantage model is easier than unilateral tariff reduction.  
Wonnocot reasoned that in addition to customs union member states, other 
countries of the world also set a tariff. If we consider the customs union as one single 
country, it is like all the countries of the world setting a tariff for them, which is not an 
optimal condition. The optimal condition is when the whole world moves towards free 
trade. In this case it is not surprising if the formation of a customs union entails benefits 
from exports (especially for developing countries). The issue in question is how 
countries within the union compensate for the negative effects with each other, and 
further benefit from the dynamic advantages of a customs union as well as the 
economies of scale and improvement of trade relations with the rest of the world. Here, 
the reasoning is close to the discussion of Bhagwati and Panagarya. Although, 
theoretically, we cannot make a final judgment that the unilateral free trade is always 
preferable to a customs union, or the customs union unambiguously increases the 
welfare, it directs the world's economy to move towards the redistribution of resources 
to more efficient activities. The rest of the world will then be motivated to change into a 
big customs union (Kemp and Van, 1976).  
Therefore, Wonnocot stated that there is one hypothesis embedded in the context 
of a customs union in which the prices are compared with one single international price; 
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in other words, there is one single price for every good in the world market. Then, they 
reasoned that there are many countries outside of the union who operate separately in 
the world market, in a way that the tariff of every single country is totally paid by the 
consumers and they have no impact on international prices.  
When we consider the tariff or third country, there exists one point that we have to 
discuss: first, the third country (Country C in the analysis) might be a large country with 
respect to the goods referred to in the figures herein, but it is not large in all goods. 
From the tariff negotiations point of view, the third country might set a tariff on the 
goods in question in order to take tariff-related privileges from it strade partners.  
Therefore, the important advancement of Wonnocot is that in a world with 
tariffs, some welfare interests are expected from the customs union that we do not 
expect from unilateral trade liberalization. This interest is associated with the point that 
the exporting members of a customs union are low-cost producers, and that before the 
formation of a customs union they are not able to benefit entirely from their 
comparative advantage because of the tariffs set by other countries.  
Now, if other countries eliminate their tariffs, the exporting countries of the customs 
union are able to benefit from their own comparative advantage completely. The 
importing country is likely to incur a loss, but this loss might be less than the benefit 
gained by the partner country from exports. Hence, the elimination of tariff in the world 
will increase the welfare of a customs union, with the assumption that the loss will be 
compensated by members.  
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3.2.9 Free trade agreements versus customs unions 
Because the integration of Europe as well as North America led to success, since 
the late 1980s, RTAs have been revitalized. The static and dynamic effects of RTAs 
have been investigated in a number of theoretical and empirical studies (e.g., Lee, Park, 
and Shin, 2008). However, the trade and welfare effects resulting from different types of 
RTAs still call for further analysis. One of the pioneer figures, who compared RTAs of 
various kinds in general, and FTAs and CUs in particular, is Kruegar (1997).Through 
the analysis of static net welfare gains and dynamic evolutionary paths, Kruegar (1997) 
claimed that “CUs permanently lead to preferable results compared to FTAs. The 
shortcoming of FTAs is because of the spaghetti bowl phenomenon expected from the 
hub-and-spoke type of overlapping FTAs. The welfare-reducing trade diversion effect 
and the high costs of verifying rules of origin (RoO) may overwhelm the gains from 
freer trade with FTAs”. This additional cost may cause larger negative welfare effects in 
addition to the traditional trade diversion effect and may not trigger the domino effect of 
regionalism because of the difficulty in accommodating new entrants into the existing 
RoO regimes.
1
 Mirus and Rylska (2001) corroborated Krueger’s claim by providing a 
detailed description of the disadvantages and advantages of FTAs and CUs, 
concentrating on RoO and CET (Park and Park, 2009). 
Through a modified Meade model of endogenous external tariff protection, 
Panagariya and Findlay (1996) further made a theoretical comparison between the 
welfare effects of FTAs and those of CUs. The authors argued that a CU is a less 
                                                 
1
See Baldwin (1993) for the domino effect of regionalism. 
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protective and superior form of RTA to a FTA. They identify a possible free-rider 
problem in lobbying for protection that makes a CU less effective than a FTA, as stated 
by Richardson (1994). 
As stated before, the number of studies conducted on the static net gains 
resulting from the establishment of RTAs and the dynamic evolution of RTAs toward 
global free trade are remarkable. In spite of these investigations, however, there is still a 
lack of empirical studies to prove that CUs are preferable to FTAs. The larger effects of 
greater RTAs on the volume of regional trade between various types of RTAs have been 
highlighted in a few empirical studies. For example, Ghosh and Yamarik (2004b) and 
Kandogan (2008) found stunning results regarding the effect of economic integration on 
intraregional trade. They found the coefficients for CU and CM membership dummies 
both negative and significant in several specifications. However, the authors did not 
control for multilateral resistance terms, and, more importantly, for self-selection into 
RTAs. As reported by Baier and Bergstrand (2004), and further corroborated by Vicard 
(2008),“studies on the determinants of RTAs suggest a ‘market for regionalism’ view of 
regional trade integration, where countries choose their partners and the form of the 
RTA according to economic and political determinants”. 
Using a gravity regression analysis, Ghosh and Yamarik (2004b), and Magee 
(2008) evaluate intra-bloc and extra-bloc trade effects of different types of RTAs. The 
authors could show that the RTA type significantly leads to different trade effects .Gosh 
and Yamarik (2004b) found that compared to a FTA, a CU gives particular rise to more 
intra-bloc trade and less extra-bloc trade estimating proposed RTAs. The trade effects 
patterns are, however, reversed as far as real RTAs are concerned. According to Magee 
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(2008), compared to CUs, FTAs have a greater impact as far as the net trade-creating 
effects are concerned; however, the author found the reverse result when he estimated 
“the cumulative effects with lags because of the strong post-enactment intra-bloc trade-
creating effect and weak anticipatory trade-diverting effect of CUs”. So, the question as 
to whether CUs lead to more intra-bloc trade and less extra-bloc trade and are better 
compared to FTAs remained an unanswered question. Through a gravity regression 
analysis, Park and Park (2009) answered the question. The quantitative estimation of the 
trade effect of CUs and FTAs provided by the authors showed that as far as more intra-
bloc trade and less extra-bloc trade are concerned CUs are preferable to FTAs. The 
results of Park and Park (2009) indicated that while an FTA provides 14.2% gain with 
members and 14.5% with non-members, a CU provides 32.6% gain with members and 
5.9% gain with non-members with no trade diversion. 
Contrary to the free riding effort of lobbying for protection, as stated by 
Panagariya and Findlay (1996), and Richardson (1994), if the lobbying effort becomes 
successful, a CU may raise the CET and make the CU more protective than a FTA. 
3.3 Theoretical Models 
In this part, the theoretical model is to be founded on economies of scale, or the 
difference between the special and social costs of production, which are basically the 
logic for formation of customs union for developing countries, and we will study its link 
with the gravity extraction relation.  
In figure (3.1) the supply and demand curves have been drawn for one 
hypothetical product. It is assumed that the two countries only produce one single 
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product and they include only one consumer. The global supply curve has been drawn 
as a straight line, i.e. the assumption of a small country and lack of influence on the 
world’s price has been adopted. Also the customs income is redistributed to the 
consumer. As Corden (1974), Robson (1998) and other texts that assume economies of 
scale or deficiencies of the market, it is possible that after formation of a customs union 
the demand curve of the whole union drawn in Part (C) of  Figure 3-1, is moved towards 
the right. In order to coordinate with the extracted gravity model, we assume that both 
countries import the product in question, in other words, we assume a similar structure 
for imports. The situation before the formation of the union in the two countries is 
drawn in part (A) and (B). Like before, the quantities of production, consumption and 
imports, either subject to tariff or exempt, could be perceived.  
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(A) 
(B)
(C) 
Figure  3-1 Export Customs Union of Developing Countries 
 
Again, the price of the cheapest world resource is Pw and the price subject to 
tariff in both countries h and p are Pt and P't, respectively. The volume of imports of the 
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two countries are equal to AB and A'B' and ECDF and E'C'D'F' is the customs income 
each country collects. OA, O'A' are the domestic production of the two countries. Now 
let us assume these two countries form a customs union, and, at present, we do not 
speak about determining Pu and P'u in figures (A) and (B).  
In this case, Sh+P is the aggregated supply curve of the two countries and Dh+p is 
the aggregated demand of the two countries. Once again, we assume that these two 
countries have no effect on the world's price, either separately or collectively. So, the 
effect of exchange relation is equal to zero and the straight line Pw still shows the global 
supply curve. (This hypothesis is adopted here in order to simplify our discussion, 
however, if the effect of the transaction relation also exists, the results will be verified in 
a better way). If the two countries establish prohibitive common external tariffs, the 
equilibrium is in point e3 and the price of the good is equal to Pe (figure C). The whole 
consumption is supplied from the internal production of the union. However, it is not 
clear in which country the production is centralized. If, following the formation of a 
customs union, the said industry is transferred from h to p, production in h will be equal 
to zero, and, generally, the domestic consumption will be provided out of the imports 
from p. In this case, in country h, the customs income ECDF is lost, the surplus of the 
consumer welfare is reduced by PtDe1Pe and the surplus of the producer (and 
employment of generating resources) is lost.  
The figure is clearly drawn in a way in which in the price Pe neither of the two 
countries are transferred into exporters to the rest of the world. Based on this 
assumption, the figure is drawn in a way so that both countries are importers. This 
action is consistent with the theory of the similarity of imports.  
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Now, under these conditions, what incentive does country h have to take part in 
a customs union? This is the same case mentioned in Brown's (1961) and El-Agra's 
(1999) models, under which if a country incurs a loss from actual income, it will have 
no motivation to take part in the customs union. Even the compensation for loss by the 
country to which the production is transferred will not be able to stimulate it to 
participate in a customs union (in other words, even giving a bribe may not work) 
because the said country loses the employment of generating resources. 
Please note that the analysis is much more complicated in the country to which 
the production is transferred. We assumed that the production is transferred to country 
P. In this case, in figure (B) the supply curve moves towards the right and will be 
exactly parallel and equal to Sh+p in figure (C), which we show by S'h+p, and we assume 
that after formation of the union, the prohibitive tariff is set. In this case in figure B, P'eI' 
is equal to the volume of production, which will cover the aggregation of demands p 
and h. P'ee2 will be equal to the consumption in country P, and e2I' will be equal to the 
consumption in country h, i.e. Pee1 in figure (A). In the case of a prohibitive tariff of the 
second country, p is transformed to exporter. The surplus of the consumer welfare in 
country p decreases by P'tD'e2P'e but the surplus of producer welfare increases to SoI'P'e, 
the e2D'I' of which is obtained as a result of exports to country h.  
It is clear that as a result of this transfer of industry, country P has lost the 
customs income for C'E'F'D' compared to the case where the price subject to tariff is 
equal to P't. It is likely that the interest in surplus of the producer will compensate the 
loss from the customs income in country P, and, in this case, country P will benefit from 
the formation of the customs union (considering that the total reduced surplus of the 
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consumer is transferred to the producer, this is more possible); in addition, it has also 
turned into an exporter.  
However, country h has suffered a total loss because it has lost the customs 
income, both surplus of consumer welfare by PtDe1Pe and surplus of the producer. 
Setting a prohibitive common external tariff is clearly a puzzle for the formation of a 
union. If country P pays the aggregate of all these to country h, it is still difficult for 
country h to accept the customs union plan, because of job preferences or industrial 
production.   
Now, let us assume that in the whole union in figure (C), because of the 
difference of private and social costs, upon payment of subsidy the total supply curve is 
transferred to S"h+p, and also, let us assume that the said industry is centralized in one 
country. In this case, the new equilibrium in figure (C) will be, for example, on point M, 
and the price of P"u is determined at this point, which is the place where Dh+p and S"h+p 
cross, as reflected in figures (A) and (B). At this price, the customs union is also self-
sufficient. It is observed that price P"u is less than price P't and Pt, and, in this case, 
country P is still an exporter.  
The price of Pu, i.e. the price of a customs union, is specified here and for the 
same reason the price Pu has not been assumed separately for the two countries before. 
In this case from the whole production P"uM in figure (C), P"uW is the consumption of 
p and WM is the consumption of country h. The surplus of consumer welfare in country 
h increases by PtDH"Pu, and, in this country, only E"F"FE suffers the effect of trade 
diversion. It is completely likely that the interest of consumer welfare would neutralize 
and even exceed the effect of trade diversion and the formation of a union would be 
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beneficial to country h. It is highly possible that country p will also benefit from welfare 
because the surplus of consumer welfare is increased from D'oP'eI' to D'oP'uM', the 
surplus of producer welfare is increased and only the customs income is lost at C'D'E'F'. 
The only issue is the production lost in country h to the benefit of country p.  
Here we can declare that as a result of customs union formation, either of the 
two countries in any case was transformed into an exporter (country p in the example) 
and could expand the supply to P'uM in figure (C) due to foreign economies or the 
difference of private and social costs of production upon payment of subsidy. Here, a 
subsidy paid on production could properly neutralize the negative effects of prohibitive 
protectionism, and, as stated by Corden (1974) and Hunt (1989), a subsidy support is 
changed into a developmental policy that could eliminate the high expenses of 
protectionism with prohibitive tariffs that would the price in Pe (in three figures) and 
would impose plenty of losses on either of the two parties.  
Now suppose a multiproduct world, in which all assumptions of this model 
apply and all other conditions are stationary. It is entirely likely that country h that has 
lost the production of the product in question in figure (3-1) is able to obtain the 
production of another product, under the same conditions discussed above. In this case, 
the two countries will complement each other in the demand structure (as well as 
production). If the events we mentioned above happen for another product in country h, 
both countries will benefit from the formation of a customs union, both countries are 
transformed into an exporter of the goods in question based on their own relative 
preference model and they will achieve plenty of welfare interests.  According to De 
Melo and Panagarya (1992), when two developing countries complement each other in 
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the demand (and supply) structure, the formation of a union will bring them plenty of 
interest. In this case, the production of two countries will be dissimilar. And there will 
be high complementariness in demand, which will entail plenty of interest for 
developing countries. So, the issue of complementariness in demand becomes clear with 
this model. As reasoned by De Melo and Panagarya, the developing countries are more 
involved in inter-industry trade. In the above-said model, in which specialization occurs 
in two different goods in two countries and inter-industry trade will be intensified 
between these countries, they will each become an exporter. This is why since the 
beginning of the model, and before the formation of a union, we supposed that the 
imports of the two countries are similar; this is the same conclusion obtained from the 
gravity equation. Thus, full specialization in production in this model is consistent with 
the gravity model; both countries will have exports to each other and the reduction of 
prices in the union will lead to mutual trade between the two. However, we have not yet 
discussed the exports of third countries to these countries. Further, we have not studied 
the issue of the centralization of enterprises in the two countries.  
Now, let us suppose the two countries form a customs union and the supply 
curve is also S"h+p (in figure C) and they also establish a Common External Tariff (CET) 
that would place the price at PCET level in the union, which is lower than Pu. In this case, 
the total supply of the union is reduced to PCETN, and, out of this value, PCETR is 
consumed in country P, and RN is also the exports of p to h. The NQ is the imports of h 
from the world's cheapest resource (rest of the world) at the price Pw, and country h 
would collect a value of NQUT of customs union, albeit RNTV will also suffer the 
effect of trade diversion. In addition, a high volume of the surplus of producer will be 
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redistributed to the consumer at the price PCET in country h (figure A). So, positive 
welfare effects will occur with a reduction of price from Pu to PCET and the two 
countries may benefit from this. In this case, trade with the rest of the world is not 
eliminated, and, even, it is likely that the trade with rest of the world will also increase. 
Because in a self-sufficient trade union there is no import from the rest of the world and 
it is possible that NQ is even more than CD+C'D', which depends on the level of 
original tariff Pt, and the elasticity of supply curve Sh+p, the elasticity of the demand 
curve Dh+p and the level of tariff PCET. The higher the level of the original tariff and the 
lower common external tariff, the higher the possibility for the effect of trade creation, 
and, based on the situation in developing countries in terms of protectionism, this 
probability is not so far-reached.  
Therefore, the increase of trade of the third country (rest of the world), which 
was incorporated in the gravity model could show it simply in the theoretical model. It 
is expected that in the estimation of the gravity model, the effect of exports of the rest of 
the world to the two partner countries is positive on their mutual trade. This is one of the 
important assumptions of the present dissertation, and we will address it in the next 
chapter.  
Hence, the dynamic effects will still continue, and, gradually, as resources are 
reallocated over the time, we expect the countries to be specialized in production of 
goods and achieve higher production capacity. In these conditions, after a while, trade 
will increase speedily. Intentionally, we inserted into our discussion the issue of a once-
forever reallocation of resources that will be followed by the once-forever effect of 
trade creation or trade diversion, in order to classify the speed of trade growth in the 
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short term and long term. In the gravity model, we measure the speed of trade growth, 
i.e. exports and imports, by the elasticity of trade against Yi and Yj (GDP of the two 
countries i and j). It is clear that in this analysis we have considered a time scope for the 
reallocation of resources in order to ensure that we have considered the delay in the 
allocation of resources and transfer of resources among sections, which could occur for 
different reasons, including fundamental reasons, for the developing country.  
Now we pose another question, what will happen if the goods the two countries 
h and p produce are differentiated (in terms of quality)? For example, both countries 
manufacture automobiles but the model and type of these automobiles are different from 
each other, now, what will happen if both countries form a customs union?  
Here, it is likely that full inter-industry specialization does not happen. When the 
markets of the two countries are open to each other, the possibility of intra-industry 
trade will prevent full specialization of auto manufacturing because the consumers will 
like various models of the cars and they prefer diversified models; this is called 
economies of scope, which is a factor for intra-industry trade. In this way, in addition to 
domestic consumers, the consumers of the partner country are also added to the 
consumers of the product produced in country h or p. In this case, the curves Dh and 
Dp, related to each country, will move towards the right. The move of the demand curve 
to the right side will provide a high possibility for welfare interest resulting from intra-
industry trade. It is likely that the number of enterprises or the production capacity will 
increase in order to meet the new demands. In any case, either the supply curve is 
transferred towards the right, or the production expenses will decrease, which will have 
the same effect. This situation is shown in Figure 3-2. 
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Figure  3-2 The effect of customs union on differentiated goods 
 
In this case, for example, if the equilibrium moves from E1 before the formation 
of the union to E2, the production has increased, and it will meet the consumption in the 
domestic market and also export to the partner country. This is because D1 includes the 
demand of the domestic and partner's consumers and it can even include consumers 
outside of the customs union, because we supposed the product is differentiated and the 
world's lowest price is not drawn in the model. The more demand and supply curves are 
transferred, the more interest is gained from the customs union in each country. It is 
emphasized that there is no full specialization in the model (corner equilibrium will not 
occur in the convex production facilities curve). In addition, the industries will benefit 
from the bigger market of the union and economies of scale, which is the second factor 
of intra-industry trade. Once again a customs union is formed that has changed countries 
into exporters. The formation of a customs union and the low level of common external 
tariff on the competitive goods of the rest of the world can even boost the exports of the 
rest of the world to the customs union and its member states; this issue is consistent 
with the theoretical substantiation of the gravity model. Trade liberalization along with 
the possibility for intra-industry trade, will also increase the possibility of the volume of 
trade among member and nonmember states as well as the rest of the world.  
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Usually, the production of distinguished goods and their consumption are 
common in those countries that maintain a higher level of income. For countries with 
high revenue, the closer their per capita income means the more possibility for intra-
industry trade. The more similarity in the structure of demand, the more interest will be 
gained from the formation of a customs union. According to Linder's theory, this is the 
necessary condition for increasing trade among similar countries. In this model, first we 
imagine the status of the two countries, only for comparison, according to figure (A) 
and (B), figure (3-1). In this case, the two countries will be similar in terms of imports 
and provided there are preferences in two countries for different models of the 
differentiated goods, the similarity in imports is the adequate condition for increasing 
counter trade (counter export) between the two countries. This is the same discussion 
discussed in the gravity model. Therefore, the possibility of intra-industry trade could 
also be explained with the gravity model, or more precisely, it is consistent with the 
gravity model.  
In the above discussions, the distribution of industrial production among two 
countries being in the state of inter-industry trade, the distribution of enterprises in each 
country was not determined. Krugman's (1980) "Home Market Effect" says that after 
trade liberalization, the entities will be centralized in those markets that are bigger than 
other markets (by market we mean country). This discussion is the new trade 
geofigurey, which was founded by Krugman and was mentioned in the preamble, 
Chapter 1 of this dissertation. Krugman's economic geofigureical model is presented in 
Krugman (1991a). In reply to Krugman's home market effect, Markosen (1981) and 
Davis (1998) showed that under specific conditions it is likely that the home market 
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effect is reversed or exterminated. In practice, there are a large number of manufactured 
goods and it is possible that the pattern of distribution and centralization of industries 
within the customs union do not fully follow home market effect; however, there will be 
some industries that are distributed among the countries based on a special pattern that 
is a function of relative advantage. Yung Hur (2001) showed that the low trade 
expenses, or low common external tariff, as set forth in the present dissertation, against 
customs union nonmember states, are necessary to guarantee the distribution of 
industries in different regions of the customs union. Hence, the lower the level of 
common tariffs, the distribution will maintain a more balanced pattern. This is why, 
earlier, Krugman and Venebels (1993) showed that Europe's industries, like the US 
industries, have not changed into Silicon Valley industries, due to trade barriers in 
European countries.  
However, in summary, the less protectionism among developing countries after 
the formation of a customs union, the more possibility for the effect of trade creation 
and the more counter exports the member countries will have to each other ( and to the 
rest of the world). In the current situation, the developing countries have also entered 
into the stage of intra-industry trade (Ahmad and Ahmed, 2005) and are more likely to 
benefit from the formation of customs union. In the 1960s and 1970s, most of the 
regional integration plans among developing countries that had been recently created, 
were broken up, due to the high effect of trade diversion and the disagreement of the 
members regarding the distribution of interests. However, in the 1990s, especially the 
economic integration between these countries continued more intensely. In this chapter, 
the theory of globalization (with the definition given for trade liberalization and low 
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preference margin) and the customs union are linked to each other so that its effects on 
counter trade inside, and inside and outside of the union, can be explained. It has 
become clear, that the more similar the level of members' imports to each other, the 
more possible is the increase of exports, or the effect of trade creation. In addition, the 
exports of the rest of the world to member states will also have a positive influence on 
their counter exports to each other and to the rest of the world. We also discussed the 
elasticities of trade income (exports and imports) in the short-term and long-term. In the 
next chapter, the hypotheses extracted from the gravity equation and the theoretical 
model will be put for the accuracy of the plan and also tested. Regarding the industry 
distribution pattern, this dissertation cannot enter into further discussion on this.  
3.4 Economic Integration in Developing Countries 
Market access has been facilitated and new market opportunities have been 
developed across the world because of the extensive tariff liberalization initiated since 
the mid-1980s. In 2001, the average tariff rate reduced from 9.8% in 1980 to 3.7%in 
developed states. In developing countries, the average rate reduced from 30% in 1980 to 
12.7% in 2000. 
Despite the reductions, manufactures among developing countries still observe 
high tariffs on trade. Compared to developed countries, exporters from Latin America 
encounter tariffs in neighboring Latin American markets that are seven times higher. 
For instance, Sub-Saharan Africa observe tariffs six times higher, and Asia experience 
tariffs two times higher (World Bank, 2004). Developed countries impose tariffs on 
manufacturing on exports from developing states, which are higher compared to tariffs 
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among developed countries. A 2% increase was observed in the tariffs for Latin 
American exports and an 8% increase was observed in tariffs for South Asia exports. 
According to the Economic Analytical Unit (2004), South-South trade would be 
among the particular beneficiaries because of the greater reduction in tariffs for 
developing countries compared to developed countries resulting from further economic 
integration. Based on the estimations provided by the World Bank (2005), by 2015, 
developing countries will obtain some $300 billion, which makes up 45% of gains 
obtained from serious trade reforms. Moreover, productivity would be stimulated 
because of the increase in competition. 
Developing countries have made significant attempts in the last few years to get 
further regional economic integration. The attempts include the revitalization and 
expansion of current regional arrangements or the formation of new groups observed 
among various developing countries. 
The capacity for trade policy analysis is not enough in developing countries. 
Developing countries are not very aware of the effects of trade agreements on economy 
and society. Moreover, experts in the field who leave their job for better-paid posts 
impede knowledge accumulation in developing countries. Hence, in order to decide on 
strategic interests, governments have to get international consultations from firms, 
which are not only expensive but also unsuitable for the local context. Consequently, 
because of inadequate knowledge of trade issues, developing countries do not consider 
trade as a development tool.  Developing countries are generally tardy in concluding 
trade agreements, and the reluctance of developing countries to give commitment results 
in the formation of agreements that are often unsuitable to their local context. The idea 
 154 
 
that developing countries need to develop their analytical capacity was highlighted in 
the inauguration declaration of the Doha Round in 2001. 
“We accept industrialization as a legitimate policy goal and consider how 
membership in a CU may enable a less developed country to achieve more 
economically the ends served by protection”. This is the fundamental viewpoint of the 
article of Coopers and Massel (1965b). We may also consider some other foundations to 
analyze the theory of customs unions for developing countries: for example, increased 
exports, optimal distribution of Pareto resources, more access to the markets of the 
partner countries, using better trade relation, using economies of scale, monopoly in the 
international stage, pursuing political and ideological goals, practicing the increase of 
competition, attracting foreign investments, and attracting multinational companies and 
the like. Balasubramanyam and Greenaway (1993) stated the need to attract foreign 
investment as an impetus for RTAs. The authors’ aim was to reduce trade barriers. 
Recently, however, there have been efforts to move beyond the trade barrier reducing 
exercise, and to include specific commitments on investment. Therefore, the new wave 
of RTAs is generally referred to as ‘new regionalism’ (see Burfisheret al., 2004; and 
Holmes et al., 2006 for discussion). 
These accords are sometimes referred to as “comprehensive preferential trade 
and investment agreements” or PTIAs (UNCTAD, 2006) or “new generation RTAs”. 
The nucleus of development strategy is made up of economic integration in the form of 
PTIAs, especially for developing countries. Compared to developed countries, which 
were included in 54 percent of PTIA at the end of 2005, developing countries were 
parties to 79% of the PTIA network, as reported by UNCTAD 2006. At the end of 2005, 
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a number of 86 RTAs were reported by UNCTAD (2006) for South-South PTIAs. 
Moreover, from the July 1, 2006 onwards, some 67 PTIAs were under negotiation, 
including some 106 countries (Aggarwal, 2008). 
In any of these issues, once again we come across different and opposing 
conclusions (as summarized in Langhammer and Hiemenz, 1998). Hence, from the 
beginning we have to emphasize that we cannot integrate all these issues in one 
integrated economic model. For example, if one underdeveloped country encounters the 
issue of industrial development, the country may determine to follow the imports 
substitution policy and defend infant industries in order to employ its extra and idle 
production resources. In this case, membership of a customs union can, on the one side 
increase the speed of industrialization through increasing the market size, and, on the 
other side, suffer the welfare loss through reducing the real income in some of its 
industrial activities with no comparative advantage over the partner country in the 
union; especially if the redistribution of resources from industries without advantages 
throughout the union to advantageous industries, is time-consuming and difficult and 
would require lots of cost and capital. 
For a developed country, the customs union will only entail the welfare, but for a 
developing country the welfare profit and loss resulting from the effect of trade creation 
and trade diversion cannot be used as the only basis for investigating the economic 
integration for these countries (Robson, 1998). The issue becomes more difficult when 
different price disturbances, exclusivities, market deficiencies, shortage of foreign 
exchange, shortage of skillful manpower (or supply constraint) also exist, and the 
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developing country is determined to face and fight these disturbances or constraints that 
could divert the distribution of resources. 
 The next problem, in case the customs union is able to contribute to 
industrialization, is the distribution of industrial activities among regional member 
states that often creates serious deadlocks in the negotiations of a customs union among 
these countries. The article of Langhammer and Hiemenz (1998) reviews all these 
problems and questions many of the theories set forth by advocates of customs unions 
among the developing countries and brings about some counter opinions.  
Even the social preference with respect to an activity, that could cover the whole 
customs union of the developing countries (as discussed by Johnson, 1965; Coopers and 
Massel, 1965b), produces the next problem: when, for instance, the industrialization 
preference leads to the creation of industries with new advantages, there will be a 
dispute regarding its location, or spatial distribution among member states.  
It might be argued that the policymakers of developing countries will, to some extent, 
accept the decline in their national income for achieving industrialization through 
integration (Johnson, 1965; Coopers and Massel, 1965b). However, there will be major 
disputes on behalf of those countries that asymmetrically benefit from such 
industrialization over how this decline in income should be compensated and the like 
before it might result in failure of the integration plan.  
In addition, because of numerous institutional barriers and disturbances existing 
in the developing countries, the trade of developing countries with each other will be 
carried out with difficulty (Ahmad, 1991). According to the theory of customs unions, 
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the more the member states are competitive in terms of production, but potentially 
complement each other (in terms of consumption), the more will be the effect of trade 
creation; in addition, if members of the customs union carry out most of their trade with 
each other (like the members of the EEC in 1958), the more will be the effect of trade 
creation. It is unlikely that such conditions are established in the developing countries.  
Furthermore, the major part of the effect of the creation of a customs union is 
necessarily the trade diversion, because many of the developing countries took 
initiatives to become industrialized when they were used to importing all their industrial 
products from industrially developed countries; or currently importing their required 
products from newly-industrialized countries like South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and, more recently China, Malaysia and Indonesia. In addition, sometimes it is 
argued that the most important barrier for industrial development of developing 
countries is the size of the market, so it is essential to increase the market size with 
economic integration to ensure optimality for establishment of industrial capacity. El-
Agraa (1999) stated:  
Neoclassic analysis of integration of developing countries basically begins from 
the developmental (differential) viewpoint. It is assumed that there is a suitable reason 
to support specific activities. Especially industrial activities which are done either to 
increase income or a higher growth rate or to achieve some noneconomic goals and are 
pursued only for the same reason. In order to achieve these economic goals, perhaps we 
have to ignore the income, but this also does not negate the said reasoning. We can 
investigate the consequences of economic integration on this basis within a broader 
framework than what is often applied, in which the economies of scale and “…the 
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difference between social and private costs of production are taken into consideration”. 
The benefits resulting from integration can be discussed within a (particularly valid) 
framework of opportunities for using economies of scale that we cannot benefit from 
the market of one single country and the consequences of market deficiencies 
(difference between social and private costs) can also be incorporated into the analysis. 
The market deficiencies come into existence usually when specific goods or services do 
not entirely pass the market and thus lead to foreign economies or lack of foreign 
economies, or when the government's policies have disrupted the prices of elements and 
goods. 
The economies of scale are the basis of Robson's (1998) economic model for 
developing countries. According to this model, the industry average cost curve, as a 
result of economic integration, declines to the level at which the production cost is equal 
to the world's low price or decreases even more than that. In cases before the 
integration, the price of the importing country is Ph, while upon the integration of two 
countries, in the figure on the right, the demand curve is changed into Dp+h and 
intersects ACp, for example, in Pw (or higher or lower than that). 
 
 
Figure  3-3 Economies of Scale in Customs Union 
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Before the formation of a union, the made-to-measure tariff kept the prices in the 
two countries equal to Ph and Pp. This is the basis of the logic presented by Robson 
(1998) for integration of developing countries. Of course, again, according to El-Agraa 
(1999), it is not clear how the two countries can solve the issue of the transfer of 
production from Country h to Country P, because the economies of scale cause the 
centralization of industries in comparatively more powerful developing countries, 
because it is essential to achieve the optimal size of capacity in one factory. These more 
powerful countries usually started the industrialization stages earlier. This is called the 
effect of "back-wash", which was previously remarked upon by Midrall and others.  
The difference between private and social expenses of production, as discussed 
by Corden (1974 and 1997), begins with the reasoning that due to the social benefits of 
production, that are not reflected in private expenses, the social supply curve is located 
lower than the private supply (in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.3). Therefore, it is economical 
for the government to subsidize production in order to achieve the social optimal level 
of production (in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, the supply curve is transferred to the right 
direction, which has not been drawn to ensure briefness, and we have postponed the 
discussion of it to the section for presentation of theory in the next chapter). 
Coden's reasoning was used as the basis of the neoclassical theory, which was 
changed into a theory for economic development and industrialization by Hunt (1989) 
along with other rival models of development, as we already mentioned in the 
introductory part of this dissertation.  
Once again, as we will see, if a country in which the private and social costs of 
production are different from each other, forms a customs union with another country 
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that produces the same goods without this condition, and the first country pays the 
subsidy on production, the said industry will be transferred to the first country and once 
again it will set forth the issue of the distribution of industries among countries. Hence, 
as it is also confirmed by Brown's (1961) and El-Agraa (1999) models, some countries 
might incur losses from a customs union, and, in this case, there must be a fair 
mechanism in place for distribution of interests accruing to one or several parties. 
“According to protectionism-based industrialization, there exists no economic logic for 
the formation of a customs union among developing countries.” 
The article of Coopers and Massel (1965b) deals with the formation of a 
customs union among countries of the North and South and the possible losses or 
benefits from the formation of such a union. According to the preference for 
industrialization and the transaction between this preference and the income that must 
be paid for by protection with regard to industrialization, the hierarchy of the industries 
that are allocated to the South, is specified. Then, based on this initial model, we can 
find optimal tariffs, or Pareto semi-optimal tariffs that will protect the industries and the 
transferred payments to be transacted between North and South for the compensation of 
possible losses between the North and South. Under specific circumstances, it becomes 
clear that the customs union might benefit the two countries:  
“If the degree of inter-group overlapping of tariff-supported products in the two 
countries is higher it is more likely that the customs union will lead to net welfare 
benefit. With a high degree of overlapping, the effect of trade creation will probably 
neutralize the effect of trade diversion. However, if the two countries complement each 
other, it is likely that various industries are supported in each country and the customs 
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union will totally lead to trade diversion, which is accompanied by loss of efficiency 
(and welfare), as stated by Viner.” 
Cooper and Massel also investigate the effect of subsidy. These subsidies are 
paid for exported goods. Practically, the subsidy paid on exports creates more space for 
industrialization compared to a customs union. “If the payment of export subsidy opens 
the world's markets on the exports of developing countries, the support cost will still be 
less than when the customs union is formed”. In addition, the subsidy on exports will be 
followed by more efficient professionalism. However, Cooper and Massel emphasize 
that in the real world, the complexities provide a situation in which the establishment of 
one industrial sector based on subsidy on exports might be very difficult and its 
protection is extremely difficult. Not only are the markets of developed countries barely 
opened for developing countries, it is also extremely difficult to obtain the political 
cooperation required for such work.  
The discussion of Cooper and Massel with regard to subsidies is close to the 
discussion of Corden, which was previously discussed. The difficulty in opening the 
developed countries' markets for developing countries, in new protectionism literature, 
has been stated as the unspecified consequences of globalization, and the imbalance of 
the results of the Uruguay-GATT round, as reported by Krugmann (1995).  
Instead of the formation of PTAs between developing and developed nations 
(that is, north-south countries), most of the PTAs have been set up between similar 
states (the so-called north-north agreements between developed states; south-south 
agreements between developing states), as reported by a few researchers including 
Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996), Ray (1998), and Das and Ghosh (2006). As Stiglitz 
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(2003) argued, “even though there is more to gain from North-South trade in theory, just 
as north-north trade agreements have intensified, there is no question that south-south 
trade agreements can also flourish”. Yildiz  and Nath (2010) showed that even when the 
external tariff of the member countries fall under the CU relative to no agreement, the 
welfare of the north nations would be decreased because of the formation of a south-
south CU. They show that there are normally incentives among south countries to 
establish a CU among themselves, under which North Countries are often worse off 
relative to no agreement. 
With this discussion, now we come back to Jalal Ahmad's model. The article 
begins by referring to new elements in South-South trade, in which emphasis has been 
placed on the increasing role of developing countries, especially newly-developed 
countries, export of industrial goods to developed and developing countries and the 
substitution of these countries in place of developed countries in the export of industrial 
products. His model is an "export-oriented" model, which is closer to the model and 
theory presented in this article in the next part and in the mathematical substantiation in 
the next chapter. His emphasis is particularly closer to the role of intra-industry trade in 
export development and South-South economic integration with the theory and model in 
the present dissertation.  
In his model, for the two goods of R and M, the newly-industrialized countries 
and the rest of the developing countries have two different ratios of production elements 
and two different production facilities curves, which do not trade with each other from 
the beginning and they only have trade with advanced countries and their trade is 
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carried out in the opposite direction (the trade of each of these two groups of developing 
countries, with developed countries).  
When there is a possibility of mutual trade in the group of developed countries, 
the image changes. In this case, the facility curves of each individual country are 
gathered together and a new facility curve is created. In the international price scale, 
after this, part of their trade with developed countries will decline and the intra-industry 
trade among these two groups of developing countries will begin. In practice, the level 
of welfare does not decline. Of course, this does not mean that the whole North-South 
trade will decline. The substitution of South-South trade with North-South trade 
happens for those industrial goods for which there is a capacity for their production in 
developing (South) countries. In addition, new trade transactions will be established 
between the north and south. As a matter of fact, in the past three years, the growth of 
South-South trade has been associated with an increase (and not decrease) of North-
South trade.  
When the industrial capacities of the South increase, the imported goods 
previously imported from the North, will give its place to South-South trade. In 
addition, if the protectionism continues in the North countries, the South countries will 
take measures to look for other markets.  
After the expansion of exports, this logic matches with what has been argued 
recently by Fukase and Martin (2001). In this model, which was developed for the 
ASEAN states, emphasis has been put on the benefit of the development of exports in 
one free trade region, following trade liberalization and elimination of trade barriers. 
The liberalization of imports, with the change in the real foreign currency rate will 
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increase exports.  The reduction of domestic prices of the importing competitor's goods 
will make the consumers replace them with non-tradable goods. The reduction of the 
need for non-tradable goods will reduce their prices compared to tradable goods (often 
called real foreign exchange rate). Hence, the profit from production of non-tradable 
goods will decline and the production of exportable goods is encouraged; in other 
words, the exported goods supply curve will move towards the right. Along with 
liberalization, this transfer will imply welfare benefits and allocation of resources for 
ASEAN countries.  
This was a review of the most important models related to the economic 
integration of developing countries, based on economies of scale (Robson, 1998), the 
difference between private and social expenses of production (Corden, 1974;Hunt, 
1989), the distribution of industries in the South and North based on the optimal tariffs 
of semi-Pareto and the export subsidy (Cooper and Massel), increased the role of the 
south countries in trading industrial products (Ahmad, 1991) and a change in the real 
foreign exchange rate (Fukase and Martin, 2001).  
In the next chapter, based on export performance, which is close to Jalal 
Ahmad’s, and Fukase and Martin’s model, a mathematical model for generalized 
economic integration and a theory for explanation of the mathematical model behavior 
are presented within a geometric model. In order to keep the consistency of the 
discussion and show the role this dissertation plays in the advancement of the notion of 
customs unions, we will present the theory in the next chapter.  
However, to summarize, the conclusion of the literature review is that we cannot 
offer a definite opinion regarding the welfare effects and the allocation of customs 
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union resources among each group of countries, and, what we can say about the 
developing countries, is accompanied by some level of ambiguity.  
Therefore, it is natural if we try to place the theory of the present dissertation on 
a more general basis.  
3.5 Empirical Findings on Regional Economic Integration 
The previous sections presented a comprehensive overview of the theory on regional 
economic integration, which illustrated how regional trading agreements work and 
showed the way they are beneficial to member states. The following part is dedicated to 
a review of the empirical evidence that deals with the influences of regional economic 
integration. 
Accordingly, based on the methodology employed by researchers to analyze the 
effects of the formation of regional economic integration on trade flows, the 
classification of the following approaches is formed as: descriptive approach, simulation 
approach (Computable General Equilibrium), and econometric approach (gravity model 
and others). Moreover, the data collected for analysis are classified as cross section, 
time series, and panel based on aggregate or sectoral level.  
According to the above classifications, the subsequent section provides a review of 
the introduced topics. 
3.5.1 Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model 
A static Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model or a dynamic inter-
temporal general equilibrium model forms the basis of the simulation approach. The 
model provides an in-depth illustration of the economic structures and behavior of 
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agents; and, through the framework, presents a simulation of the economic impact of the 
current or proposed regional blocs. Usually, substantial and potential benefits resulting 
from trade liberalization between members of a RTA are provided by simulation based 
on the general equilibrium models. 
Plenty of ex ante CGE studies of trade agreements have investigated the impacts 
of preferential trading arrangements (e.g., Haaland and Norman, 1992; Brown and 
Stern, 1989a; Brown et al., 1992). In order to analyze the possible consequences of a 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), Hertel et al. (2007) applied CGE analysis. 
The researchers report that one of the results of the FTAA is the increase of imports 
worldwide, and that this result does not experience any variation in the trade elasticities. 
In addition, better results can be obtained by combining econometric work with CGE-
based policy analysis; the results most probably appeal to up-to-date policy makers, as 
reported by Hertel et al. (2007). 
The results obtained from CGE studies are not easily generalizable because the 
results in these models are dependent on assumptions, parameters, and data, which call 
for careful interpretation (Negasi, 2009). 
Moreover, investigation of the questions for this study is not possible through 
CGE studies.  Another characteristic of CGE studies is their prospective nature instead 
of retrospective nature, as stated by Krueger (1999).Furthermore, the analysis of any 
particular market is not possible in the CGE model, because of the sectoral aggregation. 
According to Mckitrick (1998), policy information is usually outdated, and base line 
scenarios are far from being factual and are based on the older data. According to 
Milner and Sledziewska (2008), CGE studies depend extensively on data and are not 
applicable with high levels of data disaggregation. Accordingly, in some cases, the 
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results obtained through CGE studies lack the required validity, and, while the CGE 
models are useful for speculating on the effects of a particular agreement, they do not 
provide firm evidence. 
3.5.2 Gravity Model 
It is essential to know the sort of Gravity model before reviewing the existing 
gravity literature on the effects of trade agreements. A preferential trade agreement is 
set up among members to enable them to trade at reduced tariff rates; accordingly, it is 
possible to categorize them as partial or total with regard to the extent of duty reduction 
or commodity coverage. Furthermore, the total agreements can be classified according 
to their level of integration.
1
Therefore, the gravity literature includes a variety of policy 
issues by analyzing different types of trade agreements. For instance, Baier and 
Bergstrand (2007, 2009a) explored free trade agreements, and the impacts of RTAs are 
studied by Ghosh and Yamarik (2004a), and Magee (2003). From a different point of 
view, the partial impacts of seven particular RTAs are estimated by Carrère (2006) from 
a single gravity equation. Whether the depth or form of agreements matter with regard 
to their impact on members' bilateral trade by including separate controls for RTA types 
was investigated by Vicard (2009) and Roy (2010a). Accordingly, with regard to the 
conducting of various and adequate studies on the topic, the comparison of different 
point estimates is not helpful. Therefore, according to Cipollina and Salvatici (2010), 
RTAs can be best categorized as reciprocal and nonreciprocal agreements to circumvent 
this issue of conducting a meta-analysis. 
                                                 
1
In this context, it should be noted that Frankel (1997) also categorizes partial agreements as reciprocal and 
nonreciprocal. Frankel (1997, p. 13) considers one-way concessions to have been “widely tolerated” by the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
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Developing an accurate counterfactual of ex-post studies of how much trade 
would have increased in the absence of a given free trade agreement or customs union 
has proved difficult (Roy, 2010b). For instance, Balassa (1967, 1975) constructed a 
counterfactual of how trade would have changed in the absence of European integration 
by calculating pre-integration income elasticities that were assumed to continue post-
integration. However, later, it was shown that before and after integration, the elasticity 
of income changes considerably, and this variation makes the results subject to the 
sample period. The gravity model has been applied to examine the effect of preferential 
arrangements on the flows of trade by a few researchers (e.g., Aitkin, 1973; Willmore, 
1976; Frankel and Kahler, 1994; Frankel, 1997; Aitkin and Obutelewicz, 1976; Frankel 
and Wei, 1995; Krueger, 1999). Analyzing the impact of CUSFTA as well as NAFTA 
from 1989 to 1995, Schwanen (2009) conducted a full-fledged research to explore 
changes in the Canadian trade patterns. In his study, a comparison is made between the 
sectors liberalized because of these arrangements with trade in other sectors; his 
comparison reveals that trade development with the US is faster in liberalized sectors.   
In order to examine the effect of the FTA on inter-province trade, Helliwell et al. 
(1998) employed two sorts of evidence. To provide an explanation for both inter-
province and province-state trade flows, the authors first put forth a gravity model. 
Later, they examined new data relevant to industry to determine the degree to which 
tariff changes in the US and Canada provide an explanation for inter-industry 
differences, which lead to the growth of inter-province trade. 
At the aggregate level, Helliwell et al.’s (1998) findings indicate that in 
proportion to east-west trade, north-south trade was increased by the FTA. When the 
adjustment for suitable factors was done, the gravity model put forth that, if there had 
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been no change in the1988 trade structure, the inter-province trade would have been 
13%more than it actually was in 1996. However, it is difficult to estimate the net impact 
of the FTA on the total 15% increase in inter-province trade from 1988 to 1996, because 
the general economic growth of the provinces was also affected by the FTA. 
At the disaggregated level, Helliwell et al.’s (1998) findings indicate that the 
increases in imports from the US and the decreases of inter-province trade were because 
of the FTA-related reduction in Canadian tariffs. Moreover, both exports to the US and 
the inter-province trade increased because the US tariffs decreased.  All together, the 
researchers estimated that FTA-induced tariff cuts caused a 7% decrease in inter-
province trade, which was around half of the total reduction previously calculated with 
aggregate data. 
In order to obtain the effects of separate trade creation and diversion, regional 
dummy variables (inter and extra) have been used in gravity models (using ex-post 
approaches). The estimated coefficients on the dummy variables may capture a range of 
policy and other (including misspecification) effects rather than the regional trade 
policy effect under investigation. It is also the case that gravity modeling is invariably 
used to model total trade flows or at least broad aggregates of trade. The available 
empirical research on the topic, however, indicates that most of the results provided by 
researchers are obtained through aggregated data. Nevertheless, the calculations 
obtained based on aggregated data are questioned, because the data may blur changes 
happening at the level of disaggregated data. Moreover, the application of disaggregated 
increases provides the opportunity to use the variation in the extent of tariff 
liberalization under the agreement without utilizing such a variable. The identification 
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of the impacts of tariff liberalization on different sectors is complicated. Therefore, the 
variation of sector can lead to a difference in the welfare consequences.  
Because of the lack of research conducted on the topic, Clausing (2001) through 
a supply and demand framework specification analysis, used the commodity level data. 
His findings show that “CUSFTA had substantial trade creation effects, with little 
evidence of trade diversion”. Moreover, the author argued that contrary to the 
approaches of a lot of past research on preferential trading agreements, which have been 
based on aggregate data, it is possible to examine how trade flows are influenced 
because of actual tariff changes by using disaggregate data. It is much more complicated 
to differentiate between the impacts of an agreement and those of other impacts 
influencing trade flows, without using the variation in the extent of liberalization across 
goods. In this regard, this thesis is in agreement with the notions explained above. 
In a similar study, the effects of the trade creation and trade diversion of the 
North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) were analyzed by Jayasinghe and 
Sarker (2008) on the trade of six particular agri-food products between 1985 to 2000. 
Applying the generalized least squares methods and pooled cross-sectional time-series 
regression, the authors calculate an extended gravity model. Their results indicate that 
there was a growth in intra-regional trade because of NAFTA, and that NAFTA 
displaced trade with other countries worldwide.  
At the level of disaggregated trade data, Milner and Sledziewska (2008) applied 
panel data economic model analysis and revealed that although it was temporary, the 
European Agreement significantly influenced the trade diversion of imports in Poland; 
they showed that trade creation was considerably dominated by trade diversion. 
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The impact of previous trade and income on the flows of present trade has often 
been ignored in the estimation of the trade panel gravity models. However, because of a 
number of economic reasons, trade has been proven to be dynamic. Through the 
extension of the static model with lagged regressors and the incorporation of trade and 
income lags, Bun and Klassen (2002) compensated for the shortcomings of the static 
panel gravity mode. Bun and Klassen (2002) employed a panel of 221 annual bilateral 
OECD trade flows over 48 years to show the significance of the dynamics and the 
misspecification of static models.  
The studies of the effects of regional integration have also been conducted in the 
African context. As indicated by the findings of the conventional gravity model, 
Alemayehu and Haile (2008), in a study on COMESA, indicated that it is possible by 
standard variables to provide an explanation for bilateral trade flows among the regional 
groupings, even when the impact of regional groupings is not significant on bilateral 
trade flows. Moreover, the authors propose that weak cooperation of the private sector, 
compensation issues, overlapping membership, harmonization of policy, political 
commitment, and changes in primary conditions limit the efficiency of regional blocs. 
The implications of the temporary actions for goods sensitive from the Ugandan 
viewpoint were evaluated through a partial equilibrium model by Khorana et al. (2007). 
The rationale behind these arrangements is questioned by the findings obtained through 
simulation. The authors provided a discussion concerning whether the regional trading 
arrangements had been really advantageous to the stakeholders; they further proposed 
approaches for Uganda to take more benefit within the customs union through 
liberalization of trade. Under these critical circumstances, since the current empirical 
studies on the regional integration impacts on the trade flows of partner countries is 
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probably different regionally, even in Africa, it is worth investigating particular regional 
blocs. 
 A number of countries have been estimated through this sort of model. For 
instance, the trade flows between Bangladesh and its main trading partners have been 
studied by Rahman (2003), who employed import export and total trade. The researcher 
found that, in general, Bangladesh’s trade is determined by the size of the economy, 
GNP per capita, distance and openness. Moreover, through a gravity model, Blomqvist, 
(2004) provided an explanation for the trade flow of Singapore, and a very high degree 
of explanation is achieved, especially for the GDP and distance variable. In another 
study, Anaman and Al-Kharusi (2003), through a gravity model framework, showed 
that the determinant of Brunei’s trade with EU is mainly from the population of Brunei 
and EU countries.    
 The relationship of trade blocs and intra-trade of economic blocs have also been 
explained through the Gravity model. For instance, as reported by Tang (2003), EU 
integration significantly reduced the trade with ASEAN and NAFTA (North American 
Free Trade Agreement) from 1981 to 2000.  In another study, the significance of 
geographic distance, economic size, and common language in intra-regional bilateral 
trade was highlighted for ASEAN by Thornton and Goglio (2002). Martinez-Zarzoso et 
al. (2004) stated that geographic sensitivity and economic distance can be used as 
criteria to categorize the export sectors; the authors further showed which goods enjoy 
export strength through the gravity model framework. Martinez-Zarzoso et al.’s (2004) 
findings indicate that countries in the Southern Common Market (comprising Argentina, 
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Paraguay, Uruguay and Brazil) and European Union would enjoy a significant 
geographical effect from bilateral trading in the footwear and furniture sectors.   
However, irrespective of the differences in defining the RTA variable(s), 
choosing the variables in the trade agreement and the likely resulting bias from this 
selection is the main concern in the literature. With regard to the inadequate consensus 
about the bias direction, the concern receives more relevance. Although variables 
omission may cause the trade agreement coefficient estimates to go up and down, there 
is the probability of positive selection by referring to the “natural trading partner 
hypothesis”, as stated by Magee (2003). Although there is considerable literature, which 
dates back to Tinbergen (1962) about RTA, the issue has experienced recent 
investigation. For instance, in an attempt to study endogeneity, “one of the first 
estimates” of the influence of preferential trade agreements was provided by Magee 
(2003) through a simultaneous equations model. Based on IV, Magee (2003) showed 
that the states’ volume of bilateral trade for intensify the potentiality of the states to 
participate in a trade agreement; however, he does not provide evidence of sufficient 
clarity regarding the effect of such agreements on trade. 
In addition, the instruments employed, e.g. two states’ GDP similarities or two 
states’ factor capacities, is under question. Surprisingly, in spite of the fact that the 
instruments employed by Magee (2003) are under question, they have the credibility to 
indicate that most political and economic variables do not fulfill the exclusion 
limitation, and, consequently, cannot be employed as instruments.   
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 Although various forms of gravity equation are available because of the 
extensive use of the gravity model in empirical studies, this model, possesses a few 
common characteristics across the literature. 
 Firstly, the use of the gravity model clarifies bilateral trade, and the trade 
variable has set up the dependent variable in the gravity equation. 
 Secondly, as in Radman (2003), and Montanari (2005), GDP or GDP per capita 
and GNP or GNP per capita are used to measure the economic mass of the exporting 
and importing countries. The fact underlying this is that states possessing more income 
capacity are more inclined to trade, and states possessing less income are less inclined 
to trade.  
 Thirdly, distance, which is defined as the geographical distance between states, 
is usually used as one of the main variables in the gravity model. Distance also acts as a 
proxy for the expenses of transport; it is normally considered as the straight-line 
distance between economic centers of states. However, distance cannot always be 
considered an accurate variable. For example, China possesses many economic centers, 
which are many thousands of kilometers from one another. 
 Finally, to seek such qualitative variables as colonial history, border, trade 
agreement, and languages in bilateral trade, gravity equations often involve dummy 
variables. 
Numerous studies have been conducted to examine the impact of regional 
integration on the trade patterns of D-8.  Kabir Hassan et al. (2010), for example, 
addressed the economic performance of the OIC member countries through the analysis 
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of trade data within a gravity model framework. The authors studied the future of an 
Islamic Common Market. Analyzing a variety of sub-regional groupings, their results 
indicate the trade creation of D-8, comprising eight bigger OIC member countries. For 
example, two countries in the D-8 bloc would trade 4.28 times more among themselves 
rather than two otherwise-similar countries outside the bloc would. 
Othman et al. (2010) applied a multi-country computable general equilibrium 
model, i.e., GTAP. The results indicate that while D-8 intra-trade is expected to 
increase very substantially, not all countries will experience a welfare gain under a 
free trade arrangement. Likewise, the impact on economic sectors differs substantially 
across countries. The simulation results show that the D-8 free trade would increase 
intra-trade very pronouncedly by 87 percent. This clearly indicates that if increasing 
intra-trade is an important objective of the D-8 preferential trade arrangement, it would 
very likely succeed.  
However, the proposed intra D-8 free trade is likely to have a small effect on 
member countries’ GDP due to the particularly minute intra-trade base between 
them. It is expected that Malaysia’s GDP and its overall national welfare would 
show the highest gain relative to other D-8 member nations. Besides Malaysia, Turkey, 
Indonesia and Pakistan are also expected to benefit from freer trade in D-8 in terms of 
welfare increase, and, hence, poverty alleviation. 
 A study conducted by the D-8 secretariat (2008a) explains the main 
commodities of foreign trade of D-8 countries for export and import, which indicate 
the member countries comparative advantage in producing these goods. In another 
study, theD-8 secretariat (2008b) looks at the current account balance among D-8 
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countries over the last decade; the results show that the current account balance was 
only negative for Turkey and Bangladesh and that all D-8 members were improving 
their current account balance except Iran and Turkey. 
Acar et al. (2009), by using a multi-sector, multi-country computable general 
equilibrium framework, for three D-8 member countries, investigated the impact of full 
trade liberalization among Malaysia, Indonesia and Bangladesh. The simulation results 
indicated that free trade among these three countries likely benefit Indonesia and 
Malaysia while leading to some welfare loss for Bangladesh. Based on the results, it can 
be suggested that mechanisms be developed in order to strengthen the adjustment 
capacity of the less developed trade partners. 
Nikbakhtet al.(2011) studied the bilateral trade in D-8. Similar to previous 
papers in this area of research, they applied a generalized version of the gravity model 
to analyze the bilateral trade in D-8. In this model, they entered the similarity in 
economic structure, the economic openness degree of importer countries and the trade 
policy into the basic model and used it to survey the bilateral trade in D-8. 
The results indicate that all variables (except for the policy trade) in the used 
model have the expected sign and are significant. In summary, the results indicate that 
the GDP of the home and host countries have a positive sign; the population of the 
home (host) country has a negative (positive) sign; similarity in economic structure has 
a negative sign and the economic openness degree of importer countries has a positive 
effect on bilateral trade. In addition, the results indicate that the geographical distances 
among the capitals of the D-8 members has a negative relationship with bilateral trade.  
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3.6 Summary 
Generally, three groups of studies emerge from a review of the current studies of the 
methodology of evaluating the impact of regional economic integration on flows of 
trade among countries. A number of methods have been used in empirical research to 
explore the impact of RTAs. The number of empirical studies that use economy wide, 
multi-sectoral computable general equilibrium models for examining the welfare effects 
of RTAs is considerable. Although computable general equilibrium models are effective 
for the investigation of welfare effects, some empirical weaknesses undermine them. 
The first limitation is their prospective nature, as reported by Krueger (1999). The 
second limitation is that the investigation of particular markets is not possible through 
sectoral aggregation. McKitrick (1998) reported the policy information of them and 
pointed out that their baseline scenarios lack reality and relied on older data. Third, they 
rely on fundamental assumptions of perfect competition and constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) technology, and a system of demand and supply ensuring market 
clearing mechanisms, which are not realistic. Furthermore, information for sectors is not 
provided, especially for the poorest nations. Therefore, the findings of CGE analyses are 
not always reliable, as stated by Jayasinghe and Sarker (2008).  
The study of the effects of RTAs has also been conducted through descriptive 
approaches. To figure out the regional concentration of trade, a variety of indicators are 
used in descriptive studies. A descriptive approach is based on the assumption that when 
there is no agreement, there would be no change in the amount of trade happening with 
partner nations. Descriptive approaches are based on a static framework and its findings 
rely on the aggregation level. Accordingly, changes in the terms of trade due to changes 
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in the relative trade importance of members and outsiders, as well as a decline in the 
volume of trade for a single commodity included in the broader class, cannot be 
detected. Moreover, analysis of the effects of trade creation and diversion is not possible 
through the descriptive approach, and, consequently, it fails to study welfare 
implications of RTAs (Negasi, 2009). 
Using pre-RTA and post-RTA data, the impact of RTAs was entered into the model 
specification and estimate models. By employing regional dummy variables, the effect 
of RTAs on flows of trade is obtained. This is called the gravity model approach, and it 
provides an explanation for bilateral trade flows between trading partners overtime. This 
approach is a useful method for evaluation of the impact of RTAs. 
On the other hand, the basis of the current economic integration arrangements is 
on regional priorities and there are no traces of ideological priorities in this regard.  
Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to study the significance of economic integration or 
cooperation with regard to priorities of ideology and religion. The thesis is going to 
investigate the opportunities for such an arrangement, highlight how such an 
arrangement may be challenged, and provide prospective policy recommendations 
(Raimi and Mobolaji, 2008). Most of the studies (e.g., Hassan, 2001) conducted on the 
capacity for trade among OIC countries are based on regional considerations, and have 
ignored the ideological considerations. This study can therefore fill the gap and pioneer 
investigation of religious priorities for economic integration.   
Despite the important role of D-8 countries, the empirical literature analyzing D-
8 members’ trade with each other is still rather limited. There is no similar study in the 
case of D-8 in the literature; therefore, the present practical study could be valuable for 
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all individual D-8 members. The study contributes significantly to the field of Islamic 
economics and applied economics. Unlike conventional economics, the thesis proposes 
a bloc whose basis is on faith. 
Through the econometric point of view, the issue of non-random selection and 
the paucity of reliable instruments, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) recommended the use 
of panel data in order to at least control for selection on the basis of time-invariant 
unobservables. Hence, the application of panel fixed effects was used by Kandogan 
(2008) and Magee (2008). 
Regarding the tension between the data time dimension and the time-invariant 
unobservables, the findings of such studies need cautious interpretation. Furthermore, 
the application of panel data cannot end the obscurity about the bias direction. While 
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) proposed the possibility of negative selection on the basis 
of time-invariant unobservables, according to Magee (2008), “the bilateral fixed effects 
solve the problem of positive selection”. 
More recently, although Henderson and Millimet (2008) found that the concern 
over the gravity model’s parametric form was unwarranted, Egger et al. (2008), and 
Baier and Bergstrand (2009a) employed matching techniques. While Egger et al. (2008) 
continued to avoid potential selection due to time-invariant unobservables by using 
difference-in-differences matching; Baier and Bergstrand (2009b) “revert to the world 
of selection on observables by alluding to many who have argued that the selection bias 
on observables may well dominate that on unobservable”. However, it is a popular fact 
that the gravity model cannot determine which observables are involved in the trade 
cost function. In this context, the thesis enriches the field through the control of a 
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number of representative observables, and, through the assessment of the robustness of 
RTA coefficient estimates, to the selection of unobservables. In summary, this thesis is 
contributive in three ways: it attempts to investigate a faith-based integration possibility; 
the thesis further provides the causes of low achievements of the attempts made for 
integration among D-8 Muslim countries; and, finally, it proposes an econometric 
model modified by dummy variables in respect of the geographical barrier and uses the 
trade indices as complementary to determine theD-8 member states trade situation. 
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CHAPTER 4                                                              
METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH 
4.1 Introduction 
This sector is made up of the model specification, which covers the theoretical 
background for the gravity model and its application in determination of the flow of 
trade in D-8, as well as describing the nature of the data and variables employed in 
specific model estimation. 
In this chapter we will first present a generalization for the gravity model that 
studies the counter exports (or imports) of different countries, usually economic 
integration member states, and then we will extract a new expanded gravity model that 
is different from previous models in several aspects. After that, its infrastructural theory 
will be discussed. This is a theory for the formation of a customs union among 
developing countries, which confirms the new gravity model, albeit against which the 
generality of the gravity model is still protected.  
4.2 Gravity Models of International Trade 
In its simplest form, the gravity model was first presented in economics in the 
following way by Tinbergen (1962) and Linneman (1966), which has been directly 
derived from Newton's theory of gravitation:  
Tij= C1+C2Yi+C3Yj+C4POPi+ C5POPj+ C6Dcu+ C7Dlan+ C8DdC9DrelP+Uij              (4.1) 
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Where i and j denote particular countries, Tij is the exports (imports) of country i 
to (from) j, Yi is the income of the country i,Yj is the income of the country j, POPi is the 
population of country i and PoPj is the population of country j, that appear on the right 
side as explanatory variables. Yi and Yj are the mass variables in Newton's equation and 
the variable of population is two other scale variables. Following these variables, a 
series of Dummy variables are added to explain other effects on the mutual trade in the 
country. Dcu is a Dummy variable that is equal to one in the case where the two 
countries are members of a customs union, and otherwise it is equal to zero. It is 
expected that the coefficient of this variable, (C6), is positive, which shows that the 
customs union has a positive effect on two countries' trade. Dlan is a Dummy variable for 
the common language of the two countries, and if they are common, it is equal to one, 
otherwise it is equal to zero. It is expected that the common language will have a 
positive effect on the two countries' trade. Dd is a Dummy variable showing the 
distance, or adjacency of the two countries. In the case where the two countries are 
adjacent, it is equal to one; otherwise it is equal to zero. The adjacency of the two 
countries will have a positive effect on the two countries' trade. The more two countries 
are close to each other, the more they will have trade with each other, because the 
transportation costs affect the trade. Therefore, distance will have a negative impact on 
the trade; like the Newton model that has a negative impact on gravitation. Since the 
adjacent countries trade more, they are considered as natural partners (Frankel, 
etal.,1995). Drel is a Dummy variable standing for common religion, or any common 
cultural factor, that can have a positive impact on the trade between two countries.  
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It is expected that the coefficients of C2 and C3will be positive and that the 
coefficients C4 and C5will be negative. The more the revenue of the two countries 
increases, the mutual trade will become more. On the other hand, population growth has 
a negative influence because, on one side, the population growth will increase the size 
of the local market, so the country will be more introverted and will have more imported 
rival industries, and, on the other side, it reduces the exports of this country because the 
same industries have to meet the needs of the increasing population. Finally Uij is a log 
normally distributed error term with E (Uij) = 0. 
After the introduction of this model to the experimental analysis of international 
trade, in order to study the mutual or counter trade processes, or capital flows, the 
evaluation of the effects of economic integration plans, especially EEC and EFTA;;the 
evaluation of the potential power of trading between various countries, especially the 
measurement of exports and imports revenue elasticity; and the effect of trade barriers 
like tariffs and non-tariff barriers, like distance, hostility or cultural differences on trade 
have been repeatedly applied. An initial classic study in this regard was carried out by 
Aitken (1973) who used it to calculate the effects of trade creation and diversion. 
Usually the application of this model, in practice, has witnessed a remarkable 
experimental success. However, no substantiation of the gravity model has been 
presented so far and there are still ongoing conflicts in this regard. The most important 
of which is the experimental application of the gravity model by Frankel (1995), which 
considers the Dummy variable of distance to test the theory whether or not the countries 
of the American continent could be regarded as normal trade partners, and, following 
that, it also tests two important advancements of Krugman (1991b, 1991a).This article 
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faced strong criticism by Polak (1996). He rejected the perception of the trade effects of 
geographical distance in the gravity model and argued that the results of Frankel's 
article are not correct. Particularly, once again it is claimed that the gravity model does 
not have theoretical substantiation or a theoretical basis.  
Since 1970, many efforts were made to theoretically prove the gravity model by 
Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985, 1989 and 1990). Deardrof (1995 and 1997) also 
tried to prove the gravity model. He relied on the works of Helpman and Krugman 
(1987) to extract the simple forms of gravity models out of their work. Evenet and 
Keller (1998), and Feenstra, Arkusen and Rose (1998) also extracted the gravity model 
from the Heckscher-Ohlin theoretical model or new theories of international trade based 
on Helpman-Krugman and referring to Deardorf. Referring to the basic work carried out 
by Helpman, Krugman and Deardorf, and Bergstrand, Sologa and Winters (2001) 
recognized their efforts as partial substantiation of the gravity model, albeit not 
complete substantiation. Anderson (2001) is another effort to study the theoretical 
foundation of the gravity model. The major expansion of his work in 1979 was to study 
the trade puzzle in Canada after the country's free trade with US: the trade within 
Canada's provinces had increased more than the trade of the border provinces of Canada 
with the provinces of the US states. Hence, a general basis has not yet been provided for 
the gravity model.  
On the other hand, it has been specified that the gravity model complies with the 
new theories of international trade that consider the different goods and monopoly 
competition or oligopoly, and efficiency on an increasing scale and the inter-industry 
trade; therefore, its application in testing of the competition theory of international trade 
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against each other is not considered to be convincing (Deardorf, 1997) and it is often 
claimed that the basis of the gravity model is more generalized than the two trade rival 
theories (Feenstra, Markusen & Rose 1998). Humnels and Levinston (1995) also 
believe that it is something besides the increasing efficiency on the scale of main factor 
for success of the gravity model. Evenet and Keller (1998), similar to Feenstra, 
Markusen and Rose (1998), with distinction between the data samples, in terms of 
different goods, intra-industry trade, inter-industry trade and factor proportions, 
explained the success of the gravity model in forecasting the trade processes between 
the countries with very different factor proportions and the low share of intra-industry 
trade in the whole trade, or, as expressed by them, "North-South" trade (based on full 
specialization in Heckscher-Ohlin model) on one side, and the success of the model 
based on the theory of increasing efficiency on the scale in trade among those countries 
in which product distinction and intra-industry trade prevail, or, as termed by them, 
"North-North" trade, on the other side. Hence, their work is based on model 
identification, which identifies the gravity model in each homogeneous or non-
homogeneous good, the fundamental theory.  
The gravity model has been extremely successful empirically. Models of this 
type have now been estimated for a wide range of countries. Rahman (2004) uses 
import export and total trade, and three equations to investigate the trade flow between 
Bangladesh and its major trading partners. He finds that, in general, Bangladesh’s trade 
is determined by the size of the economy, GNP per capita, distance and openness. 
Blomqvist (2004) applies the gravity model to explain the trade flow of Singapore, and, 
as usual with the gravity model, a very high degree of explanation is achieved, 
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especially for the GDP and distance variable. Anaman and Al-Kharusa (2003) on the 
other hand show that in a gravity model framework, the determinant of Brunei’s trade 
with the EU is mainly from the population of Brunei and EU countries.    
The gravity model is also applied to explain the trade relationship between trade 
blocs and the intra trade of economic blocs. Using the gravity model, Tang (2003) 
found that EU integration resulted in a significant trade decrease with ASEAN and 
NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) during the period 1981- 2000. 
Thornton and Goglio (2002) proved the importance of economic size, geography 
distance and common language in intra-regional bilateral trade for ASEAN   
Martinez-Zarzoso et al (2004) classified the export sectors according to their 
sensitivity to geographical and economic distance, and, under the gravity model 
framework, they identified which commodities enjoyed export strength. Their results 
showed that sectors, such as footwear and furniture, enjoy a high and significant 
geographical effect in bilateral trading between the EU and countries in the Southern 
Common Market (comprising Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Brazil).   
There are a large number of empirical applications of the gravity model; it is not 
strange to have many variations of the gravity equation. However, within the intensive 
literature the gravity model shares some common features.  
First, the gravity model is applied to explain bilateral trade, the dependent 
variable of the gravity equation is always the trade variable.   
Second, the economic mass of the exporting and importing country is measured 
by GDP, GNP or GNP per capita, with the GDP per capita in some augmenting the 
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gravity model, such as Rahman (2009), Montanari (2005). The idea behind this is that 
countries with higher income tend to trade more and those with lower income trade less.    
Third, distance is another commonly used variable in the gravity model. 
Distance is the geographical distance between countries; it is also a proxy for transport 
cost, which is usually measured as the straight-line distance between the countries’ 
economic centers (usually capitals). However it is not a very accurate measure in some 
cases, such as using Beijing, the capital of China, in that it under or over estimates the 
distance between China and other trading partners because China has many economic 
centers that are thousands of kilometers apart. Finally, dummy variables are always 
included in the gravity equation in order to investigate the qualitative variables, such as 
border, language, colonial history, and trade agreement in bilateral trade.   
Moreover, it seems that there has not been any study of bilateral trade flows 
amongst the D-8 countries in a gravity model framework.  This thesis tries to fill the 
gaps in the literature concerning D-8 countries by utilizing the gravity model to explore 
the relationship among the D-8 countries for two stages – from 1983 to1997 and 1997 
to 2008. The gravity model estimated in this thesis is based on panel data with fixed 
effect estimation. 
In this chapter, we will show that the gravity model can have a general 
foundation and considering how it is extracted here, without sticking to any hypothesis 
regarding preferences, the type of goods, technology, specialization or the type of 
market; it is able to use different fundamental models or various data to produce good 
experimental forecasts from trade processes. In this research, the gravity model is 
actually derived from the principal unification framework of national accounting and 
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presents a better understanding of the time route of trade elasticities compared to GDP, 
the interrelation of exports and imports, trade liberalization, the effect of geographical 
distance and tariffs, and how they are interpreted in the gravity model, the relation 
between exports and economic growth and the consequences of trade liberalization and 
economic integration as well as globalization. Also, short-term and long-term 
elasticities are separated and the logic beyond why long-term elasticities are smaller 
than short-term elasticities (Bayoumi, 1998) and the difference of elasticities of imports 
and exports from each other in short-term and long-term periods are put into discussion.  
4.3 First Extraction 
Helpman and Krugman, in one two-country and two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin 
model of the world economy, showed that the following relation is established between 
the volume of trade and GDP:   
                                                                                       (4.2)  
In which VT is the volume of trade,  is the share of the jth country from the 
world’s . This relation has been derived based on a full specialization hypothesis in 
production of distinctive products. Here is the measure of dispersion of 
relative country size. Since Σ = 1, the more the size of the two countries are close to 
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each other the proportion of VT/  is higher and when the countries are all one size, 
it is at its maximum level . The said ratio is actually the ratio of trade to GDP and when 
the per capital income of countries get closer to each other, the trade-production ratio 
will also increase. This means that in the dynamic route of growth, the economies 
become more open and free, and the trade will expand.  
In the whole period after World War II, the volume of trade has grown faster 
than GDP because the measure of dispersion of the relative size of global economies for 
advanced countries that dominate the global economy and trade has increased (Helpman 
and Krugman, 1985). On the other hand, the share of developing countries has also 
increased in the whole World's GDP and a higher share of production has been allocated 
to trade. For the same reason, we expect that in the short term and in a dynamic growth 
route, the growth of trade or growth of exports of every country will be higher than the 
GDP growth.  
In this way, assuming a full specialization (intra-industry, or inter-industry  
specialization in production), same preferences, and establishment of a unified price 
policy, the country j consumes the quantity of  of each good produced in the world's 
economy or produced by itself and exports (1- ), part of which,  is exported to k
th 
country. So  or export of j to k is as follows:  
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= =                                                                                             (4.3) 
This is a form of gravity model.   
Based on the same relation, Evenet and Keller (1998), like Deardrof (1995, 
1997), extracted the gravity relation as follows:  
(4.4)  
In which M is the counter imports of the two countries I and J and  is the 
world's total production.  and  are the productions of the two countries i and j. These 
equations have been extracted based on the assumption that there is no trade barrier and 
transportation costs. We can expect that if each country produces any type of good, and 
in the case where the production costs of each country are similar, we can hardly find 
motivation for trade, because there is no reason for trade since the consumers are 
indifferent among the sellers (Deardrof-1995).  
Obviously, this type of reasoning requires restricting assumptions, in which 
sometimes the trade model is not defined (the first case in Deardrof's article), the share 
of consumption is considered fixed and we have to stick on the differentiation or 
homogeneity of the goods or full specialization in production. The trend of research is 
then extended to whether the Heckscher-Ohlin theory or the new international trade 
theory is able to explain the gravity model and its success. In addition, the existence of 
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the  scale factor, which covers all its previous substantiations, is limited to some 
extent, because they are not considered in the estimations.  
In order to show in detail and in a newer and more useful way how this gravity 
equation is derived without the said faults, we consider two countries that manufacture 
differentiated goods, which consume a fixed share of their own products and the 
products of the other country, and export the rest of their production:  
=  ; i=j,k                                                                                                          (4.5) 
In which  is the consumption by i
th 
country, GDP is the sum of National Gross Product 
of the two countries and is the share of consumption of the two countries j and k 
(i=j,k). So, the export of country j to k is as follows:  
 (4.6) 
And the export of country k to j is:  
(4.7) 
                                                                                    (4.8) 
This is obviously the gravity equation. We can show that:  
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(4.9)                                                                                         
Because  
   (4.10)  
So 
                                                                                                                        (4.11) 
Since in an equilibrium state, the exports of the two countries to each other are equal, 
we have:  
                                                                                              (4.12) 
Therefore: 
                                                                                                          (4.13) 
Based on equation (4.9), and assuming that the existence of tariffs and 
transportation cost (1+tk) and (1+djk), and considering the constraints of the state budget 
k, this is in the following form:  
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                                                                                   (4.14) 
(Because the total consumption of country k is equal to the GDP of the same country) 
and especially considering that:  
                                                                                                             (4.15) 
So, if we put quantities instead of  we can show that:  
 
                                                                 (4.16) 
yk and yj are per capita GDP of the two countries and Nj and Nk are the population of 
the two countries. tk is the tariff of country k, which has a negative impact on the exports 
of country j, and djk is the cost of transportation of each unit of goods, which still has a 
negative impact on the counter exports.  
The constraint of the budget, taking tariff and transportation costs into 
consideration, will be as follows:  
                                                         (4.17) 
In which:  
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                                                                                                (4.18) 
Therefore, the more the per capita production of the two countries is close to 
each other, the more counter exports they will have, although it will also be influenced 
by the ratio of population of the two countries. The ratio of yk/yj actually shows the 
Linder effect in the gravity model, and some of the authors in their estimated models 
have inserted the logarithm of the square root of the difference of the per capita 
production of the two countries in order to measure this effect in the gravity models. 
The bigger the per capita of country k compared to country j, the more exports j will 
have to k. If we consider that j is the US and k is China, the per capita production of the 
US is almost 40 times more than China's, although China's population is 5 times that of 
the US. Population, Nk, introvertly affects the counter exports of the two countries and 
the high difference of per capita production will reduce it. This extraction justifies the 
insertion of the variable of the population of the two countries into the gravity model.  
A more considerable point is the effect of the growth of Sj on the exports of j to 
k. The more the share of consumption in country j increases, the more exports j will 
have to k. According to relation (4.16) in the case where the US GDP is 10 times more 
than that of China's GDP, (the share) the US consumption will be 10 times more than 
(the share) that of China's consumption. Now, if this time we consider j as China and K 
as the US, upon the increase of China's share of consumption (Sj) the exports of China 
to the US will increase. In the extraction of the next part, we will see that upon the 
increase of consumption in the globalization theory, counter exports will also increase.  
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In the last relation we can normalize , and in that case the gravity equation 
will be fully obtained. This normalization is carried out based on Krugman (1980). In 
another way we can assume that is the imports of country j from k, and in this case 
we can reach findings similar to the next extraction. This extraction has been carried out 
based on such assumptions as the fixed ratio of consumption, differentiated goods and 
specialization, as well as the homogenous preferences that are, to some extent, 
considered as restricting assumptions.  
4.4 More General Extraction of Gravity Model 
In this section, without considering these constraining assumptions, a more 
general extraction of the gravity model, with more important characteristics, is 
presented. Here we start from the principal unification of the national income 
accounting and we only apply one globalization theory for extracting the final form of 
the gravity model. In addition, no specific behavioral theory is used for extraction of the 
model, which could be related to the theories of the international trade competitor. Let 
us assume there are two countries of j and k:  
 ;    i=j,k                                                                                       (4.19) 
And the globalization:  
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;    i=j,k                                                                                             (4.20)
 This assumption says that the consumption of each country is a function of the 
total imports of that country and the more globalization is expanded, the more 
correlation the consumption of each country will have with imports. This assumption 
models the trend of economic integration of the world's countries, or global integration 
(and is different from the functional form of the relation of imports in the following 
equations system). 
Now we consider the following system for the economy of the two countries: 
 
 
 
(4.21) 
We take the total differential from the first three equations and we then show them as 
follows:  
                                                                                         (4.22) 
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                                                                                        (4.23) 
                                                                                    (4.24) 
 
We then put the first three equations of the system (4.21) in the fourth relation and we 
take the total differential. After simplification, the final equation as follows is resulted:  
, 
 
                                                                                              (4.25) 
We then take the total differential of the said relation as follows:  
                                                                           (4.26) 
We can assume that in the static state equilibrium, the ratios of
Y
C
, 
Y
X
and 
Y
M
as 
inclination to consumption, exports and imports, respectively, are fixed and tends 
towards a specified quantity (this point validates the extraction for stationary state 
equilibrium). Under the said assumption, relation (4.26) could be rewritten as follows:  
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                                                                      (4.27) 
Which is a partial differential equation and its general form is as follows:  
                                                                                            (4.28) 
A is the fixed quantity of integration and it plays an important role in 
establishing balance between the two sides of the equation. Equation (4.28) has been 
extracted, based on the assumption that x,c and m are fixed. Now we can obtain 
equation (4.19) with mathematical operations as follows (for convenience the fixed 
quantity of A is eliminated):  
 
(4.29) 
(4.30) 
Through multiplying the two equations of (4.29) and (4.30), we can have:  
 
(4.31) 
And by putting the above equation to order, assuming the counter exports of the two 
countries k and j:  
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 (4.32) 
The above equation is an important equation that states that the increase of 
counter imports of the two countries will lead to counter exports among them; in any 
case, trade liberalization will have a positive effect on the exports of the two countries 
and on the volume of trade between them. Now we can insert the effect of protectionism 
(tariff) and the transportation costs into equation (4.29):  
                                                                                      (4.33) 
(4.34) 
tj and tk are the tariffs of the two countries j and k, djk is the cost of transportation of 
each unit of goods between the two countries. If under an equilibrium state, we assume 
Xjk=Xkj and we substitute Mj and Mk and we put the equation to order, we will have:  
 
                                                        (4.35) 
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In equation (4.35), the statement related to distance (I=djk) appears in the 
denominator with the square 2 (multiplied by itself two times), which is similar to the 
Newton gravitation equation. We can extract several important results from equation 
(4.35):  
First, if country j eliminates its tariffs or trade barriers for imports from country 
k, its exports to country k will increase. The same rule applies for country k. Trade 
liberalization, either unilateral or mutual, will increase the exports of the country.  
Second, the exports of j to k have a reverse relation with the consumption 
coefficients of the two countries (j, k), which indicates the introversion of the two 
countries.  
Third, in long-term equilibrium, in which the coefficients mj and mk and other 
coefficients tend to a specified limit, the effect of distance on trade, which is shown by 
the power (1=djk), tends towards stability. This point can justify the "missing 
globalization", which was mentioned by Coe et al. (2002) and associated with the 
coefficients relating to the variable of distance in the gravity models, which have stayed 
fixed upon the passing of time. As stated by them, the coefficients relating to the 
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variable of distance must be reduced over time and with estimation of the gravity model 
for different time intervals, which is a symbol of globalization and reduction of the 
importance of distance for trade. In fact, globalization is related to the behavior of ci, xi 
and mi (average tendency towards consumption, exports and imports in two countries of 
j and k) in the two countries; this formulated theory seems more logical. In fact, the 
reduction of the coefficient of the variable of distance depends on ys.  
Now, based on equation (4.36), we can obtain an equation for the elasticity of 
exports of j to k based on yi and yk, and compare the result with the elasticity of 2j and 
2k:  
(4.36) 
Based on equation (4.21), the long-term elasticity of stationary state is equal to 
2j, which is different from the elasticity in equation (4.36). As stated by Helpman and 
Krugman (1985), upon the passing of time the difference criterion of 1-(Sj)
2
 will 
increase and the ratio of trade to production will also increase. When a country starts the 
economic growth from the low limit of trade-production ratio, it is expected that in the 
first phase the s are small.  
Therefore, we expect that in the initial stages of economic growth and tariff 
reduction, the trade-production ratio to increase and the globalization, with higher 
elasticity of consumption over imports (yj), to develop, and, consequently ,xjk to 
decrease. In a limit state, we can imagine that the ratio of export or import to production 
will move towards 1.  
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Therefore, in the short term we can expect high elasticity of exports (or imports) 
to production against the long-term period (Bayoumi, 1998). In long-term equilibrium, 
the long term elasticity of the income stationary state of exports (or imports) moves 
towards 1 and the growth of exports or imports will be equal to the growth of 
production and with each other. Hence, we expect a balanced growth will occur without 
deficit or surplus of payment balances. In this way, the issue set forth is the theory of 
the globalization process, which is more logical than the distance coefficient.  
The statement means that in relation (4.36) we expect Xj=mj and Xk=mk in the 
long term and the elasticity of imports and exports to be equal. So we have:  
(4.37)  
Because, in any country, in equilibrium state:  and  
So, any effort for trade liberalization, unilateral or bilateral and or multilateral, 
will lead to increased exports of the country that embarks on trade liberalization. More 
importantly, liberalization in any country will increase both the trade and welfare in 
other countries, in addition to trade and welfare of the same country. Tariff reduction in 
country j will increase the exports of j to k. Clearly, in this gravity model, exports of any 
country will have a reverse relation with the tariff of the same country. This feature does 
not exist in other forms of gravity relation.  
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Please note that in regionalism, or regional economic integration, the increase or 
decrease of level of trading of partner countries in integration plan, like a customs 
union, or common market, and their economic welfare, will all depend on the elasticity 
of substitution between the imports from the member states and non-member states. In 
addition, it will also depend on the same method on which the production of any 
imports of technology, capital goods or other traded materials depends.  
We expect that in the estimation in relation (4.37), the power of the statement 
(YjYk) is close to one, in which case it indicates the high level of globalization or the 
speed of globalization (or bigger Yis). Taking into account the ultimate limit of mj and 
mk, we expect the distance to still show itself as a trade barrier with stable effect. Of 
course, as was discussed in the previous chapter, perhaps due to numerous problems it is 
not correct to place in the gravity model common variables for distance between 
countries.  
It is noteworthy that based on equation (4.5) and (4.9) and in direct similarity 
with relation (4.16), the statement  in relation (4.36) can be shown in the 
following form, implementing the assumption of globalization:  
(4.38)  
Now knowing that:  
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We place the above value instead of Cj and show the multiplication of the left side of 
relation (4.38) in the following way:  
                                                                                  (4.39) 
Or  
                                                      (4.40) 
Based on the relation of  and :  
(4.41)  
We can show equation (4.37) as follows:  
                                                                                                                                    (4.42) 
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In which , and directly the Linder theory and variable of 
population (which is a criterion of introversion of the two countries) are also observed. 
Please note that in a state where the model is considered for several countries, in the 
relation Ci=iMi 
yi
, Mi is the total imports and so in relation (4.42), Mk/Mj is the ratio of 
the total imports of the two countries. This is another desirable characteristic of the 
present extraction and it states that the closer the total imports of the two countries j and 
k, the more counter exports of the two countries to each other. In addition, the more the 
consumption coefficient of country k (k), the less exports j will have to k.  
4.5 Regionalism, Multilateralism and Globalization 
In relations (4.33),(4.34), since a customs union is established between countries 
j and k, we can divide Xi and Mi (i=j,k) into two parts of Xuj and XNj and Muj and MNj. 
U and N stand for membership or non-membership in the customs union, respectively. 
In this case, we can show relation (4.35) in the following way:  
(4.43)  
In which U is either j or k and (1-) and (1-)are geometric mean multipliers of the 
two sources of imports and exports, so that:  
, 
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                             (4.44) 
0< <1  
In addition, in the same way, for Mk
1
 and Xk we can assume that, in the equilibrium 
state, Mjk=Mkj and relation (4.43) are changed into a gravity model. With some similar 
changes once again (1+tj), (1+tk) and (1+djk) will appear in relation (4.43). For 
simplification purposes, we restrict our discussion to relation (4.43).  
Having assumed a customs union is established between countries j and k, how 
would the exports of country j to k and k to j (i.e. Xjk and Xkj) and the exports of these 
two countries to non-member countries (XNK and XNj). It is clear that the reduction of 
imports from nonmember states, i.e. the reduction of MNj and MNK will directly reduce 
the exports of j to k and k to j as well as the exports of these two countries to 
nonmember states (XNK and XNj);of course with the assumption that other conditions are 
fixed. However, if Muj and Muk also increase simultaneously and compensate the 
reduction of imports from non-member states, the exports of the two countries will not 
decrease. We can think of relation (4.43) based on Viner's (1950) theory of customs 
unions, in which the goods of the importing country from a partner country in the 
customs union and nonmember states will be complete substitutes for each other; 
however, such a hypothesis is not explicitly specified in this relation and the imported 
(and exported) goods are incomplete substitutes for each other.  
Hence, everything will depend on the elasticity of goods substitution in the 
markets of the customs union. Instead of the Cob Douglas forms, we can substitute with 
                                                 
1
- In other words, in a customs union, we have defined a behavioral relation for the exports and imports of 
each country, and not the product of a simple add-up.  
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the CES forms, in which different hypotheses will create different substitution 
elasticities instead of the substitution elasticity being equal to one of the Cob Douglas 
forms. In addition, the tariffs pre and after customs union formation, play an important 
role in the volume of change of the trade model, and, consequently, in the volume of the 
effect of trade creation and trade diversion. However, if after formation of the customs 
union, the common external tariffs are equal to the tariff of the country with the lowest 
volume of tariffs, the imports from union member states and from non-member states 
will both increase. For example (1+tj)
 2 (1+tj) (1+tk), if and only if tjtk;in this case the 
exports will also increase.  
With this reminder, we come back to the principal relation of Helpman and 
Krugman (1985). The principal reminder of these two scientists is that the more 
specialization, relation (4.2), which is the basis of the gravity model, presents a better 
approximation of the volume of bilateral trade in which the bigger the size of industries 
producing the differentiated products, the said approximation will be better. So, in the 
world of intra-industry trade, in which economies of scale and economies of scope exist, 
any customs union member state, through implementing a tariff for the industries that 
manufacture differentiated goods, in the country or countries in which there are these 
types of economy, will allow the other country to increase both its counter exports and 
imports simultaneously, and, also its own exports and imports to other member 
countries. Upon the increase of the market size following the formation of a customs 
union, the industries are able to move towards the lowest level of cost on the efficiency 
curve on their own scale. In this case their exports, either counter or total, will increase 
more; in other words, as Johnson (1965) said; “any country in the customs union, 
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without losing its industrial production, will allow other country to become 
industrialized." This is the state of a customs union that does not diverse trade. Along 
with a reduction of tariff of other countries, the volume of trade will totally increase.  
According to relation (4.43), the customs union with trade diversion will reduce 
the volume of exports depending on the elasticity of the substation of goods in 
consumption and production in terms of geographical origin. The most important 
message of equation (4.43) is that when any country joins a customs union that does not 
deviate trade, it is able to increase its exports because the exports (whether counter or 
total exports) always have a positive correlation. At the same time, it was shown that 
any effort for trade liberalization will lead to more exports. Therefore, the conclusion 
will be clear: in general, the efforts for unilateral liberalization by one country, within a 
customs union with trade diversion, or multilaterally, will lead to more trade, counter 
exports of the countries and accelerated industrialization, and the globalization forces, 
through regulating the relation of economic growth rate and exports-imports growth rate 
in long term equilibrium, will guarantee the increase in the volume of trade.  
4.6 Consequences of the above Extraction and Discussion about the 
Linder Effect 
In the previous section, a noticeable relation was obtained between imports and 
exports. We also came to know that the counter exports depend on the per capita income 
of the two countries and also the total imports of the two countries. More important, it 
was also shown how protectionism against imports in one country would reduce the 
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exports of the said country. In this part, we will discuss the Linder's theory or the Linder 
effect (Gandolfo, 1998).  
Linder (1961) proposed that trade in manufactured goods was primarily determined by 
domestic demand conditions. This demand-oriented explanation was in sharp contrast to 
the supply-oriented factor-endowment theory which focuses on factor endowments and 
intensities as sources of comparative advantage and international trade patterns. Linder 
proposed that a country will export products for which there is a large and active 
domestic market. The simple reason is that the production for the domestic market must 
be large enough for firms to realize scale economies (Bukhari et al, 2005). Thus, an 
important implication of the Linder hypothesis is that international trade in 
manufactured goods will take place largely between countries with similar income 
levels and demand patterns. That is, trade will be stronger between countries with 
similar per capita income. 
Linder also noted the role of quality as a determinant of the direction of trade. He 
argued that richer countries spend a larger proportion of their income on high quality 
goods. He also argued that closeness of demand is a source of comparative advantage 
giving richer countries comparative advantage in the production of high quality goods, 
the goods that they demand. He then argued that similarity of production and 
consumption patterns lead countries with similar per capita income to trade more with 
each other. Linder hypothesis is the first theory explaining the effects of differences in 
quality on the direction of trade (Hallak, 2010). 
For two developed countries, the closer their per capita incomes, the more 
increase in demand for intra-industry trade, and the less scope of the effect of trade 
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diversion because of a customs union, and the share of intra-industry trade will become 
more in the whole trade. This is called demand complementariness.  
For two developing countries, the more their per capita incomes are closer to 
each other, the more their inter-industry trade will be, because the two countries are 
specialized in the production of the goods that complement their demands, and not in 
the production of similar but differentiated products.  
This type of regulating trade policy is similar to reliance on inter-industry trade. 
In this way, when the customs union or common market is formed between these 
countries or with the participation of these countries, the effect of trade diversion is 
likely to be more, or the potential interest from formation will be limited.  
When the developing country enters into the stage of construction of industries 
for the production of imported inputs and capital goods, the issue of an increase of 
market size will be of high importance for these industries. The market size is the 
determinant of the optimal scale of these industries. The formation of a customs union 
among those countries that are in this stage, provides the industries producing imported 
inputs and capital goods with benefits from a larger market. This issue will lead to a 
reduction of the production cost of these industries, and a reduction of the price of their 
final products, which, finally, will lead to an increase of market size and an expansion 
of final product exports, and will reduce the value of the effect of trade diversion. The 
industries that produce capital inputs and goods conform to more series of final products 
and will develop more quickly.  
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Therefore, the final products tariff reduction, which leads to a reduction of tariff 
dispersion, and the formation of bigger markets with the economic integration of 
developing countries, will influence the increase of exports of these countries. 
According to relation (4.43), the tariff of MNi goods is reduced and the tariff of Mui will 
be eliminated. This is a better alternative from the continuity of upward tariff and 
regional isolation.  
The combination of these two propositions means that the regional economic 
integration, along with the trade liberalization of partner countries in the economic 
integration plan, is both beneficial for each individual country, and all partner countries 
in the integration plan. It will also contribute to multilateral tariff reduction. In addition, 
the formation of a discriminative customs union that places a common external tariff 
higher than the tariffs before formation, will lead to both a reduction of exports of the 
member states to each other, and their total exports. It is obvious that, in this analysis, 
Bhagwati's discussion, which stated that the effect of trade diversion can increase 
welfare (Bhagwati and Serinivassan, 1983), or the discussion of a change of exchange 
relation, is not incorporated. Bhagwati's discussion does not always vote in favor of a 
customs union that deviates trade and exploitation from the effect of exchange relation 
is not always possible. The final judgment is that with economic integration along with 
tariff reduction, the exports of developing countries will increase.  
4.7 Gravity Model for the Present Study 
As mentioned earlier, Newton’s Physics of motion first justified the gravity 
model. As a result of the partial equilibrium model for export supply, import demanded 
the analysis of the gravity equation (Lineman, 1996). Based on simpler assumptions, the 
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gravity equation was demonstrated to be a reduced form of the model. However, 
Bergstrand et al. (1985) showed that the partial equilibrium model did not define the 
form complexities of the equations, which also allowed some of its parameters to be 
undefined, mainly due to price variability exclusion. As a result of the simplicity of 
form of the equation, Linneman’s exclusion of price justifies its consistency. The first 
theory explaining the gravity equation based on the expenditure properties system was 
stated by Anderson (1979). In support of Anderson’s synthesis, Helpman and Krugman 
(1985); Bergstrand (1985, 1989); and Deardroff (1998); also added to the 
implementation of the theoretical foundation for the gravity model. 
In these studies, the gravity equation is theoretically derived as a reduced form of the 
general equilibrium model of international trade for final goods, and, therefore, recently, 
the theoretical basis of the gravity model has become apparent, well understood and 
generally accepted. Anderson and Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra (2002) have resolved 
these shortcomings through their studies. The approach on micro foundation, however, 
claims that the crucial assumption of perfect product suitability to the conventional 
gravity model was unrealistic as it has been recently proven that the flow of trade can be 
differentiated by place of origin, and that variable price exclusion resulted in 
misspecification of the gravity model (Bergstrand (1985, 1989); Anderson (1979) and 
Helpman and Krugman (1987)). 
However, supported the ideas which showed that price variables, apart from the 
usual variables for gravity equation are statistically significant, which explains the flow 
of trade amongst participating countries. The above analysis, therefore, shows that the 
theoretical foundation was used for the application of the gravity model on the flow of 
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international trade. Moreover, this new right for international flow trade assessment 
motivates the reliance of our extension of the gravity model for the study of the 
economic integration impact analysis for D-8. 
4.7.1 Model Specification 
 Of the theories of trade mentioned, the gravity model was chosen to quantify 
trading for D-8 countries. The hypothesis on the gravity model bilateral trade showed 
that the flow of trade between two countries is proportional to their gross domestic 
product (GDP) and negatively related to trade barriers between them. A number of 
specific alterations for the gravity model were provided by empirical works. The model 
applied in this research varies from the gravity model, as stated by Frankel et al. (1995); 
Pollak (1996); Krugman (1991); Yavari and Ashrafzade (2005); Matyas (1997); Jalali 
(2008). The model was enhanced by adding the original population and target countries 
as bilateral trade support mass. The gravity model estimation has the following form: 
 
 
For estimation purposes, the basic gravity model is most often used in its log 
form. Hence, this is equivalently written using logarithms as: 
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Where:       
t=1983… 2008.   
Xijt: Country i trade with country j in year t.   
GDP it: Country i GDP in year t.   
GDP jt: Country j GDP in year t.   
Popit: Population of Country i in year t.   
Popjt: Population of country j in year t.    
 : Import country i and j 
A:  
Language and common border 
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: Is the error term   
A good number of researchers incorporate more variables as control for geographic 
factor differences, historical ties and general policy trade, due to the trade flows 
between nations, which can be affected by other factors other than the core variables 
(Population GDP, distance). Therefore, it is common to expand the major gravity model 
by adding other variables, which were believed to define various policy impacts on the 
flow of trade. For the estimation of the impact on regional trade arrangement using 
gravity equations, dummy variables are added to each member state by thorough 
examination, and, therefore, the augmented gravity model incorporated other variables. 
4.7.2 Variables and Data Description 
The yearly flow of trade of a country’s data set, population, GDP and distances for D-8 
countries from 1983 to 2008,GDP period in time t, was used to determine the economic 
size. The variables were assumed to be significantly and positively related to trade. 
World Development Indicated (WDI) was used to draft the gross domestic product 
(GDP) for D-8 in US dollars. A set of population variables was used to determine the 
product of population, the intention of which was to estimate the market size. The 
bigger the market the higher the trade, therefore, a positive turnout was expected for the 
market size. The D-8 data population is derived from the World Bank. 
The distance taken for the proxy analysis for transport among D-8 was calculated as 
distance in kilometers for D-8 country’s capital cities. The distance data was obtained 
from the great circle distance between the capital cities, while distance was measured as 
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the minimum distance along the earth’s surface, as stated by Byers (1997). This variable 
was assumed to have a negative impact on trade because of the high cost of transport 
and the distance between countries. 
The Linder effect is captured through a variable which measures the degree of 
similarity between the per capita income levels of the given D-8 countries and each 
trading partner. This variable, which we denote as “LINDER”, is the absolute value of 
the difference in the levels of real per capita GDP in the D-8 countries and potential 
trading partner. Support for the Linder hypothesis would follow from the finding of a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient on this variable. A definition difference 
between a pair of country’s GDP per capita is stated as follows: 
 
The Linder term is larger the more dissimilar are the two countries’ incomes. Therefore, 
the prediction of the Linder hypothesis is that α1is negative. α2 and α3 show the export 
elasticity for country I and import elasticity for country j, respectively, when compared 
to GDP. It is expected that α2; α3 should be positive. If α2> α3 it then means that the 
country’s exports are expected to grow faster than its imports. However, other 
coefficients may be negative or positive due to the countries distinctive economic and 
geographic structure. For the avoidance of multi-correlation, 7 dummy variables are 
defined as a representative of D-8 numbers. A value of one shows that Xij > 0 and Zero 
if Xij = 0. 
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 The last variable is common language or common border (ψ). The information ψ 
was carried out at the Iranian Institute for Trade Assessment and Research. Common 
languages or common borders are expected to exhibit a positive sign. 
4.7.3 Econometric Method 
The panel framework is defined to cover variations in trade for D-8 trading 
partners for two periods, from 1984 to 1997 and from 1997 to 2008. Several advantages 
were shown for panel estimation over cross section data and time series data, as it 
controls for individual heterogeneity. Studies on cross section and time series that are 
not controlled by the heterogeneity are biased results. However, panel data show more 
variability, more degree of freedom and less multicollinearity between the explanatory 
variables, thereby enhancing the econometric efficiency estimate. Moreover, the panel 
data also measures the effect, which is undetectable in data cross section and time series 
(Battagi, 2005). 
The assessment of the gravity model was earlier carried out using single year cross-
sectional data or data time series. These methods may be affected by misspecification, 
which result in the biased assumption of bilateral volume trade due to the lack of control 
for heterogeneity (Chan and Wall, 2005). In applying the gravity model panel data are 
used, because panel data are usually the case for data cross section and time data series 
(Matyas et al., 1977; Egger (2002). In line with Matyas et al. (1997), the natural 
representation of two sided trade flows with the gravity equation having a three-way 
specification is expressed as follows: 
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y= DNα+DJγ+DTλ+Zβ+ε                                                                                            (4.47)  
   
Where   
y is vector of dependent variable   
Z is the matrix of explanatory variables   
DN, DJ, DT  are dummy variable matrices   
α is local country effect   
γ: target country effect   
λ is time effect   
β is parameter vector of explanatory variables.   
ε is error term   
 When the data for cross section is used for one year, no time effects were 
observed λ = 0 
When time series is used, it covers the effects for specific pair of countries, an 
implication that α = γ = 0. 
Using panel data there is no restriction required, which can take into account both 
country and time effect.  
Panel estimation can be assessed using pool estimation, fixed effect and random effect 
(Gujarati, 2003); the following estimates pool function: 
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Yit = β1+β2X2it+β3X3it +εit                                                                                                                     (4.48) 
Where, I = cross sectional unit, t = time period and error term in normally distributed 
with a mean of zero and constant variance. Pooled was assumed to have one single set 
slope coefficient with one overall concept. In pooled estimate, error term captures the 
difference over time for individuals. 
Fixed effects account for the individual and time effect by allowing the intercept to vary 
for each individual and time period, while the slope coefficient is constant with the 
model: 
 
Yit = β1i+β2X2it+β3X3it +εit                                                                                                                                       (4.49) 
 It is normally assumed that ε is independent and identically distributed over 
individuals and time mean zero and variance σ2, and all Xit are independent of all error 
terms. Introducing the variable dummy concept allows for intercept variability 
according to individual and time. 
One of the problems of the fixed model is that it may not identify the time invariant 
effect, for example, distance. However, this variable is excluded from estimation. The 
fixed estimation, however, may provide inefficient and biased estimated results. 
Random effect estimation was used to estimate the panel data. The intercept was treated 
by random effects as a random effect as a random variable, while the individuals 
included in the sample are drawn from the larger population. The model is stated as 
follows: 
 
Yit = β1+β2X2it+β3X3it +wit                                                                                                                                      (4.50) 
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Where:  
 wit=εi +uit   
It is assumed that the individual error components are not correlated with each other and 
are not auto correlated across both cross section and time series units.   
εi  ~ N (0, σ
2
ε)uit  ~ N (0, σ
2
u) 
E(εi,uit) = 0, E(εi,ε j) = 0 (i ≠ j)   
E(uit,uis) =  E(uit,ujt) =  E(uit,ujs) = 0 (i ≠ j, t ≠ s)   
 
  
4.8 Trade Intensity Index 
4.8.1 Decomposition 
Many researchers have demonstrated the measurement and bilateral trade 
analysis. Drysdale and Garnaut (1982), in a survey, identified two systematic study 
approaches for bilateral trade: the intensity approach developed by Kojima (1964) and 
Brown (1949), and the bilateral trade gravity model presented by Linneman (1996); 
Linder (1961); and Tinbergen (1962).  
The approach of the gravity model independently defines each flow of bilateral 
trade, which lays claim to trade between two economies to be proportional to their 
economic sizes (measured by per capita GDP, population area, GDP) and inversely 
proportional to the distance (both cultural and geographical distance) between them. 
However, comparison of the bilateral trade across pair of countries is not provided for 
by gravity model. Moreover, assumptions for the independent flow of bilateral trade 
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gravity model were too extreme (Anderson and Wincoop 2003). Understandably, the 
more the trade resistance with other economies, the more it pushes trade with a given 
bilateral partner. This, however, is known as ‘multilateral resistance”. In other words, as 
shown by Kazutaka (1977), international trade is divided into two categories by the 
intensity approach determinants, which include those that influence their geographical 
distribution and those that impact on the total export and import levels of the world 
countries. It then suggests a hypothetical world made up of countries without 
geographical specialization in international trade. 
The totality of a country’s trade is spread amongst countries in line with the world 
trading partners of that country. The bilateral trade level is evaluated by the trade 
intensity index based only on the size of a country’s economy. All things being equal, 
neighboring countries sharing a common border or having a close cultural relationship 
are assumed to have closer trade relation than those that are culturally or geographically 
apart. The gravity model estimated values of trade reflect the impact of each country’s 
specific characteristics with market distribution, cultural relationship, geographical 
factors, etc. However, the approach of the gravity model cannot perform trade 
comparison across countries. The trade intensity approach is briefly summarized in this 
section. The trade intensity index is an alternative method for bilateral trade resistance 
and flow, which measures the method of analysis. The intensity approach is preferred to 
the gravity model in this section as presented by Tinbergen (1962) et al. due to the fact 
that it is better suited to some objectives of this study. Unlike the gravity model, the 
abstract index from the effects of import and export sizes of countries focuses on the 
differences in bilateral trade level resulting from differential resistance. 
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A countries share of trade is measured by its intensity trade index with other 
countries in proportion to its world trade share. For country I’s exports to country j, the 
index Iij is defined as the share of I’s export to j in its total exports (Xij/Xi) compared to 
the share of j’s import in world imports, net of I’s imports (Mw – Mi)1. The index is 
thus stated: 
 
                                                                                                  (4.51) 
An index exceeding unity shows the presence of a relatively strong trade relationship 
due to the relative need of country I’s trade being higher than j’s share of world trade. 
The intensity index is still in its original state and aggregated measure, which needs to 
be fractionated before it can be useful as an analytical tool. The major problem being 
that it fails to make provision for commodity composition variation for the 
complementarities of a country’s exports and another’s import. A possibility exists for 
the composition of oneness of imports and imports of two countries albeit there may be 
high intensities in the commodities they trade. 
The modification of the index was broken down into an index that encompasses the 
commodity composition of a country’s trade, and that which deals with the commodity 
trade intensity that was traded, as stated by Drysdale (1967). The intensities are stated as 
follows:  
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Complementarity index (Cij), for i's exports to j, is the sum of the products weight for 
each commodity's share in country i's exports  and in country j's imports  with 
the weight of commodities by the inverse of the shares in world trade. 
                                                                                                                         (4.52) 
                                                                                                   (4.53) 
For this formula, the high trade intensity may be the result of strong concentration in 
one country's exports of commodities in which the other country has a high import 
share. 
The index of country’s bias (Bij), defined analogously the intensity index for each 
commodity k, as 
(4.54)                 
 
That is, a country bias index of 1 for country i's exports to country j of commodity k 
shows that the share of country j in country i’s exports of k is equal to the former's share 
of world imports of k.   
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Average weight of indexes of a country bias for all commodities yields an index of a 
country bias (Bij) in country i's total trade with j. Thus: 
 
The indexes are so defined that: 
I ij= Cij . Bij                                                                                                                                                                         (4.56) 
The intensity approach enables major factors that contribute to the trade between 
countries and regions to be identified. It does not, however, "explain" trade patterns. 
This requires examination of the trading partners' composition of trade, and the factors 
that determine the country’s bias indexes for specific commodities.  
The resistance concept is used for a countries bias for trade analysis. This conceptisde 
fined as any factor that inhibits/lowers immediate commodity movement internationally, 
caused by price differential (Drysdale and Gaenaut, 1982). Furthermore, they are 
classified as resistance objectives when a firm can only overcome at some cost, for 
example, transport cost, and the subjective resistance is obtained from factors, for 
example, imperfect information. The resistance strength, such as the presence of taking 
blocs and relative distance, political alliance, and aid and investment flows, are 
determined by many factors. Attempts to model the benefits of these many resistances 
econometrically, however, proved disappointing (Yamazawa 1971). 
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4.8.2 Trade Intensity Index Background 
Several researchers used these indexes to assess bilateral trade flows. In a study 
conducted by Yamazawa (1970, 1971) on the international trade pattern between pairs 
of countries using countries bias index and complementarities distance and other 
dummy variables have major impact on trade intensity index. The study utilizes the data 
levels of a few countries and lots of geographical clusters. Drysdale and Garnaut (1982) 
use the index to assess bilateral trade patterns. Subsequently, there was limited use of 
the index for bilateral trade relationships in the following papers. The three indexes 
were used to analyze and define the pattern, trend and composition in Australia-
Philippines trade over two decades, 1962-81 (Hill, 1985). Three indexes were used to 
measure the transformation of trade relationships between Japan and China for the 
period 1965-1993 (Zhang, 1997). In a similar manner, the examination of the 
relationship of trade strength between New Zealand and its major partners in trade –
Asia Pacific nations and Australia – using the trade intensity index was reported (Bano, 
2002) for the period 1981-1999. In addition to other methods, Creamer (2003) assessed 
the impact of open regionalism in the Andean community on inter and intra-regional 
trade from 1990-2000, using the trade intensity index. Ng and Yeates (2003) determined 
East Asian intra-regional trade using the trade intensity index as well as the likely 
distance adjusted trade intensity index. Application of the trade intensity index was used 
to determine the trade strength between India and China (Bhattacharya and 
Bhattacharyay, 2007). These studies aside, the bilateral trade between trade partners was 
not reasonably applied using this index. 
 
 226 
 
CHAPTER 5                                                                   
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Introduction 
The gravity model has been highly empirically successful, and is currently, 
being assessed in different countries. Rahman (2003) used total export and import trade 
and three equations to evaluate the flow of trade between Bangladesh and its major 
trading partners. According to his report, Bangladesh’s trade was determined by 
economic size, distance and openness, as well as GNP per capita. The explanation on 
the flow of trade using the gravity model was applied by Blomqvist in Singapore. A 
high degree of explanation was achieved, mainly for the GDP and variable distance. In 
another development using the gravity model framework, Anaman and Al-Kharusa 
(2003) demonstrated the trade determination for the European Union (EU) and Brunei 
from either country’s population (Brunei and EU).  
Tan (2003) demonstrated that the EU integration resulted in a significant 
decrease in trade with the North American Free Trade Agency (NAFTA) and ASEAN, 
from 1981 to 2000. Thornton and Goglio (2002) showed the benefits of economic size, 
common language and geographic distance in Intra regional bilateral trade for ASEAN. 
Sector classification of exports according to their geographical and economic distance 
sensitivity, as well as under the gravity model framework have been stated by Martinez-
Zarzoso et al. (2004), which identifies the commodities that benefit from export 
strength. However, the results suggest that footwear and furniture enjoy a high and 
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significant geographical impact on bilateral trade between South American countries, 
such as Paraguay, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, and the EU. The gravity model has 
been empirically applied, which is not new, with many variations of gravity equations. 
However, in the literature, the gravity model shares some common features; firstly, it 
was applied to define bilateral trade dependent variables for the gravity equation, which 
is the trade variable. Economic mass for importing and exporting countries were 
measured using GNP, GDP, or GNP per capita. 
The GDP per capita for augmenting the gravity model has been reported 
(Montanari, 2005; Rahman, 2003). The idea behind this is that countries with a high 
trend in their income improve trade, while those with a lower income trade are less 
likely to improve trade. In the gravity model, distance is another commonly used 
variable. Distance can be said to mean the geographical distance between countries, 
which is also the authority for the cost of transport measured as the linear distance 
between the countries’ economic centers (mainly capitals).  
However, it is not an accurate measurement for some cases including the use of 
Beijing, capital center for China, and other partners in trade, due to the fact that China 
possesses a good number of economic centers that are thousands of kilometers apart. 
Finally, the dummy variable is included in the gravity equation to assess the quantitative 
variables including border, colonial history and languages in bilateral trade agreements. 
In addition, there has not been any study on bilateral trade flows amongst D-8 countries 
for the gravity model framework; however, this study fills the gap using literature that 
concerns D-8 countries using the gravity model to explore the relationship between two 
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stages of D-8 from 1983 to 1997 and from 1997 to 2008. The estimation of the gravity 
model in this study is based on panel data with an impact on fixed estimation. 
5.2 Panel Unit Root Tests 
To analyze data and test the regression model, the research variables were 
assessed to determine whether or not they are stationary. For a better understanding of 
the characteristics of the variables, five parallel tests were used: 
1) Test Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC)  
2) Im, Pesaranand Shin (IPS)  
3) Fisher-ADF test 
4) Fisher-PP1 
5) Breitung t-stat  
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Table  5-1 Stationary or Non-Stationary of Variables 
variables Method Statistic Prob.** 
Cross- 
sections 
Obs 
Result 
(95%) 
GDPI 
Levin, Lin & Chu 
t* 
 12.3348  1.0000  56  1344 
Non-
Stationary   
Breitung t-stat  19.4260  1.0000  56  1288 
Non-
Stationary   
Im, Pesaran and 
Shin W-stat  
 12.5629  1.0000  56  1344 
Non-
Stationary   
ADF - Fisher 
Chi-square 
 58.4351  1.0000  56  1344 
Non-
Stationary   
PP - Fisher Chi-
square 
 19.2189  1.0000  56  1400 
Non-
Stationary   
GDPJ 
Levin, Lin & Chu 
t* 
14.6702 1.0000 56 1379 
Non-
Stationary   
 
Breitung t-stat 19.9898 1.0000 56 1323 
Non-
Stationary   
 
Im, Pesaran and 
Shin W-stat 
17.1549 1.0000 56 1379 
Non-
Stationary   
ADF - Fisher 
Chi-square 
36.8462 1.0000 56 1379 
Non-
Stationary   
PP - Fisher Chi-
square 
9.81650 1.0000 56 1400 
Non-
Stationary   
LINDER= 
 
 
Levin, Lin & Chu 
t* 
0.98707 0.8382 56 1390 
Non-
Stationary   
 
Breitung t-stat 1.85780 0.9684 56 1334 
Non-
Stationary   
 
Im, Pesaran and 
Shin W-stat 
1.01743 0.8455 56 1390 
Non-
Stationary   
ADF - Fisher 
Chi-square 
111.458 0.4967 56 1390 
Non-
Stationary   
PP - Fisher Chi-
square 
89.7450 0.9398 56 1400 
Non-
Stationary   
POPIJ 
Levin, Lin & Chu 
t* 
1.93157 0.9733 56 1311 
Non-
Stationary   
 
Breitung t-stat 6.26152 1.0000 56 1255 
Non-
Stationary   
 
Im, Pesaran and 
Shin W-stat 
-2.06401 0.0195 56 1311 Stationary 
ADF - Fisher 
Chi-square 
347.945 0.0000 56 1311 Stationary 
PP - Fisher Chi-
square 
239.108 0.0000 56 1400 Stationary 
Xij 
Levin, Lin & Chu 
t* 
-10.4272 0.0000 52 1158 Stationary 
Breitung t-stat -2.77251 0.0028 52 1106 Stationary 
Im, Pesaran and 
Shin W-stat 
-7.19446 0.0000 52 1158 Stationary 
ADF - Fisher 
Chi-square 
276.711 0.0000 52 1158 Stationary 
PP - Fisher Chi-
square 
269.506 0.0000 52 1195 Stationary 
Fisher tests probabilities are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic 
normality. 
As shown in Table 5-1, most of the regression model variables are non-
stationary at the initial level based on five different tests, as shown above. These 
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variables are stationary at first differentiation and the cointegration test was carried out 
to find appropriate methods to test the research model. 
5.3 Cointegration Test 
In this study, the Pedroni, Kao and Johansen method was used to check the 
cointegration. Based on the results presented in the table below, the cointegration or 
long-term equilibrium relationship between models variables are accepted in all cases 
Table  5-2 Pedroni , Kao and  Johansen Fisher  Panel Cointegration Test 
Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test 
 Statistic Prob. Weighted Statistic Prob. Result 
Panel PP-Statistic -12.95300 0.0000 -14.93041 0.0000 Have Co 
integrated 
vector 
Panel ADF-
Statistic 
-13.13704 0.0000 -15.30784 0.0000 Have Co 
integrated 
vector 
Kao Residual Cointegration Test 
 Rho Prob. t-Statistic Prob. Result 
DF 3.584534 0.0002 -9.103521 0.0000 Have Co 
integrated 
vector 
DF* 5.438922 0.0000 -6.287611 0.0000 Have Co 
integrated 
vector 
Johansen Fisher Panel Cointegration Test 
Hypothesized No. 
of CE(s) 
Fisher Stat.* 
(from trace test) 
Prob. Fisher Stat.* (from 
max-eigen test) 
Prob. Result 
None 1211. 0.0000 842.1 0.0000 Have Co 
integrated 
vector 
At most 1 605.8 0.0000 403.5 0.0000 Have Co 
integrated 
vector 
At most 2 288.3 0.0000 193.9 0.0000 Have Co 
integrated 
vector 
At most 3 173.1 0.0000 151.4 0.0001 Have Co 
integrated 
vector 
At most 4 137.4 0.0015 137.4 0.0015 Have Co 
integrated 
vector 
 
* Probabilities are computed using asymptotic Chi-square distribution. 
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5.4 Model Estimation  
The trade equation runs through the pooled estimation method, and the results 
showed that the estimated coefficients have nearly all the expected signs, except 
market size.  
 
Table  5-3 Gravity model among D-8 member countries 
 
Bilateral trade estimation results for D-8 members using equation (3) are stated in Table 
5-3.  
1. A
s observed in the regressed model from 1983 to 1997, the D-8 members’ import 
elasticity was 0.57, while export elasticity was 1.21. This implies that when D-8 
 232 
 
countries GDP increases by 1%, on average, imports increase by 57%; it is 
expected that exports will increase by 1.21%. The results show that from 1997 to 
2008, the import elasticity decreased to 0.50 and export elasticity declined to 1.06. 
This means that for a1% increase in GDP, imports increase by 50% while exports 
rise by 1.06% on average.  
Moreover, the major point of D-8 countries were that the export elasticity to GDP 
was about one while the imports have no elasticity. is an indication that D-8 
countries export grows faster than import. 
2.  
The market size coefficient for both 1983 to 1997 and 1997 to 2008 was negative. 
This implies that if the population of country I compared to country j increases, it 
will reduce the exports of country I. The reason being that the population growth 
increases the size of the local market, so the country becomes more introverted and 
will have more imported rival industries; alternatively, it reduces the exports of the 
country due to the fact that the same industries have to meet the needs of the 
population increase. 
3. D
istance elasticity, which is the proxy for transportation costs from 1983 to 1997, 
shows that if the distance increases by 1%, on average, exports reduce by 97%.  
However, after 1997, transit performance was improved with advanced 
transportation system technologies, which declined to 70%. 
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4. C
ommon borders have no meaningful effects on exports on D-8. The reason being 
that D-8 member countries are diversified.  
5. Linder, as expected from the theory, was negative, which implies that that 
international trade in manufactured goods will take place largely between countries 
with similar income levels and demand patterns. That is, trade will be stronger 
between countries with similar per capita income 
6. L
anguage has no meaningful effect on the export for the whole period under 
consideration, because of the heterogeneous nature of most D-8 countries. 
5.5 Dummy Variables Results 
Another aspect of this model is the dummy variables; when two countries, I and j, 
are under consideration, if  , dummy variable=1 and if  dummy 
variable=0. 
Table 5-4 shows the results. 
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Table  5-4 Bilateral trade effects among D-8 members since 1997 
Country Coefficient Std.Error Prob 
Membership in 
D-8 impact on 
bilateral trade 
Bangladesh -0.53 0.061 0.0000 Detrimental 
Egypt -0.18 0.23 0.4404 Effect less 
Indonesia 0.39 0.161 0.0149 Beneficial 
Iran -0.21 0.13 0.1105 Effect less 
Malaysia 0.43 0.089 0.000 Beneficial 
Nigeria -0.16 0.07 0.03 Detrimental 
Pakistan 0.10 0.061 0.0822 Beneficial 
Turkey 0.04 0.086 0.5958 Effect less 
  
 The econometric model results show that D-8 could not enhance the bilateral 
trade among its members. The results show that Malaysia, Indonesia and Pakistan have 
a reasonable joint bilateral trade and derive benefits from the integration plan. However, 
the D-8 PTA had a negative effect on the trade of Bangladesh and Nigeria. The export 
and import trend since 1997 shows a significant decline between the two countries’ 
trade compared to other D-8 members. Other members, such as Egypt, Turkey and Iran, 
do not have a reasonable joint bilateral trade. However, it is obvious that D-8 did not 
influence these countries bilateral trade since its inception. A summary of the results 
indicate that not all countries will experience a welfare gain under a free trade 
arrangement. Likewise, the impact on the economic sectors differs substantially across 
countries. 
5.6 Export Intensity Index 
The trade intensity index (TII) was thought to be a uniform export share. 
However, the statistic explains whether or not a given area exports more (as a 
percentage) to a known destination than the world does on average. This can be 
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symbolized in much the same way as an export share that does not show distress from 
any ‘size’ bias; therefore, the statistics can be compared across regions over time, 
during the rapid growth of exports.  
Attempts were made to survey the export intensity of trade relations among D-8 
countries using standard TII. The statistic for trade intensity is the ratio of two export 
shares. The numerator is the share of interest destination of a region’s exports under 
study. The denominator is the share of the world’s exports interest destination as a 
whole, which takes a value between 0 and +∞. Values greater than 1 indicate an 
‘intense’ trade relationship. The bilateral trade data, to calculate the TII was obtained 
from the IMF Directory of Trade Statistics, 2010, while the trade intensity indices were 
calculated for the period 1990 to 2008. 
(5.1) 
Where  
Xij: country i’s export to country j 
Xi: country i’s total export 
Mj: country j’s total import 
Mw: world’s import 
Mi: country i’s import 
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Using the equation above assesses the intensity of export among the economies of D-8. 
The results are shown in the Table 5-5 to Table 5-12.  
Table  5-5 Export Intensity Index for Iran and D-8 (1990-2008) 
Year Bangladesh Egypt Indonesia Malaysia Nigeria Pakistan Turkey 
1990 0 0 0.32 0.33 0 4.58 3.23 
1995 0.34 0.04 0.05 0.27 0 3.83 6.05 
1996 0.19 0.01 0.08 0.03 0 0.66 3.93 
1997 0.3 0.03 0.05 0.12 0 4.41 3.42 
1998 0 0 0 0.65 0 2.99 4.58 
1999 0 0 0 0.18 0 3.04 4.93 
2000 0.48 0 0.49 0.27 0.01 6.38 3.19 
2001 0.3 0.2 1.03 0.49 0.02 5.18 4.91 
2002 0.27 0.19 0.46 0.35 0.05 3.88 3.96 
2003 0.4 0.25 0.51 0.25 0.01 4.79 5.87 
2004 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.47 0.01 2.93 3.93 
2005 0.27 0.2 0.19 0.49 0.01 2.33 5.7 
2006 0.47 0.27 0.21 0.78 0.01 2.7 7.44 
2007 0.33 0.23 0.14 0.47 0.01 2.86 6.38 
2008 0.36 0.23 0.18 0.58 0.01 2.63 6.51 
 
 
Table  5-6  Export Intensity Index for Turkey and D-8 (1990-2008) 
Year Bangladesh Egypt Indonesia Iran Malaysia Nigeria Pakistan 
1990 0.25 2.63 0.19 7.44 0.11 0.37 1.78 
1995 0.19 5.02 0.19 5.04 0.31 0.39 1.9 
1996 0.45 5.63 0.31 4.25 0.4 0.37 1.49 
1997 0.21 4.87 0.24 4.58 0.36 0.35 1.06 
1998 0.53 6.01 0.22 2.78 0.15 0.52 1.4 
1999 0.75 6.36 0.26 2.56 0.12 0.95 2.75 
2000 0.7 6.37 0.18 3.68 0.11 1.24 1.16 
2001 0.37 6.68 0.21 4.01 0.1 1.21 0.62 
2002 0.37 4.96 0.17 2.68 0.36 0.96 0.98 
2003 0.64 5.14 0.2 3.03 0.46 0.64 0.89 
2004 0.42 5.58 0.16 3.49 0.08 0.63 0.73 
2005 0.97 5.14 0.17 3.31 0.07 0.58 1.1 
2006 0.85 5.13 0.17 3.41 0.07 0.45 0.65 
2007 0.44 4.36 0.24 4.17 0.07 0.62 0.65 
2008 0.75 4.87 0.19 4.13 0.09 0.55 0.82 
 
 
 
 237 
 
Table  5-7 Export Intensity Index for Pakistan and D-8 (1990-2008) 
Year Bangladesh Egypt Indonesia Iran Malaysia Nigeria Turkey 
1990 18.21 0.07 1.48 1.08 0.64 0.26 2.48 
1995 15.39 2.51 1.69 6.26 0.39 0.88 2.46 
1996 9.53 2.26 1.92 2.48 0.28 1.06 1.01 
1997 8.49 1.97 1.38 0.85 0.27 1.4 0.77 
1998 10 1.75 2.84 0.92 0.3 1.44 0.84 
1999 9.57 1.48 3.47 0.55 0.45 2.63 0.61 
2000 11.54 2.37 1.99 0.79 0.47 3.67 1.32 
2001 9.87 2.41 2.11 1.1 0.5 2.4 1.45 
2002 8.77 2.84 1.74 1.18 0.54 2.25 1.48 
2003 10.37 2.4 0.78 1.83 0.75 3.36 1.99 
2004 11.58 2.65 0.8 2.06 0.43 11.13 1.61 
2005 11.32 1.76 0.66 2.92 0.39 1.36 2.03 
2006 6.96 2.27 0.31 2.23 0.3 1.68 1.87 
2007 7.79 2.39 0.37 2.57 0.42 2.36 2.31 
2008 8.69 2.14 0.45 2.59 0.37 2.14 2.07 
 
 
 
Table  5-8  Export Intensity Index for Indonesia and D-8 (1990-2008) 
year Bangladesh Egypt Iran Malaysia Nigeria Pakistan Turkey 
1990 2.28 0.56 0.39 1.15 0.39 0.83 0.06 
1995 1.59 1.89 1.18 1.45 0.7 1.19 0.4 
1996 1.92 1.51 0.66 1.54 0.93 1.11 0.28 
1997 2.18 1.66 0.67 1.79 0.75 1.5 0.27 
1998 3 1.75 0.37 2.65 1.52 2.03 0.36 
1999 2.83 1.66 0.89 2.44 2.86 1.92 0.35 
2000 2.75 1.44 0.98 2.43 2.74 1.39 0.37 
2001 2.9 1.74 0.75 2.71 2.75 1.97 0.48 
2002 3.53 1.63 0.61 2.89 2.69 2.68 0.54 
2003 3.07 1.84 0.77 3.48 1.73 2.45 0.48 
2004 3.07 2.01 0.7 3.76 1.2 3.04 0.48 
2005 3.16 1.82 0.88 3.73 0.83 3.11 0.71 
2006 3.3 2.8 0.83 3.9 0.72 3.06 0.67 
2007 4.02 2.57 1.29 4.08 0.82 3.52 0.73 
2008 4.06 2.39 1.13 4.16 0.79 3.23 0.70 
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Table  5-9 Export Intensity Index for Malaysia and D-8 (1990-2008) 
Year Bangladesh Egypt Indonesia Iran Nigeria Pakistan Turkey 
1990 1.58 0.94 1.89 0.37 0.19 3.82 0.5 
1995 0.59 1.56 1.66 0.61 0.2 4.35 0.44 
1996 1.31 1.27 1.95 0.39 0.2 3.63 0.34 
1997 1.9 1.17 2.07 0.53 0.11 3.77 0.41 
1998 1.94 1.4 2.78 0.43 0.2 6.07 0.49 
1999 1.18 1.32 3.5 0.45 0.42 3.49 0.48 
2000 1.16 1.07 2.83 0.57 0.38 2.42 0.25 
2001 1.47 1.18 3.61 0.7 0.3 2.81 0.64 
2002 2.01 1.66 4.05 0.68 0.45 3.28 0.3 
2003 2.38 3.16 4.17 0.87 0.41 3.98 0.38 
2004 2.25 2.11 4.52 0.73 0.21 2.91 0.31 
2005 2.23 1.74 3.62 0.66 0.55 2.21 0.41 
2006 1.98 1.26 4.09 0.72 0.17 2.15 0.36 
2007 1.73 1.4 4.39 1.13 0.28 3.18 0.43 
2008 1.84 1.47 4.03 1.06 0.33 2.51 0.41 
 
 
 
Table  5-10Export Intensity Index for Egypt and D-8 (1990-2008) 
Year Bangladesh Indonesia Iran Malaysia Nigeria Pakistan Turkey 
1990 0.11 0.07 0.16 0.01 0.09 0.78 0.52 
1995 2.86 0.16 0.02 0.25 0.29 0.6 3.5 
1996 0.1 0.04 0 0.17 0.32 1.04 4.06 
1997 0.39 0.13 0.5 0.31 0.31 0.55 2.84 
1998 0.98 0.19 0.02 0.09 0.86 0.91 4.54 
1999 0.28 0.35 0.04 0.32 0.61 1.15 3.88 
2000 1.03 0.39 1.16 0.24 0.96 3.54 3.32 
2001 0.04 0.46 0.36 0.2 0.92 3.16 2.85 
2002 1.17 0.87 0.67 0.26 1.4 4.51 3.05 
2003 1.1 0.87 0.19 0.32 0.46 3.05 3.23 
2004 0.64 0.41 0.21 0.33 0.54 3.47 3.02 
2005 1.39 0.53 0.24 0.3 0.42 4.51 2.47 
2006 1.26 0.54 0.18 0.3 0.43 4.21 2.4 
2007 0.78 0.42 0.5 0.46 0.53 4.85 3.19 
2008 1.14 0.49 0.38 0.43 0.46 4.52 3.08 
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Table  5-11  Export Intensity Index for Bangladesh and D-8 (1990-2008) 
Year Egypt Indonesia Iran Malaysia Nigeria Pakistan Turkey 
1990 1.75 0.29 3.6 0.18 0.31 6.76 1.39 
1995 1.74 0.19 3.68 0.12 0.24 3.23 0.8 
1996 1.55 0.21 2.62 0.21 0.17 5.05 0.73 
1997 0.36 0.34 5.13 0.17 0.28 3.96 0.5 
1998 0.39 0.16 3.26 0.16 0.1 3.34 0.54 
1999 0.33 0.28 2.62 0.09 0.07 2.6 0.55 
2000 0.55 0.15 2.48 0.1 0.25 3.3 0.45 
2001 0.58 0.16 2.12 0.07 0.08 2.63 0.55 
2002 1.02 0.25 1.75 0.08 0.08 2.63 0.64 
2003 0.59 0.23 1.38 0.05 0.08 3.6 0.56 
2004 0.78 0.21 1.15 0.09 0.13 2.61 0.72 
2005 0.68 0.39 1.3 0.1 0.22 2.37 0.88 
2006 0.62 0.22 0.92 0.13 0.14 2 1.25 
2007 0.56 0.24 1.27 0.17 0.13 2.67 1.21 
2008 0.62 0.28 1.16 0.15 0.16 2.35 1.13 
 
 
 
 
 
Table  5-12  Export Intensity Index for Nigeria and D-8 (1990-2008) 
 
Bangladesh Egypt Indonesia Iran Malaysia Pakistan Turkey 
1990 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0 
1995 0 0.01 1.65 0 0.02 0.03 0.08 
1996 0 0.05 1.07 0 0.02 0 0.12 
1997 0.01 0.04 1.14 0 0.01 0.08 0.12 
1998 0.11 0.05 1.02 0 0.02 0 0.03 
1999 0.18 0.04 3.14 0 0.04 0.03 0.04 
2000 0 0 3.77 0 0 0 0 
2001 0 0 6.24 0 0 0 0 
2002 0 0 10.97 0 0 0 0 
2003 0 0 6.28 0 0 0.01 0 
2004 0.12 0 5.22 0 0.01 0.2 0.45 
2005 0.18 0 2.77 0 0.02 0.09 0.48 
2006 0.1 0 0.01 0 0.03 0.1 0.6 
2007 0.17 0 1.81 0 0.05 0.15 0.81 
2008 0.15 0 2.45 0 0.08 0.11 0.63 
 
5.6.1 Import Intensity Index 
In a similar manner to the export intensity index, the trade intensity index (TII) 
may be used as a common import share. However, the statistic shows whether or not a 
given area imports more (as percentage) from a county (or region) than the world does 
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on average. This is similarly interpreted as an import share. It does not become 
distressed by ‘size’ bias; therefore, there is a need for cross regional comparison of 
statistics over time when there is a rapid growth of imports.  This section investigates D-
8 countries trade relation’s import intensity of trade using the import intensity index. 
Data on the calculation of bilateral trade for TII were obtained from the IMF Directory 
of Trade Statistics, 2010, and trade intensity indices were calculated from 1990 to 2008. 
                                                                             (5.2) 
Where  
Mij: country i’s import from country j 
Mi: country i’s total import 
Mi: country i’s total import 
Xj: country j’s total export 
Mi: world’s import 
Xw: world export 
Xi: country i’s total export 
The results are shown in Table 5-13 to 5-20 for each D-8 members within 1990 to 2008.   
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Table  5-13  Import Intensity Index for Iran and D-8 (1990-2008) 
Year Bangladesh Egypt Indonesia Malaysia Nigeria Pakistan Turkey 
1990 0 0 0.45 0.32 0 1.65 10.58 
1995 2.4 0.05 1.82 0.56 0 8.33 4.47 
1996 6.57 0 0.68 0.41 0 1.88 4 
1997 3.87 0.15 0.66 0.48 0 1.01 4.31 
1998 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 3.83 
1999 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 3.63 
2000 2.2 1.24 1.01 0.53 0 1.91 3.55 
2001 2.35 0.52 0.49 0.63 0 2.15 2.88 
2002 1.95 0.71 0.49 0.55 0 1.92 2.64 
2003 1.35 0.2 0.49 0.65 0 2.07 2.58 
2004 1.18 0.22 0.5 0.62 0 1.71 2.92 
2005 1.35 0.26 0.58 0.58 0 2.04 3.03 
2006 0.87 0.19 0.44 0.55 0 2.4 2.53 
2007 1.29 0.54 0.57 0.73 0 2.77 3.42 
2008 1.19 0.33 0.53 0.62 0 2.52 3.16 
 
 
 
 
Table  5-14 Import Intensity Index for Turkey and D-8 (1990-2008) 
Year Bangladesh Egypt Indonesia Iran Malaysia Nigeria Pakistan 
1990 1.8 1.15 0.1 3.96 0.59 0.02 2.33 
1995 0.86 8.8 0.42 5.41 0.53 0.09 2.77 
1996 0.94 9.36 0.28 4.42 0.36 0.13 1.04 
1997 0.4 11.61 0.31 4.01 0.41 0.13 0.74 
1998 0.55 14.85 0.43 3.9 0.46 0.03 0.8 
1999 0.63 4.28 0.47 4.22 0.36 0.05 0.42 
2000 0.48 3.54 0.42 3.39 0.32 0.59 1.07 
2001 0.54 3.3 0.53 5.22 0.4 0.92 1.63 
2002 0.68 3.25 0.73 4.24 0.34 1.27 1.54 
2003 0.68 3.43 0.8 6.26 0.45 1.06 1.84 
2004 0.97 3.21 0.82 4.18 0.49 0.48 1.7 
2005 1.13 2.63 0.91 6.08 0.59 0.51 2.06 
2006 1.28 2.57 0.94 8 0.52 0.65 2.01 
2007 1.62 3.44 0.93 6.87 0.58 0.88 2.49 
2008 1.83 3.18 0.97 7.03 0.56 0.68 2.19 
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Table  5-15 Import Intensity Index for Pakistan and D-8 (1990-2008) 
Year Bangladesh Egypt Indonesia Iran Malaysia Nigeria Turkey 
1990 10.76 0.79 0.83 4.19 3.92 0.01 1.55 
1995 4.22 4.8 1.16 4.61 5.9 0.03 1.79 
1996 4.8 3.85 1 5.23 3.65 0 1.43 
1997 4.31 1.22 1.75 5.4 3.88 0.09 1.18 
1998 4.14 6.26 2.78 4.12 5.82 0 1.4 
1999 2.88 5.84 2.01 2.16 3.69 0.03 3.1 
2000 3.37 3.78 1.53 6.82 2.65 0 1.75 
2001 2.54 4.52 2.01 5.52 2.99 0 0.74 
2002 2.94 4.84 2.85 4.17 3.14 0.03 1.78 
2003 3.52 3.25 2.4 5.12 3.5 0.1 0.81 
2004 2.83 3.7 3.35 3.13 2.58 0.21 0.74 
2005 3.02 4.82 3.28 2.49 2.14 0.1 1.07 
2006 2.34 4.54 3.32 2.92 2.34 0.11 0.7 
2007 3.14 5.26 3.83 3.1 3.47 0.17 0.71 
2008 2.83 4.87 3.67 3.38 3.16 0.13 0.82 
 
 
 
 
Table  5-16  Import Intensity Index for Indonesia and D-8 (1990-2008) 
Year Bangladesh Egypt Iran Malaysia Nigeria Pakistan Turkey 
1990 0.1 0.09 4.13 1.56 0 1.8 0.2 
1995 0.31 0.18 1.77 4.43 1.78 1.62 0.27 
1996 0.37 0.34 2.5 1.3 1.14 2.49 0.38 
1997 0.18 0.19 3.2 1.45 1.23 1.95 0.23 
1998 0.14 0.39 2.64 1.69 1.1 3.66 0.25 
1999 0.28 1.06 0.42 1.69 3.36 3.42 0.32 
2000 0.21 0.41 0.52 1.82 2.64 2.3 0.21 
2001 0.16 0.76 1.09 2.26 4.97 4.12 0.18 
2002 0.17 0.92 0.49 2.28 12.49 1.75 0.13 
2003 0.12 0.92 0.54 2.17 6.78 0.75 0.2 
2004 0.15 0.44 0.29 2.41 5.54 0.68 0.16 
2005 0.3 0.56 0.2 2.28 2.94 0.43 0.14 
2006 0.25 0.58 0.23 3.15 0.01 0.33 0.15 
2007 0.24 0.45 0.15 5.37 1.95 0.4 1.01 
2008 0.27 0.53 0.19 4.63 2.23 0.38 0.43 
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Table  5-17 Import Intensity Index for Malaysia and D-8 (1990-2008) 
Year Bangladesh Egypt Indonesia Iran Nigeria Pakistan Turkey 
1990 0.15 0.02 1.39 0.22 0.16 0.87 0.08 
1995 0.16 0.21 1.75 0.17 0.03 0.55 0.37 
1996 0.22 0.14 1.92 0.15 0.02 0.35 0.37 
1997 0.15 0.17 1.9 0.12 0.02 0.32 0.47 
1998 0.11 0.21 2.79 0.39 0.02 0.32 0.16 
1999 0.11 0.31 3.1 0.2 0.04 0.48 0.16 
2000 0.18 0.26 2.69 0.29 0.02 0.46 0.12 
2001 0.21 0.2 3.27 0.51 0.02 0.39 0.11 
2002 0.27 0.27 3.51 0.37 0.01 0.44 0.14 
2003 0.19 0.34 4.17 0.27 0.01 0.34 0.08 
2004 0.18 0.35 5.03 0.5 0.01 0.35 0.08 
2005 0.21 0.31 4.59 0.52 0.03 0.32 0.09 
2006 0.18 0.32 4.57 0.84 0.04 0.32 0.07 
2007 0.24 0.49 4.89 0.51 0.05 0.45 0.08 
2008 0.21 0.37 4.96 0.62 0.04 0.36 0.08 
 
 
 
 
Table  5-18  Import Intensity Index for Egypt and D-8 (1990-2008) 
Year Bangladesh Indonesia Iran Malaysia Nigeria Pakistan Turkey 
1990 2.29 0.53 0 0.57 0 0.06 2.29 
1995 1.17 0.76 0.17 1.31 0.01 1.37 3.67 
1996 1.33 0.83 0.16 1.26 0.06 1 4.46 
1997 0.5 0 0.12 1.25 0.05 0.96 2.79 
1998 0.29 1.33 0.12 1.14 0.06 1 6.09 
1999 0.25 1.44 0.22 0.83 0.04 0.46 4.77 
2000 0.59 1.55 0.26 1.16 0 2.53 6.85 
2001 0.33 1.36 0.21 0.61 0.01 0.54 3.76 
2002 1.09 1.75 0.21 1.8 0 3.05 5.35 
2003 0.63 1.98 0.27 3.41 0 2.56 5.53 
2004 0.84 2.16 0.29 2.28 0 2.83 6.02 
2005 0.73 1.95 0.22 1.88 0 1.88 5.54 
2006 0.67 3.04 0.29 1.37 0 2.45 5.58 
2007 0.6 2.8 0.24 1.53 0 2.59 4.77 
2008 0.71 2.63 0.25 1.59 0 2.71 5.29 
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Table  5-19 Import Intensity Index for Bangladesh and D-8 (1990-2008) 
Year Egypt Indonesia Iran Malaysia Nigeria Pakistan Turkey 
1990 0.26 1.94 0.24 1.25 0 12.05 0.25 
1995 2.64 1.24 0.32 0.54 0 13.69 0.11 
1996 3.18 1.36 0.31 1.09 0 7.77 0.39 
1997 1.61 2.32 0.25 2.33 0.01 6.32 0.15 
1998 1.27 2.96 0.45 1.22 0.11 6.75 0.31 
1999 0.89 2.42 1 0.78 0.19 7.51 0.62 
2000 1.1 2.14 0.51 0.95 0.04 7.49 0.64 
2001 0.4 2.35 0.32 1.23 0.23 6.85 0.29 
2002 1.25 2.41 0.29 1.3 0.09 4.93 0.25 
2003 1.18 2.36 0.42 1.57 0.19 5.78 0.49 
2004 0.69 2.77 0.29 1.67 0.13 6.9 0.27 
2005 1.49 2.36 0.29 1.6 0.19 6.76 0.66 
2006 1.36 2.37 0.51 1.62 0.11 7.51 0.81 
2007 0.84 2.38 0.36 1.39 0.18 8.44 0.46 
2008 1.23 2.32 0.39 1.5 0.16 7.87 0.64 
 
 
 
 
Table  5-20 Import Intensity Index for Nigeria and D-8 (1990-2008) 
Year Bangladesh Egypt Indonesia Iran Malaysia Pakistan Turkey 
1990 0 0.15 0.24 0 0.19 0.06 0.1 
1995 0.26 0.31 0.77 0 0.22 0.96 0.42 
1996 0.18 0.34 1.01 0 0.22 1.14 0.4 
1997 0.3 0.34 0.82 0 0.12 1.53 0.39 
1998 0.11 0.93 1.64 0 0.22 1.55 0.56 
1999 0.08 0.66 3.08 0 0.45 2.83 1.02 
2000 0.03 1.02 0.51 0.01 0.11 0.4 0.51 
2001 0.05 0.92 1.02 0.02 0.06 0.1 0.36 
2002 0.02 1.5 0.96 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.43 
2003 0.03 0.49 0.83 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.23 
2004 0.14 0.58 1.28 0.01 0.23 11.86 0.67 
2005 0.24 0.45 0.89 0.01 0.59 1.45 0.62 
2006 0.15 0.46 0.78 0.01 0.19 1.81 0.49 
2007 0.14 0.57 0.89 0.01 0.3 2.55 0.67 
2008 0.18 0.49 0.85 0.01 0.36 2.33 0.61 
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5.6.2 Trade Complementarity Index 
  The trade complementarity index is an index that is cross-linked and measures a 
country’s export rate pattern that matches with that of other countries. A high rate of 
complementarity is assumed to show more successful prospects for trade arrangement. 
Whether the trade profiles are becoming more or less compatible depends on changes 
with time. The complementarity index measures the degree of interference between the 
source export profile and the destination import profile. The index lies within the range 0 
to100, with 100 showing a perfect overlap; it is the sum of the absolute value of the 
difference between the import category and the export shares of the countries under 
study, divided by two. The index is converted into percentage form, which takes a value 
between 0 and 100; zero is an indication of no overlap, and 100 a perfect match in the 
import/export pattern.  
Observations were conducted on the Import and Export complementarity index 
data from yearly bilateral exports from the United Nations. Eight developing countries 
Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE) for four data points, i.e., 1995, 
2000, 2006 and 2008, were determined. The estimated results for each D-8 country are 
shown in Table 5-21 and Table 5-22. 
It is worthy of note that the results are obtained using Intra-D-8 countries’ trade 
rating and its trade with the rest of the world (ROW) were drafted from the 
UNCOMTRADE data source provided by the World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) 
database. 
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5.6.3 Export Complementarity Index 
 This measures the degree to which the export pattern of one country matches 
the import pattern of another. 
(5.3) 
: Export complementarity index country i to j  
:Exports of commodity k by i country 
Xi: Total export of country i 
Mw:The total world’s import flow  
Mi: Country i’s total import 
: Imports of commodity k by world 
:Imports of commodity k by j country 
:Imports of commodity k by i country 
Mj:Country i’s total import 
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Table  5-21 Export complementarity index for D-8 countries (1995-2008) 
 Country Bangladesh Egypt Indonesia Iran Malaysia Nigeria Pakistan Turkey 
Bangladesh 
        
1995 
 
1.03 0.951 1.099 0.969 0.676 0.884 0.882 
2000 
 
0.898 0.688 0.919 0.975 0.692 0.687 0.846 
2006 
 
0.803 0.687 0.218 1.137 0.799 0.905 0.625 
2008 
 
0.910 0.735 0.426 1.124 0.722 0.825 0.784 
Egypt 
        
1995 0.906 
 
1.083 0.914 0.741 0.581 1.542 1.323 
2000 0.927 
 
1.23 0.747 0.795 0.52 2.022 1.18 
2006 0.868 
 
1.238 0.205 0.7 0.643 1.352 0.428 
2008 0.903 
 
1.186 0.422 0.745 0.581 1.638 0.977 
Indonesia 
        
1995 0.914 1.041 
 
1.033 0.831 0.617 1.399 1.234 
2000 0.907 1.06 
 
0.85 0.89 0.615 1.49 1.056 
2006 1.128 1.22 
 
0.225 0.964 0.741 1.323 0.667 
2008 1.213 1.207 
 
0.702 0.895 0.657 1.404 0.985 
Iran 
        
1995 0.903 0.363 1.027 
 
0.405 0.495 2.105 1.66 
2000 0.719 0.891 1.507 
 
0.558 0.219 3.212 1.391 
2006 0.916 1.169 1.594 
 
0.698 0.708 1.674 0.407 
2008 0.846 1.207 1.576 
 
0.653 0.474 2.330 1.152 
Malaysia 
        
1995 0.891 1.11 1.078 1.131 
 
0.691 1.089 1.057 
2000 0.926 0.996 0.894 0.961 
 
0.711 1.045 1.042 
2006 1.007 0.923 0.846 0.218 
 
0.765 1.049 0.592 
2008 1.096 0.986 0.939 0.479 
 
0.722 1.061 0.897 
Nigeria 
        
1995 0.875 0.308 1.01 0.353 0.331 
 
2.14 1.676 
2000 0.673 0.819 1.611 0.225 0.512 
 
3.547 1.48 
2006 0.804 1.054 1.538 0.217 0.568 
 
1.587 0.336 
2008 0.784 1.127 1.386 0.265 0.470 
 
2.124 0.974 
Pakistan 
        
1995 0.937 1.21 1.087 1.257 1.074 0.756 
 
1.012 
2000 1.039 1.182 0.879 1.134 1.126 0.847 
 
1.012 
2006 1.067 0.978 0.765 0.221 1.08 0.826 
 
0.586 
2008 1.014 1.123 0.910 0.672 1.034 0.802 
 
0.853 
Turkey        
 
1995 0.965 1.318 1.034 1.35 1.02 0.74 1.088 
 
2000 0.988 1.171 0.813 1.115 1.076 0.844 0.892 
 
2006 0.559 0.514 0.373 0.113 0.577 0.433 0.5 
 
2008 0.837 0.928 0.642 0.469 0.901 0.641 0.784 
  
5.6.4 Import Complementarity Index 
 This measures the degree to which the import pattern of one country matches 
the export pattern of another. 
                                                                                (5.4) 
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: Import complementarity index country i from j  
:Exports of commodity k by j country 
Xi: Total export of country i 
Xw:Total world’s export flow 
Mi: Country i’s total import 
: Exports of commodity k by world  
:Imports of commodity k by i country 
:Total exports of commodity k by j country 
Xj:Country i’s total export 
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Table  5-22 Import complementarity index for D-8countries (1995-2008) 
 Country Bangladesh Egypt Indonesia Iran Malaysia Nigeria Pakistan Turkey 
Bangladesh 
        
1995 
 
1.183 0.984 1.179 0.893 0.661 1.091 0.961 
2000 
 
1.155 0.86 0.966 0.843 0.703 0.993 0.86 
2006 
 
1.066 0.839 0.207 0.931 0.743 1.058 0.548 
2008 
 
1.121 0.879 0.687 0.928 0.723 1.042 0.764 
Egypt 
        
1995 1.183 
 
1.242 1.661 1.028 0.803 1.427 1.136 
2000 1.155 
 
0.984 1.211 0.889 0.896 1.243 0.911 
2006 1.067 
 
0.876 0.197 0.823 0.719 1.094 0.492 
2008 1.104 
 
0.934 0.523 0.951 0.813 1.158 0.746 
Indonesia 
        
1995 0.987 1.246 
 
1.27 1.11 0.75 1.235 1.215 
2000 0.862 0.986 
 
0.792 0.784 0.559 1.165 0.911 
2006 0.844 0.881 
 
0.182 0.759 0.609 1.024 0.461 
2008 0.879 0.913 
 
0.358 0.842 0.627 1.136 0.639 
Iran 
        
1995 1.177 1.657 1.266 
 
1.207 0.871 1.367 1.19 
2000 0.964 1.208 0.79 
 
0.91 0.797 0.908 0.834 
2006 0.207 0.198 0.183 
 
0.204 0.156 0.224 0.117 
2008 0.462 0.521 0.165 
 
0.621 0.403 0.573 0.472 
Malaysia 
        
1995 0.895 1.031 1.113 1.213 
 
0.759 0.995 1.08 
2000 0.844 0.889 0.784 0.914 
 
0.683 0.858 0.969 
2006 0.932 0.824 0.758 0.205 
 
0.731 0.958 0.621 
2008 0.891 0.904 0.824 0.374 
 
0.712 0.941 0.748 
Nigeria 
        
1995 0.66 0.802 0.749 0.872 0.756 
 
0.753 0.723 
2000 0.7 0.893 0.557 0.796 0.68 
 
0.658 0.603 
2006 0.742 0.719 0.61 0.156 0.729 
 
0.761 0.398 
2008 0.753 0.793 0.641 0.378 0.726 
 
0.731 0.546 
Pakistan 
        
1995 1.092 1.427 1.229 1.369 0.993 0.752 
 
1.275 
2000 0.994 1.243 1.156 0.908 0.858 0.659 
 
1.122 
2006 1.058 1.093 1.018 0.223 0.958 0.759 
 
0.584 
2008 1.031 1.168 1.124 0.641 0.927 0.741 
 
0.893 
Turkey 
        
1995 0.961 1.137 1.21 1.193 1.078 0.724 1.275 
 
2000 0.86 0.911 0.907 0.837 0.968 0.605 1.121 
 
2006 0.547 0.491 0.458 0.117 0.619 0.397 0.582 
 
2008 0.672 0.634 0.684 0.438 0727 0.428 0.736 
  
 
5.6.5 Trade Bias Index 
The bias index indicates the degree of resistance to i's trade with j relative to the 
average degree of resistance in i's other bilateral trading relationship.  
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(5.5) 
Where 
: Country i’s export to j 
: Exports of commodity k by i country 
: Imports of commodity k by j country 
: Imports of commodity k by world 
: Imports of commodity k by i country 
 When the trade bias index is less than one, the trade policy provides incentives 
for import substitution. On the other hand, if B is greater than one, then the policy is 
said to promote exports. For special cases, where the index is equal to one, the trade 
policy is said to be neutral and the economy operates at close to free trade. Jagdish 
Bhagwati (1988) called these cases, import substitution, ultra export promotion, and 
export promotion.  
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Based on the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), using annual bilateral 
manufacturers’ export data from the U.N. Commodity Trade Statistics Database 
(COMTRADE), the results were calculated for each D-8 member (Table 5-23). 
Table  5-23 Trade Bias Index for D-8 countries (1995-2008) 
 Country Bangladesh Egypt Indonesia Iran Malaysia Nigeria Pakistan Turkey 
Bangladesh 
        
1995 
 
1.69 0.2 3.35 0.12 0.35 3.66 0.9 
2000 
 
0.61 0.22 2.7 0.1 0.36 4.8 0.53 
2006 
 
0.77 0.33 4.23 0.11 0.18 2.2 1.99 
2008 
 
0.92 0.28 3.82 0.12 0.25 3.25 1.81 
Egypt 
        
1995 3.16 
 
0.15 0.02 0.33 0.49 0.39 
 
2.64 
2000 1.11 
 
0.32 1.56 0.31 1.84 1.75 2.82 
2006 1.46 
 
0.44 0.88 0.43 0.67 3.12 5.6 
2008 1.83 
 
0.35 0.92 0.35 0.83 2.35 3.98 
Indonesia 
        
1995 1.73 1.82 
 
1.14 1.74 1.13 0.85 0.33 
2000 3.04 1.36 
 
1.15 2.73 4.45 0.93 0.35 
2006 2.92 2.3 
 
3.7 4.05 0.97 2.32 1.01 
2008 2.73 1.95 
 
2.79 3.64 1.28 1.76 0.96 
Iran 
        
1995 0.38 0.1 0.05 
 
0.66 0 1.82 3.64 
2000 0.66 0 0.33 
 
0.49 0.03 1.99 2.29 
2006 0.52 0.23 0.13 
 
1.12 0.1 1.61 18.28 
2008 0.58 0.16 0.14 
 
0.87 0.04 1.78 12.63 
Malaysia 
        
1995 0.66 1.41 1.54 0.54 
 
0.3 4 0.41 
2000 1.25 1.08 3.17 0.59 
 
0.53 2.32 0.24 
2006 1.97 1.37 4.83 3.3 
 
0.23 2.05 0.61 
2008 1.75 1.28 4.18 2.43 
 
0.31 2.64 0.52 
Nigeria 
        
1995 0 0.03 1.63 0 0.07 
 
0.01 0.05 
2000 0 0 2.34 0 0 
 
0 0 
2006 0.13 0 0.01 0 0.06 
 
0.06 1.79 
2008 0.18 0.01 0.84 0 0.13 
 
0.12 0.93 
Pakistan 
        
1995 16.42 2.07 1.55 4.98 0.36 1.16 
 
2.43 
2000 11.11 2 2.26 0.7 0.42 4.34 
 
1.31 
2006 6.53 2.32 0.41 10.12 0.28 2.04 
 
3.2 
2008 10.38 2.24 0.96 7.65 0.32 2.13 
 
2.48 
Turkey 
        
1995 0.2 3.81 0.19 3.73 0.3 0.52 1.75 
 
2000 0.71 5.44 0.22 3.3 0.11 1.47 1.3 
 
2006 1.52 9.98 0.45 30.24 0.12 1.04 1.3 
 
2008 1.71 8.56 0.78 19.63 0.19 1.12 1.23 
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5.6.6 Trade Creation Index 
 As stated in the literature, and in line with Jacob Viner's (1950) classic analysis, 
policy-makers and economists have discussed exhaustively, the dynamic and static 
distortions created by preferential trade liberalization. It is disputable that PTAs may 
result in trade creation if member countries switch from local producers ineffectiveness 
and import more efficient produce from other member countries of the PTA. Using 
equation (5.6) the Iranian trade creation for the period 1993 to 2007 was calculated. The 
data were obtained from the Institute for Trade Studies and Research Iran. 
                                                                                         (5.6) 
: Trade creation of Iran 
: Iran’s import from D-8 
: Price elasticity of import demand 
: Import tariff in Iran 
 : Change of import’s tariff rates  
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 : After setting union tariff – before setting union tariff  
The following equations were used for the estimation of DT using four different 
conditions –10% reduction, 20% reduction, 30% reduction and 40% reduction:  
                                                                       (4.13) 
                                                                       (4.14) 
                                                                      (4.15) 
                                                                       (4.16) 
The Iranian trade creation index for the period 1993 to 2007 considering four 
possibilities was calculated and the results are shown in Table 5-24. 
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Table  5-24 Trade creation index for Iran 1993-2007 
Year 10% 20% 30% 40% 
1993 1.61 3.22 4.83 6.44 
1994 4.17 8.34 12.51 16.68 
1995 5.93 11.86 17.79 23.72 
1996 10.23 20.45 30.68 40.91 
1997 12.16 24.33 36.49 48.65 
1998 11.3 22.6 33.9 45.2 
1999 19.87 39.73 59.6 79.46 
2000 22.53 45.06 67.6 90.13 
2001 26.21 52.43 78.64 104.85 
2002 37.35 74.7 112.05 149.4 
2003 65.63 131.26 196.89 262.53 
2004 89.14 178.29 267.43 356.58 
2005 108.79 217.58 326.36 435.15 
2006 148.47 296.65 445.15 593.51 
2007 192.71 384.05 577.09 769.43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
Figure  5-1 Trade creation index for Iran 1993-2007 (10%) 
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Figure  5-2 Trade creation index for Iran 1993-2007 (20%) 
 
 
Figure  5-3 Trade creation index for Iran 1993-2007 (30%) 
 
 
Figure  5-4 Trade creation index for Iran 1993-2007(40%) 
 
The results indicate the reductions in tariff rate, and trade creation increases. 
However, for D-8, preferential trade agreements lead to a reduction in tariff rate; trade 
and competitive growth was high between Iran and D-8 members. 
The trend of the trade creation index pattern for the period 1993 to 2007 explains the 
increases in the index. Only in 1998 did the index decrease; however, it subsequently 
surged. 
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5.6.7 Trade Diversion Index 
Trade diversion occurs when member countries substitute efficiently, low-cost 
imports from non-member countries with less efficient imports from member countries. 
The net welfare effect of PTA depends on which of the two effects dominate. 
                                                                                   (5.7) 
: Trade diversion of Iran 
: Iran’s import from the word (except D-8) 
: Price elasticity of import demand 
: Import tariff for Iran 
 : Common external tariff among members 
If CIR>tIR:Trade diversion will be positive (TD>0). In such a situation trade 
creation and intra-regional trade will increase. 
However, if CIR<tIR: Trade diversion will be negative (TD<0). Therefore, intra-
regional trade declines, and, in this situation, trade diversion is manifested. 
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The trade diversion index was estimated for four conditions: CIR = 10, 20, 30 and 
40%, from 1993 to 2007. The results are shown in Table 5-25. The data were obtained 
from the Institute for Trade Studies and Research Iran. 
Table  5-25 Trade diversion index for Iran 1993-2007 
 
 
The results show that increasing the common external tariff from 10% to 40% 
from 1993 to 2007 leads to positive trade diversion (TD > 0); therefore, trade creation 
occurred. Moreover, the reduction of common external tariff trade diversion became 
negative with intra-regional trade declining while external regional trade increased. 
The main point is that with a 10% common external tariff, almost during the research 
period, trade diversion was negative while intra-regional trade declined. However, for 
the other three conditions 20, 30 and 40%, a common external tariff trade creation 
occurred while intra-regional trade increased. 
 
Year 10% 20% 30% 40% 
1993 -49.27 748.59 1546.45 2344.31 
1994 386.67 1750.23 3113.79 4477.34 
1995 536.11 2011.73 3487.35 4962.97 
1996 -390.46 1338.68 3067.83 4796.98 
1997 -1287.21 403.8 2094.82 3785.84 
1998 -1352.14 380.5 2113.14 3845.79 
1999 -4318.46 -3054.41 -1790.35 -526.3 
2000 -3445.28 -1896.85 -348.43 1200 
2001 -5206.05 -3374.74 -1543.43 287.88 
2002 242.43 13244.49 26246.55 39248.61 
2003 -986.93 14580.42 30147.77 45715.12 
2004 -2221.67 20002.41 42226.48 64450.56 
2005 -441.66 25769.02 51979.7 78190.38 
2006 2164.11 32815.37 51460.45 69007.93 
2007 21443.75 40792.38 42619.13 42758.38 
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5.7 Results 
5.7.1 State of Bangladesh’s trade with other D-8 member countries 
The index is greater than one for Bangladesh’s export to Pakistan and Iran and is 
regarded as highly intense. The trend of the export intensity index for these countries 
declined since 1997 with the index for Pakistan being higher compared to Iran. This 
implies that the tendency for Bangladesh to export to Pakistan and Iran would decrease. 
Moreover in 2006, the intensity index for Bangladesh and Turkey increased 
dramatically, which explains that the share of trade between Bangladesh and Turkey 
was more than their share in the world trade in recent years. The index was lower than 
one for Bangladesh exporting to other D-8 member countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Egypt and Nigeria), an indication that the share of Bangladesh’s trade with these 
countries is less than a proportion of its share of world trade. This implies that 
Bangladesh’s exports to other D-8 members are low. 
The import intensity index shows that the share of Bangladesh’s imports from 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan is more than a percentage of its share of world trade. 
The index trend shows that, in 1997, the share of Bangladesh’s imports from Pakistan 
became higher. This shows that the tendency of bilateral trade increased. On the other 
hand, Bangladesh’s imports from Indonesia and Malaysia remained steady. In the case 
of Egypt, there was no harmonic trend; the results show that only in some years did the 
intensity index become significant.  
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Table 5-11 shows that the import intensity index for Bangladesh and other D-8 member 
countries (Iran, Turkey and Nigeria) is less than one, this emphasizes that the share of 
Iran’s imports from these countries is less than a proportion of its share of world trade. 
Comparing the indices for export intensity and export complementarity between 
Bangladesh and Iran shows that they differ considerably; the export complementarity 
index is quite lower compared to the export intensity index. This however, means that 
despite the fact that Bangladesh and Iran’s share of exports is more than a proportion of 
their share of world trade, the small amount of trade complementarity index explains 
that the export pattern degree for Bangladesh does not match the import pattern of Iran. 
Moreover, an investigation into the export intensity and export complementarity 
trend indices for the period 1995 to 2008 shows that the export intensity and export 
complementarity index trend decreased. However, in explanation of the reasons for the 
decline in trade tendency between Bangladesh and Iran, the export degree pattern of 
Bangladesh does not match the Iranian import pattern. 
Observation of the indices for the export intensity and export complementarity between 
Bangladesh to Pakistan shows that they differ; however, the difference between them 
was smaller than between Bangladesh and Iran. Therefore, the trade complementarity 
index for Bangladesh to Pakistan is higher than Bangladesh to Iran. This indicates that 
the export degree pattern of Bangladesh matches the import pattern of Pakistan 
compared to Iran. The export complementarity index of Bangladesh to Malaysia is 
higher than the export intensity for the years 1995, 2000, 2006 and 2008. This indicates 
that the imports match the pattern of Malaysia, although the share of exports of 
Bangladesh and Malaysia is less than a proportion of their share of world trade. 
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The results show that the trade bias index for Bangladesh to Egypt, Bangladesh 
to Indonesia, Bangladesh to Malaysia, Bangladesh to Pakistan and Bangladesh to 
Turkey for the 3 point data is lower than the trade index for Egypt to Bangladesh, 
Indonesia to Bangladesh, Malaysia to Bangladesh, Pakistan to Bangladesh and Turkey 
to Bangladesh. This therefore means that Bangladesh’s access to these markets is 
limited and also the advantage of a bilateral trade partnership and preferential facilities 
for Bangladesh are restricted. Although the results show that these countries have more 
liberty to approach Bangladesh’s market, on the other hand, the results show that the 
trade bias index for Bangladesh to Iran and Bangladesh to Nigeria for the 3 point data is 
more than the trade index from Iran to Bangladesh and Nigeria to Bangladesh. This 
means that Bangladesh’s access to these markets is not limited, and, also, that the 
advantage of bilateral trade partnership and preferential facilities for Bangladesh is not 
restricted. The results show that these countries have more restriction to approach 
Bangladesh’s market. 
5.7.2 State of Egypt’s trade with other D-8 member countries 
The index is greater than one, for Egypt’s exports to Pakistan and Turkey, and 
would be regarded as highly intense. The trend of the export intensity index for Pakistan 
improved in 1997, and Pakistan’s index is higher compared to Turkey, which endures 
stability of trend. This means that the tendency of Egypt to export to Pakistan and 
Turkey decreased. Moreover, the intensity index for Egypt and Bangladesh for some 
years was more than one. 
The index is lower than one, for Egypt’s exports to other D-8 members (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Iran and Nigeria), an indication that the share of Egypt’s trade with these 
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countries is less than a proportion of its share of world trade. This implies that Egypt’s 
exports to other D-8 members are low. 
The import intensity index shows that the share of Egypt’s imports from Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Turkey and Pakistan is more than the percentage of its share of world trade. 
The index trend shows that, in 1997, the share of Egypt’s imports from Turkey and 
Indonesia increased. This implies that the bilateral trade tendency also increased. On the 
other hand, Egypt’s imports from Indonesia and Malaysia remained stable. 
According to Table 5-18, Egypt’s import intensity index to other D-8 members (Iran, 
Bangladesh and Nigeria) is less than one, which emphasizes that Egypt’s import share 
from these countries is less than a proportion of its share of world trade. 
Comparing the indices for export intensity and export complementarity between Egypt 
to Indonesia shows that they have a considerable difference; the export intensity index 
is less than the export complementarity index. This means that despite the fact that the 
share of Egypt and Indonesia’s export is less than the proportion of their share of world 
trade; the high level of trade complementarity index explains that the export degree 
pattern of Egypt matches the import pattern of Indonesia. Therefore, this explains that 
this pair of countries had a match in trade pattern, however, there is limitation for Egypt 
to access Indonesia’s market. Obviously from this result it can be said that if Indonesia 
terminates its trade barriers and restrictions toward Egypt and improves trade facilities, 
the trade volume is expected to surge significantly.  
Comparing the index of the export intensity and export complementarity between Egypt 
and Pakistan is significant. The share of Egypt and Pakistan’s export is more than the 
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proportion of their share of world trade. The higher amount of trade complementarity 
index shows that the export degree pattern of Egypt matches Indonesia’s import pattern. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the high intensity between the two countries is due 
to Egypt’s export degree pattern matching Pakistan’s import pattern. 
Moreover, investigation of the export intensity and export complementarity trend index 
from 1995 to 2008 shows that while the export intensity between Egypt and Turkey 
remained stable, the export complementarity trend index decreased from 1995 to 2006 
and that there was a remarkable improvement from 2006 to 2009. In other words, for an 
explanation of the reasons for the decline in the export complementarity index while the 
trade tendency between Egypt and Turkey was firm, the bias index is considered. As 
shown in Table 5.23, the bias index for the four was above one, which implies that 
Egypt has the facility to access Turkey’s market, although Turkey has lower restrictions 
to access Egypt’s market. 
Observation of the index export intensity and export complementarity between Egypt 
and Bangladesh, Egypt and Iran, Egypt and Malaysia, and Egypt and Nigeria shows that 
they differ, this, however, implies that the low value of intensity index is due to the low 
amount of complementarity index for the countries. However, the lack of trade tendency 
between the mentioned countries is because Egypt’s export degree pattern does not 
match the import pattern of Bangladesh, Iran, Malaysia and Nigeria.  
The results show that the trade bias index for Egypt and Indonesia, Egypt and Malaysia, 
and Egypt and Turkey for the 4 points data is lower than the trade index for Indonesia 
and Egypt, Malaysia and Egypt, and Turkey and Egypt. This indicates that Egypt’s 
access to these markets is limited and the advantage of bilateral trade partnership and 
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preferential facilities for Egypt are restricted. However, the results show that these 
countries have more liberty to approach Egypt’s market. 
The trade bias for Egypt and Pakistan from 1995 to 2000 is lower than the trade index 
for Pakistan and Egypt. However, the index changed in 2000 while the trade bias for 
Egypt and Pakistan became more than the trade index for Pakistan and Egypt. This 
implies that Egypt’s access to these markets was limited until 2000. Although the 
results show that Egypt has more liberty to approach Pakistan’s market. 
On the other hand, the results indicate that the trade bias index for Egypt and 
Bangladesh, Egypt and Nigeria, and Egypt and Iran for the 4 point data is more than the 
trade index for Iran to Egypt, and Nigeria to Egypt. This indicates that Egypt’s access to 
these markets is not limited; the advantage of bilateral trade partnership and preferential 
facilities for Egypt is not restricted. The results show that these countries have more 
restriction in approaching Egypt’s market. 
5.7.3 State of Indonesia’s trade with other D-8 member countries 
The index is greater than one, for Indonesia’s export to Bangladesh, Egypt, 
Malaysia and Pakistan, and is regarded as highly intense.  The export intensity index 
trend for these countries was augmented in 1997, whereas the Bangladesh and Malaysia 
index was higher compared to Egypt and Pakistan. This, however, implies that 
Indonesia’s tendency to export to Bangladesh, Egypt, Malaysia and Pakistan increased. 
The intensity index for Indonesia and Iran in 2007 was more than one. This indicates 
that Indonesia’s tendency to export to Iran increased. In 1997, the export intensity index 
increased for Indonesia to Nigeria, but, in 2005, the result changed and was not 
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significantly different. The index was lower than one for Indonesia’s export to other D-8 
member countries (Turkey and Nigeria), which shows that the share of Indonesia’s trade 
with these countries is less than a proportion of its share of world trade, an indication 
that Indonesia’s export to other D-8 members is low.  
The import intensity index shows that the share of Indonesia’s imports from 
Malaysia and Nigeria is more than a percentage of their share of world trade. The index 
trend in 1997 for Indonesia’s import share from Malaysia increased. This therefore 
shows that the trade bilateral tendency increased. On the other hand, Indonesia’s 
imports from Nigeria increased from 1997 to 2002, however, the trend changed 
thereafter, while the import intensity index decreased. Table 5-15 shows that the import 
intensity index for Indonesia and other D-8 members (Iran, Bangladesh, Turkey, 
Pakistan and Egypt) is less than one, thus emphasizing that Indonesia’s import share 
from these countries is less than a proportion of its share of world trade.      
Comparing the export intensity index and export complementarity between Indonesia 
and Egypt, and Indonesia and Pakistan, showed that the trade between the two countries 
differs significantly. This implies that the share of exports of Indonesia to Egypt, and 
Indonesia to Pakistanis more than a proportion of their share of world trade. The high 
amount of trade complementarity index explains that Indonesia’s export degree pattern 
matches the import pattern of Egypt and Pakistan. It may be suggested that the high 
intensity between the two countries is because the degree of export pattern of Indonesia 
matches the import pattern of Egypt and Pakistan. On the other hand, the results from 
bias index also show that Indonesia’s index is higher than that of Egypt for the entire 
four points. This is explained in that there is no restriction for Indonesia to access 
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Egypt’s market. The high intensity between the two countries is because of the match of 
trade pattern and liberty of Indonesia to export to Egypt. 
However, the result of the bias index shows that Indonesia was lower than the 
index for Pakistan from 1995 to 2000. This implies that during this period, Indonesia 
had limitations in accessing Pakistan’s market but the pattern changed in 2000.The bias 
index for Indonesia became higher than the index for Pakistan; an indication that 
Indonesia’s access to Pakistan’s market developed faster. 
Comparing the indices of the export intensity and export complementarity between 
Indonesia and Malaysia, and Indonesia and Bangladesh shows that they differ 
significantly; the export complementarity index is lower than the export intensity index. 
Despite the fact that export share of Indonesia and Malaysia, and Indonesia and 
Bangladeshis more than a proportion of their share of world trade, the low amount of 
trade complementarity index explains that the degree of the export pattern of Indonesia 
does not match the import pattern of Malaysia and Bangladesh. However, the 
complementarity index of Indonesia and Bangladesh surged in 2006, which shows that 
both countries matched at that time. The bias index is more than one for both countries, 
which indicates that Indonesia has the liberty to access the markets of Malaysia and 
Bangladesh, which is the reason for the tendency between the countries. 
A look at the indices export intensity and export complementarity between 
Indonesia and Iran, Indonesia and Turkey, and Indonesia and Nigeria shows that there is 
a significant difference between them. The low value of intensity index is due to the 
lower level of complementarity index among the countries. Therefore, the lack of trade 
tendency between the countries in question is because Indonesia’s export degree pattern 
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does not match the import pattern of Bangladesh, Iran, Turkey and Nigeria. However, 
the bias index shows that Indonesia has the liberty to access the markets of these 
countries. 
The results indicate that the trade bias index for Indonesia to Bangladesh, Indonesia to 
Egypt, Indonesia to Nigeria, Indonesia to Turkey, and Indonesia to Iran for the 4 point 
data is more than the trade index for Bangladesh to Indonesia, Egypt to Indonesia, 
Nigeria to Indonesia, and Turkey to Indonesia. Indonesia’s access to these markets is 
not limited and Indonesia could gain advantage of bilateral trade partnership and 
preferential facilities. Although the results show that these countries have less liberty to 
approach Indonesia’s market, the bias of trade for Indonesia to Pakistan from 1995 to 
2000 was lower than the trade index for Pakistan to Indonesia. Moreover, the index 
changed in 2000 and the bias of trade for Indonesia to Pakistan became more than the 
trade index for Pakistan to Indonesia. Indonesia’s access to these markets was limited 
until 2000. However, the results show that Indonesia has more liberty to approach 
Pakistan’s market. The results indicate that the trade bias index from Indonesia to 
Malaysia for the 4 point data is lower than the trade index for Malaysia to Indonesia. 
This implies that Indonesia’s access to these markets is limited, and, therefore, it gains 
an advantage from the bilateral trade partnership and preferential facilities; whereas 
Malaysia has more liberty to approach Indonesia’s market. 
5.7.4 State of Iran’s trade with other D-8 member countries 
The index is higher than one, for Iran’s export to Turkey, while Pakistan is 
regarded as highly intense. The intensity increased since the agreement was signed in 
1997. Iran and Turkey’s bilateral trade surged since 2003, but the export intensity index 
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for Iran and Pakistan declined since 2000, while the index increased for Pakistan’s 
exports to Iran. This indicates that Iran’s tendency to import from Pakistan improved.  
The results show that Iran’s export share to Turkey and Pakistan is more than its 
imports from the rest of the world. In other words, the trade share between Iran and 
Turkey and between Iran and Pakistan is more than its shares of world trade. 
Additionally, the index was even high before then. This probably reflects the geographic 
proximity and relative isolation from other markets. 
The index is lower than one, for Iran’s export to other D-8 member countries 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Egypt, Nigeria and Bangladesh), which indicates that Iran’s share 
of trade with these countries is less than the proportion of its share of world trade. This 
however, implies that Iran’s exports to other D-8 member countries are low. 
Iran’s intensity index shows that its import share from Turkey, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh is more than a percentage of its share of world trade. The index trend shows 
the transport share in 2003, from Turkey, while Turkey’s imports from Iran was higher, 
an indication of the increase in bilateral trade tendency.  
Iran’s import intensity index in 2000 from Pakistan improved, while a decrease 
is observed in Pakistan’s imports from Iran. This shows that only Iran’s tendency to 
import from Pakistan increased.  Iran’s import index from Bangladesh is greater than 
one and is regarded as highly intense. However, since 2000, there was a reduction in 
trend, an indication of the reduction in Bangladesh’s imports. It should be noted that the 
export intensity index for Iran to Bangladesh is less than one, which indicates that Iran’s 
exports to Bangladesh is not significantly different. 
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Table 5-13 shows that the import intensity index of Iran and other D-8 member 
countries (Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia and Nigeria) is less than one, which indicates that 
Iran’s share of imports from these countries is less than a proportion of its share of 
world trade.  
Comparing the indices export intensity and export complementarity between 
Iran and Turkey shows that there is a significant difference; the export complementarity 
index is lower than the export intensity index. Despite the fact that the export share of 
Iran and Turkey is more than a proportion of its share of world trade, the low level of 
the trade complementarity index explains that the export degree pattern of Iran does not 
match Turkey’s import pattern. 
Moreover, the results for the investigation of the export intensity and export 
complementarity indices trend for the period 1995 to 2006show that although the export 
intensity index trend increased, the export complementarity index trend decreased. In 
other words, in spite of raising the trade tendency between Iran and Turkey, the degree 
of Iran’s export pattern did not match Turkey’s imports. Observation of the index export 
intensity and export complementarity between Iran and Pakistan shows a significant 
difference; however, the difference between them is lower than that of Iran to Turkey. 
Therefore, the trade complementarity index from Iran to Pakistan is higher than that of 
Iran and Turkey. This, however, means that the export degree pattern of Iran matches 
the import pattern of Pakistan compared to Turkey. 
The export complementarity index from Iran to Indonesia is bigger than the 
export intensity in years 1995, 2000 and 2006; this shows that the share of exports of 
Iran and Indonesia is less than a proportion of their share of world trade; the export 
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degree pattern of Iran indicates a match with the import pattern of Indonesia. The 
import complementarity between these countries also supports this result. 
The results indicate that the trade bias index from Iran to Turkey for the 3 point 
data is lower than the trade index from Turkey to Iran. Iran’s access to Turkey’s market 
is limited, and it gains advantage from a bilateral trade partnership. However, the results 
show that Turkey has more liberty to approach Iran’s market. 
The trend in the trade bias index decreased from 1995 to 2000, however, after 
this time period the trend pattern surged, during which Iran’s access to Turkey’s market 
became more difficult. From the results, a similarity exists between Iran and Pakistan; 
the trade bias index of Iran to Pakistan is less than the level of the index from Pakistan 
to Iran, despite the liberality of the access of Pakistan to Iran’s market, Iran’s access to 
Pakistan’s market is limited. 
5.7.5 State of Malaysia’s trade with other D-8 member countries 
Malaysia’s exports to Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia and Pakistan are regarded as 
highly intense and the index is greater than one. However, the index for Indonesia and 
Pakistan is higher compared to Bangladesh and Egypt. The intensity index for Malaysia 
and Iran in 2007 is more than one. An indication that Malaysia’s tendency to export to 
Iran increased. The index is lower than one, for Malaysia’s export to other D-8 member 
countries (Turkey and Nigeria). The share of Malaysia’s trade with these countries is 
less than a proportion of its share of world trade, which implies that Malaysia’s exports 
to other D-8 member countries, is low.  
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The import intensity index shows that Malaysia’s import share from Indonesia is more 
than a percentage of its share of world trade. The index trend shows that, in 1997, the 
share of Malaysia’s imports from Indonesia increased. The bilateral trade tendency also 
increased. From Table5.17, the import intensity index of Malaysia and other member D-
8 countries (Iran, Bangladesh, Turkey, Nigeria, Pakistan and Egypt) is less than one, 
which indicates that the share of Malaysia’s imports from these countries is less than the 
proportion of its share of world trade.      
Comparing the indices export intensity and export complementarity between 
Malaysia and Pakistan shows that the trade between the two differs significantly; 
meaning that the exports of Malaysia and Pakistanis more than a proportion of their 
share of world trade. The high level of trade complementarity index shows that the 
export degree pattern of Malaysia matches the import pattern of Pakistan. However, the 
increase in intensity between the two countries may be because the export degree 
pattern of Malaysia matches the import pattern of Pakistan. On the other hand, the 
results from bias index explain that the index for Malaysia is greater than the index for 
Pakistan for the four points, which is an indication that there is no restriction for 
Malaysia to access Pakistan’s market. The high intensity between the two countries is 
because their trade pattern matches the liberty of Malaysia to export to Egypt. 
Comparing the indices for the export intensity and export complementarity 
between Malaysia and Indonesia, Malaysia and Egypt, and Malaysia and Bangladesh 
shows that they are significantly different; the export complementarity index is lower 
than the export intensity index. Despite the fact that the export share of Malaysia to 
Indonesia, Malaysia to Egypt and Malaysia to Bangladeshis more than a proportion of 
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its share of world trade, the low level of trade complementarity index explains that the 
export degree pattern of Malaysia does not match the import pattern of Indonesia, Egypt 
and Bangladesh. Moreover, the complementarity index for Malaysia and Bangladesh 
surged in 2006, an indication that the two countries matched each other. The bias index 
is more than one for the two countries from 1995 to 2008, and in 2000 for Bangladesh. 
This indicates that Malaysia has the liberty to access the markets of Indonesia, Egypt 
and Bangladesh, which could be the reason for the tendency between the countries. 
Observation of the index for the export intensity and export complementarity 
between Malaysia and Iran, Malaysia and Turkey, and Malaysia and Nigeria, shows that 
it differs significantly. The lower level of intensity index may be due to the low level of 
complementarity index for the two countries. Therefore, the lack of trade tendency 
between the countries in question may be because the export degree pattern of Malaysia 
does not match the import patterns of Iran, Turkey and Nigeria. However, the bias index 
shows that Malaysia has restrictions to access the markets of these countries. The bias 
index level was less than one, for Turkey and Nigeria from 1995 to 2008. However, the 
bias index increased in 2006 from Malaysia to Iran, which means that Malaysia gained 
more liberty to access Iran’s market.  
The results indicate that the trade bias index for Malaysia to Bangladesh, Malaysia to 
Egypt, Malaysia to Indonesia, Malaysia to Iran, and Malaysia to Pakistan for the 4 point 
data is more than the trade index for Bangladesh to Malaysia, Egypt to Malaysia, Iran to 
Malaysia, Pakistan to Malaysia and Indonesia to Malaysia. This means that Malaysia’s 
access to these markets is not limited and Malaysia could gain advantage from a 
bilateral trade partnership and preferential facilities. However, the results show that the 
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countries have less liberty to approach Malaysia’s market. The bias index from 
Malaysia to Nigeria and Malaysia to Turkey is less than one, which means that the 
export policies of these countries are not preferable.  
5.7.6 State of Nigeria’s trade with other D-8 member countries 
The index is greater than one for Nigeria’s exports to Indonesia and is regarded 
as highly intense. In 1997, the export intensity index increased between Nigeria and 
Indonesia but in 2002 the index levels decreased. The index is lower than one, for 
Nigeria’s export to other D-8 member countries (Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, Malaysia, 
Pakistan and Turkey), showing that the share of Nigeria’s trade with these countries is 
less than a proportion of its share of world trade. This implies that Nigeria’s exports to 
other D-8 countries are low.  
The import intensity index is less than one for most of the D-8 countries, which shows 
that the share of Nigeria’s import from these countries is less than a percentage of its 
share of world trade. The index trend showed in 1997, that the share of Nigeria’s 
imports from D-8 was not significantly different, and that the bilateral trade tendency 
did not change after the preferential trade agreement. Moreover, Nigeria’s imports from 
Pakistan increased in 2004. According to Table 5.20, the import intensity index for 
Nigeria and Pakistan in 2004 was more than one; this shows that the share of Nigeria’s 
import from these countries is more than a proportion of its share of world trade.      
Comparing the indices for export intensity and export complementarity between 
Nigeria and Indonesia shows that the trade between the two countries differs 
significantly. The share of exports of Nigeria to Indonesia is more than a proportion of 
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its share of world trade, the high level of trade complementarity index explains that the 
export degree pattern of Nigeria matches the import pattern of Indonesia. Therefore, it 
may be thought that the high intensity between these two countries is because the export 
degree pattern of Nigeria matches the import pattern of Indonesia. On the other hand, 
the results from the bias index explain that the index for Nigeria is lower than the index 
for Indonesia, for the four points, which explains the restriction for Nigeria to access 
Indonesia’s market. The high intensity between the two countries is due to the match of 
trade pattern and not as a result of the liberty of Nigeria to export to Indonesia. 
However, the result from the bias index shows that the index for Nigeria is more than 
the index for Indonesia from 1995 to 2000. During this period, Nigeria had the liberty to 
access Indonesia’s market, but the pattern changed in 2000. The bias index for Nigeria 
became less than the index for the access of Indonesia and Nigeria to Pakistan’s market, 
which became more difficult. 
Comparing the indices for export intensity and export complementarity between 
Nigeria and Bangladesh, Nigeria and Egypt, Nigeria and Iran, Nigeria and Malaysia, 
Nigeria and Pakistan, and Nigeria and Turkey shows that they differ significantly. The 
export complementarity index is lower than the export intensity index; an indication that 
not only is the share of the two countries exports lower than a proportion of their share 
of world trade, but, also, the lower level of trade complementarity index explains that 
the export degree pattern of Nigeria does not match its import pattern. This means that 
the low level of intensity index may be due to the low level of complementarity index 
between the two countries. The bias index is less than one for both countries, an 
indication that Nigeria has restrictions to access the markets of Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, 
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Malaysia, Pakistan and Turkey, which is the reason for the disinclination between the 
countries. 
From the results, the trade bias index for Nigeria and Bangladesh, Nigeria and 
Egypt, Nigeria and Iran, Nigeria and Malaysia, Nigeria and Pakistan, and Nigeria and 
Turkey, for the 4 point data is less than the trade index for Bangladesh to Nigeria, Egypt 
to Nigeria, Iran to Nigeria, Malaysia to Nigeria and Turkey to Nigeria. This, however, 
shows that Nigeria’s access to these markets is limited and may gain advantage from a 
bilateral trade partnership and restriction of preferential facilities for Nigeria. However, 
the results show that the countries have more liberty to approach Nigeria’s market. 
5.7.7 State of Pakistan’s trade with other D-8 member countries 
The index is greater than one for Pakistan’s exports to Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, 
Nigeria and Turkey, and is regarded as highly intense. The export intensity index for 
Bangladesh is higher compared to Egypt, Iran, Nigeria and Turkey. Therefore, 
Pakistan’s tendency to export to Bangladesh is more than the other countries. The index 
is lower than one, for Pakistan’s exports to Malaysia and Indonesia, which indicates that 
the share of Pakistan’s trade with these countries is less than a proportion of its share of 
world trade. This, however, implies that Pakistan’s exports to Malaysia and Indonesia 
are low.  
The import intensity index indicates that the share of Pakistan’s imports from 
Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran Indonesia and Malaysia is more than a percentage of its share 
of world trade. According to Table 5.15, the import intensity index for Pakistan to 
Nigeria and Pakistan to Turkey is less than one, which emphasizes that the share of 
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Pakistan’s imports from these countries is less than a proportion of its share of world 
trade.      
Comparing the indices for the export intensity and export complementarity 
between Pakistan and Bangladesh, and Pakistan and Egypt shows that the trade between 
the two differ significantly; this means that the share of Pakistan and Bangladesh, and 
Pakistan and Egypt’s exports is more than a proportion of its share of world trade, and 
the high level of trade complementarity index explains that the export degree pattern of 
Pakistan matches the import pattern of Egypt and Pakistan. Therefore, it may be said 
that the high intensity between the two countries is because the export degree pattern of 
Pakistan matches the import pattern of Egypt and Pakistan. On the other hand, the 
results from the bias index also show that the index for Pakistan to Bangladesh and 
Pakistan to Egypt is more than one. In this case, the policy is said to promote exports. 
However, the index for Pakistan is higher than the index for Bangladesh for the four 
points, which shows that there is more liberty for Pakistan to access Bangladesh’s 
market compared to Bangladesh’s liberty to gain advantage from Pakistan’s market. 
However, the index for Pakistan is lower than the index for Egypt in 2006, which shows 
that there is more liberty for Egypt to access Pakistan’s market compared to Pakistan’s 
liberty to gain advantage from Egypt’s market. Nevertheless, the high intensity between 
the two countries may be due to the matching of trade pattern as well as the liberty of 
Pakistan to export to Egypt. Moreover, the bias index is more than one, which 
encourages exports. 
Comparing the indices for the intensity and export complementarity between 
Pakistan and Iran, Pakistan and Nigeria, and Pakistan and Turkey shows that they differ 
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significantly while the export complementarity index is lower than the export intensity 
index. Despite the fact that the share of exports of Pakistan to Iran, Pakistan to Nigeria, 
and Pakistan to Turkey is more than a proportion of their share of world trade, the low 
level of trade complementarity index explains that the degree of export pattern of 
Pakistan does not match the import pattern of Iran, Nigeria and Turkey. However, the 
complementarity index for Pakistan to Iran and Pakistan to Turkey decreased in 2006, 
which shows that the two countries became more varied thereafter. The bias index, 
which is more than one for the two countries, explains that Pakistan has the liberty to 
gain more advantage from the markets of Iran, Nigeria and Turkey, which could be the 
reason for the tendency between the countries. 
The observation of the indices for export intensity and export complementarity between 
Pakistan and Indonesia shows that they differ significantly; the low level of intensity 
index is due to the low level of complementarity index between the two countries. 
Therefore, the lack of tendency to trade between the mentioned countries is because the 
degree of export pattern of Pakistan does not match the import pattern of Indonesia. On 
the other hand, the bias index shows that Pakistan had restrictions to access Indonesia’s 
market in 2000, which could also be another reason for the disinclination between the 
countries. 
A comparison of the indices for export intensity and export complementarity between 
Pakistan and Malaysia shows that they differ considerably; the export complementarity 
index is higher than the export intensity index. Although the share of exports of the two 
countries are less than a proportion of their share of world trade. However, the trade 
complementarity index explains the export pattern degree of Pakistan matches the 
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import pattern of Malaysia. It can be said that the low level of intensity index is not due 
to the complementarity level of the two countries. The bias index is less than one for the 
two countries, which shows that Pakistan has restrictions to access Malaysia’s market, 
and, thus, maybe the reason for the disinclination between the countries. 
The results indicate that the trade bias index for Pakistan to Bangladesh, Pakistan to 
Egypt, Pakistan to Nigeria, Pakistan to Turkey, and Pakistan to Iran from 1995 to 2008 
is more than one, which promotes the export policy. The trade index for Pakistan to 
Bangladesh, Pakistan to Nigeria, Pakistan to Turkey, and Pakistan to Iran is higher than 
Bangladesh to Pakistan, Nigeria to Pakistan, Iran to Pakistan and Turkey to Pakistan. 
Pakistan’s access to these markets is not limited; an indication that Pakistan could gain 
advantage from a bilateral trade partnership and preferential facilities. However, the 
results show that these countries have less liberty to approach Pakistan’s market. 
The trade bias for Pakistan to Egypt from 1995 to 2000 is higher than the trade index for 
Egypt to Pakistan. However, the index changed in 2000, and the trade bias from 
Pakistan to Egypt became more than the trade index from Egypt to Pakistan. This means 
that Pakistan’s access to these markets became more limited after 2000. However, the 
results show that Pakistan has less liberty to approach Egypt’s market. The results 
indicate that the trade bias index for Pakistan to Malaysia for the 4 point data is less 
than one; the index for Pakistan to Malaysia is lower than the trade index from Malaysia 
to Pakistan. This means that Pakistan’s access to these markets is limited and gaining 
advantage from a bilateral trade partnership and preferential facilities for Pakistan is 
restricted; whereas Malaysia has more liberty to approach Pakistan’s market. 
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5.7.8 State of Turkey’s trade with other D-8 member countries 
The index is greater than one, for Turkey’s exports to Egypt and Iran, and is 
regarded as highly intense. The export intensity index for Egypt is higher compared to 
Iran. However, Turkey’s tendency to export to Egypt is more than to other D-8 member 
countries. The index is lower than one for Turkey’s exports to Bangladesh, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia, which indicates that Turkey’s share of trade with 
these countries is less than a proportion of its share of world trade. This, however, 
implies that Turkey’s exports to these countries do not differ significantly.   
The import intensity index shows that the share of Turkey’s imports from Egypt, Iran, 
and Pakistan is more than the percentage of its share of world trade. In the case of 
Bangladesh, the results show that, in 2005, the import intensity index increased and 
differed significantly. Turkey’s tendency to import from Bangladesh improved. 
According to Table 5.14, the import intensity index for Turkey to Nigeria, Turkey to 
Indonesia and Turkey to Malaysia is less than one, which emphasizes that the share of 
Turkey’s imports from these countries is less than a proportion of its share of world 
trade.      
Comparing the indices for the export intensity and export complementarity 
between Turkey and Iran, and Turkey and Egypt, it shows that they differ significantly; 
the export complementarity index is lower than the export intensity index. Despite the 
fact that the share of exports of Turkey to Iran and Turkey to Egypt is more than a 
proportion of its share of world trade, the low level of trade complementarity index 
explains that the degree of the export pattern of Turkey does not match the import 
pattern of Iran and Egypt. However, the complementarity index for Turkey to Iran and 
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Turkey to Egypt decreased in 2006; this explains that the countries became more varied. 
The bias index is more than one for the two countries, which shows that Turkey has the 
liberty to gain advantage from Iran and Egypt’s market, which could be the reason for 
the tendency between the two countries. 
On the other hand, the results from the bias index also show that the index from Turkey 
to Iran and Turkey to Egypt is more than one. In such a case, the policy promotes 
exports. However, the index for Turkey is higher than the index for Iran and Egypt, for 
the four points. This shows that there is more liberty for Turkey to access Egypt and 
Iran’s market compared to that of Iran and Egypt to gain advantage from Turkey’s 
market. The high intensity between the two countries is due to the match of trade pattern 
and the liberty of Turkey to export to Egypt and Iran.  
Observation of the indices export intensity and export complementarity between 
Turkey to Bangladesh, Turkey to Indonesia, Turkey to Malaysia, Turkey to Nigeria and 
Turkey to Pakistan shows that they differ significantly; this means that the low level of 
intensity index is due to the low level of complementarity index between the two 
countries. Therefore, the lack of trade tendency between the mentioned countries is 
because the degree of export pattern of Turkey does not match the import pattern of 
Indonesia. On the other hand, Turkey’s bias index with other D-8 member countries 
shows that Turkey had more restrictions in accessing the markets of Malaysia and 
Indonesia from 1995 to 2008, which could be another reason for the disinclination 
between the countries. However, Turkey had more liberty and access to Pakistan during 
the period; whereas, Turkey gained more advantage from the markets of Bangladesh 
and Nigeria in 2000.   
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The results indicate that the trade bias index for Turkey and Egypt, Turkey and Iran, and 
Turkey and Pakistan, from 1995 to 2008; and Turkey to Nigeria in 2000; and Turkey to 
Bangladesh in 2006 is more than one, which promotes export policy. The trade index 
for Turkey to Egypt, Turkey to Nigeria and Turkey to Iran is higher than Egypt to 
Turkey, Nigeria to Turkey and Iran to Turkey. This shows that Turkey’s access to these 
markets is not limited and Turkey could gain advantage from a bilateral trade 
partnership and preferential facilities. However, the results show that these countries 
have less liberty to approach Turkey’s market. 
The results indicate that the trade bias index for Turkey to Indonesia and Turkey 
to Malaysia for the 4 point data is less than one, while the index for Turkey to Indonesia 
and Turkey to Malaysia is lower than the trade bias index for Malaysia to Turkey and 
Indonesia to Turkey. The trade bias index from 1995 to 2008 for Turkey and Pakistan 
was more than one, but Turkey and Pakistan’s level was lower than the trade bias index 
of Pakistan and Turkey. This means that Turkey’s access to these markets is limited and 
that it gaining more advantage from a bilateral trade partnership and preferential 
facilities from Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan for Turkey is restricted; whereas 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan have more liberty to approach Turkey’s market.  
5.7.9 Summary 
The results show that the trade intensity index for these pairs of countries – 
(Bangladesh and Pakistan), (Bangladesh and Iran), (Bangladesh and Indonesia), 
(Bangladesh and Malaysia), (Egypt and Pakistan), (Egypt and Turkey), (Egypt and 
Indonesia), (Egypt and Malaysia), (Indonesia and Malaysia), (Indonesia and 
Bangladesh), (Indonesia and Pakistan), (Indonesia and Egypt), (Indonesia and Nigeria), 
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(Iran and Turkey), (Iran and Pakistan), (Iran and Bangladesh), (Malaysia and 
Indonesia), (Malaysia and Pakistan), (Malaysia and Bangladesh), (Malaysia and Egypt), 
(Nigeria and Indonesia), (Pakistan and Bangladesh), (Pakistan and Egypt), (Pakistan 
and Iran), (Pakistan and Nigeria), (Pakistan and Turkey), (Pakistan and Indonesia), 
(Pakistan and Malaysia),  (Turkey and Egypt), (Turkey and Iran), (Turkey and Pakistan) 
–is more than one ( see Table 5-5 to Table 5-20), which suggests that the share of trade 
between the countries is more than a proportion of their share of the world trade.  We 
can say that 31 pairs of countries out of 56 have a high tendency for bilateral trade. 
On the other hand, according to the Complementarity Index, for these pairs of countries  
(Egypt and Pakistan), (Egypt and Indonesia), (Egypt and Bangladesh), (Indonesia and 
Egypt), (Indonesia and Bangladesh), (Iran and Pakistan), (Iran and Indonesia) (Iran and 
Egypt), (Malaysia and Pakistan), (Nigeria and Indonesia), (Nigeria and Pakistan), 
(Nigeria and Egypt), (Pakistan and Malaysia), (Pakistan and Bangladesh), (Pakistan and 
Egypt),(Pakistan and Indonesia), it can be said that the export degree pattern of a 
country matches the import pattern of the other.  
In addition, for these pairs of countries (Bangladesh and Egypt), (Bangladesh and 
Malaysia), (Bangladesh and Pakistan), (Egypt and Malaysia), (Egypt and Indonesia), 
(Indonesia and Pakistan), (Malaysia and Bangladesh), (Malaysia and Egypt), (Pakistan 
and Bangladesh), (Pakistan and Egypt), (Pakistan and Indonesia), it can be said that the 
import degree pattern of a country matches the export pattern of the other. 
The Trade Bias Index shows that for precisely 27 country pairs: (Bangladesh-Iran), 
(Bangladesh-Pakistan), (Egypt-Bangladesh), (Egypt-Pakistan), (Egypt-Turkey), 
(Indonesia-Bangladesh), (Indonesia-Egypt), (Indonesia-Iran), (Indonesia-Malaysia), 
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(Indonesia-Nigeria), (Indonesia-Pakistan), (Iran-Pakistan), (Iran-Turkey), (Malaysia-
Bangladesh), (Malaysia-Egypt), (Malaysia-Indonesia), (Malaysia-Pakistan), (Pakistan-
Bangladesh), (Pakistan-Egypt), (Pakistan-Iran), (Pakistan-Nigeria), (Pakistan-Turkey), 
(Turkey-Egypt), (Turkey-Egypt), (Turkey-Iran), (Turkey-Nigeria), (Turkey-Pakistan) 
access to the second countries’ market is  not restricted and they could gain advantage 
from a bilateral trade partnership.  
Table  5-26 D-8 high bilateral trade tendency country pairs 
 Bangladesh Egypt Indonesia Iran Malaysia Nigeria Pakistan Turkey 
Bangladesh         
Egypt         
Indonesia         
Iran         
Malaysia         
Nigeria         
Pakistan         
Turkey         
 
 
Table  5-27 D-8 complementarity trade country pairs 
 
Bangladesh Egypt Indonesia Iran Malaysia Nigeria Pakistan Turkey 
Bangladesh         
Egypt         
Indonesia         
Iran         
Malaysia         
Nigeria         
Pakistan         
Turkey         
 
Table  5-28 D-8 country pair access to the members market is not restricted 
 Bangladesh Egypt Indonesia Iran Malaysia Nigeria Pakistan Turkey 
Bangladesh         
Egypt         
Indonesia         
Iran         
Malaysia         
Nigeria         
Pakistan         
Turkey         
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Table  5-29 Results summary 
Methodology Result 
• Descriptive 
Approach 
 
Trade Intensity 
Index 
31 pairs of countries out of 56 pairs 
have a high tendency for bilateral 
trade. 
Trade 
complementarity 
Index 
For 25 pairs out of 56 pairs of 
countries, the export/import pattern 
degree of one country matches the 
import/export pattern of another  
Trade Bias 
Index 
The access to the destination 
market of 27 pairs of countries is 
not restricted. 
• Econometric 
Approach  
 
Gravity Model 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Pakistan 
have a meaningful bilateral trade 
with each other 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
The failure or success of any regional trade arrangement depends on the product 
ranges that member countries are capable of importing or exporting. Country members 
that export diversified products have the tendency to succeed in a regional trade 
arrangement. However, Pitigala, (2005) showed that the export concentration limits the 
increasing prospects of regional trade. 
Moreover, for meaningful economic cooperation, it is necessary for the D-8 countries to 
solicit participation in the private sector. Participation in the private sector can only be 
meaningful if the business environment for member countries is conducive.  
Intra D-8 trade can be created through intra D-8 private sector investment 
activities. Investors should open up new frontiers for a two-way trade, importation of 
raw materials and intermediate inputs and exportation of final products. The major 
trading partners should also be the main sources of foreign direct investment.   
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For the success and creation of a formidable D-8 economic bloc, the volume of 
intra-regional trade among D-8 members is fearfully low, while dependence on the 
industrialized countries is considerably high.  The removal of tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers for D-8 bloc countries can open up some profitable intra-regional trade 
channels. In the long run, a regional planning structural change creates new horizontal 
and vertical linkages with integration benefits. Moreover, the WTO framework should 
be fully adopted by D-8 member countries to explore areas where greater export 
expansions are needed. 
International cooperation, prudence and transparency at higher market levels 
could have put a stop to the escalation and outbreak of the recent financial crisis. 
Although the level of damage differs from country to country following the effect of the 
economic and global financial crisis, within D-8, consultation and cooperation will 
enhance individual contributions toward structuring institutional and financial reforms 
of the world economy. 
For a more vibrant and effective organization for D-8 that is capable of changing its 
vision into reality, it is advised that both the public and private sectors of theD-8 
countries come forward with innovative modern technology, business approaches and 
harmonized trade policies to boost the strength of intra-trade, which, in turn, will 
enhance the economic size of the D-8 member countries as well as alleviate poverty 
from the region. The high potential for joint-ventures and investment, especially, in 
areas such as Islamic-finance, halal industry, energy, housing and infrastructural 
development, telecommunications and media, education, health, agriculture and human 
resource development should be encouraged. As a result of Pakistan’s land mass and 
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population density of animal stock, in conjunction with Malaysia’s expertise in 
technology and marketing, both countries can capture major shares of the global halal 
food market that is worth billions of dollars. The success of the economic cooperation 
of the D-8 can be extended to all other OIC members. Trade agreement gives room for 
the elimination of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) if no new ones are introduced. However, in 
practice, it appears that non-tariff measures are widespread, and are a hindrance to the 
trade expansion of intra-regional trade for D-8 member states. However, development 
of the D-8 member states with a uniform Islamic culture, heritage and unity could 
promote economic empowerment of their people and enable them to face the emerging 
challenges of the next millennium. 
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CHAPTER 6                                                            
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Conclusions 
Globalization and integration of the world economy is not only a national 
concern but also for its states. However, to achieve the desired national development, a 
country should avail itself of the existing regional and international resources and 
opportunities. The benefits derived from international and regional resources are one of 
the most significant questions facing the developing economies including Islamic 
countries. As a result of the great potential that Muslim countries possess, they have 
been pushing for regional trade agreements within groups, which include the 
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the (Persian) Cooperation Council (PGCC), 
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and the Group of Eight Islamic Developing 
Countries (D-8). In the two last decades of its establishment, no significant 
breakthrough has been made for an efficient economic and trade agreement that 
embraces all OIC members using a step-by-step or incremental approach. However, the 
most practicable approach to achieve the long term goal of sustainable regional growth 
would be to create a stronger force within Islamic countries with the ability and desire 
to coordinate economic cooperation that is acceptable to other Islamic countries 
(Bozorgi and Hosseini, 2006).  
Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey are 
examples of D-8 members. The group officially initiated its activities in 1997, the aim 
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of which was to develop cooperation among the member countries. The objectives were 
for the promotion of member countries position in the world economy, provision of new 
opportunities in relation to commerce, participation of member countries in 
international decision making as well as improving the standard of living of its 
members. A focus on the aforementioned economic purposes as well as enhancement of 
the volume of trade among member countries is the basis for D-8 membership 
cooperation. In consideration of a population of the member countries of over 900 
million, which constitutes 14% of the world’s population, one can say that cooperation 
in trade may foster good trade relations, to create a big market for the products apart 
from industrially developed member countries. In the recent global economic crisis, the 
share of countries’ exports has significantly reduced and has led to losses in the global 
market industrial decline, resulting in improved changes in other countries of the world. 
Extensive market access is usually for developing economies without close interaction 
among the countries. Research on the PTAs focused particularly on whether or not it 
has any significant influence on trade.  
This research work centered on the impact of trade on the liberalization of D-8 
trade using the gravity model. The aim of the research was to investigate and looking at 
the possibility of trade liberalization via coverage expansion of tariff reduction. The 
gravity model approach was applied using panel data and quantitative analysis of the 
economic effects of the free trade arrangement among the countries. The research also 
looked at the possibility of making significant gains for member countries via intra-
trade when tariff barriers are completely removed. The level of exported bilateral 
commodity matching with that of import determines the trade composition. However, 
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although the gravity model does not account for the commodity composition, the trade 
intensity index was employed to illustrate the impact of commodity composition on 
bilateral trade. According to Drysdale (1967), the decomposition method can be used to 
show the amount of trade volume due to complementarity (compositional effect) and 
country bias (average resistance). An index that is made up of trade compositions could 
provide better knowledge of the impact of trade cost on the flow of bilateral trade. 
The D-8 countries have thought of many projects that aimed at strengthening 
economic and commercial cooperation. Presently, these are at different stages of 
implementation, the aim of which is to enhance trade within member countries via inter 
alia, facilitation of trade and access to markets. Multilateral agreements based on 
economic and commercial cooperation at different stages are being ratified by the D-8, 
which are intended to provide the required legal framework of cooperation for member 
countries. This process, however, has been sluggish and needs to be looked into for 
more accelerated effects. Due to the heterogeneous nature of the economic and 
developmental efforts of D-8 members, progress in setting the goals for economic 
cooperation is far from being reached. Members of the D-8 are required to show 
collective strength towards the objective. Internal trade within D-8 is stagnant at 6% of 
the total trade of all the D-8 member countries, which was affected due to the 
dependence on a few commodities, limited number of trade partners and inadequate 
trade infrastructure.  
Due to the urgency of setting up an Islamic Common Market, an alternative 
trend has become more imperative in globalization and regionalization, allowing 
competition those results in marginalization of the growing economy of OIC members. 
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In conjunction with this trend are different policies of protection approved by the major 
economic blocks of the developed economies, which approved the choice of alternatives 
by the developing economies. The establishment of an Islamic common market or any 
other economic form of integration is, however, imperative for the D-8 countries, as this 
will allow them to maintain a common level with the powerful economic blocks of the 
advanced economies and avoid further marginalization. In the15 years after the 1997 
Istanbul summit, the D-8 member countries have made a significant contribution to 
developing the necessary multilateral and institutional legal framework for other D-8 
members to cooperate on a large scale to develop, initiate and implement a joint 
economic approach. Despite the efforts aimed at integrating member countries over the 
years, little or no progress has been made economically, and cooperation is yet to 
produce the expected results in terms of trade among member countries. However, 
contrary to the basic intention of the established cohesion and community of D-8, intra 
trade within D-8 is still far from satisfactory, constituting about 6% of the total trade 
within member countries. 
 Generally, the member countries of D-8 are assumed to have been dragged to an 
impasse, adjudged by the continuous expansion yet unfulfilled needs compared to the 
existing but unutilized potential. The D-8 member countries are sure of the 
recommended and enhanced economic cooperation among themselves. However, 
members should aim at developing ideas, set goals for joint action and workout 
implementable modalities that will effectively become reality by setting up a formal 
economic integration scheme within a free trade distance, a custom union or common 
market. Although different reasons may explain the lag in the implementation of policy, 
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some of which comes from the high level of economic heterogeneity, which results in 
difficulties that relate to the follow up at the technical, financial and practical 
influences, while others are related to the character, decision-making and organizational 
structure and mechanism of D-8 countries. The gravity model application for applied 
research in bilateral trade is justified theoretically. A wide range of research is available 
in which gravity model was used to examine bilateral trade patterns and trade 
relationships. The generalized gravity model of trade was estimated in this report as 
well as for exports and imports, for which the results showed that the estimated 
coefficient had almost all the expected signs except market size. As shown, from 1983 
to 1997 for D-8 member countries, the import elasticity and regressed model are 0.5 and 
1.21, respectively. This, however, indicates that when the GDP of D-8 member 
countries increases by 1%, imports increase by 57%, and a 1.21% increase in exports is 
expected. The results for1997 to 2008 show that the import elasticity decreased to 0.50, 
while the export elasticity reduced to 1.06, which is explained by a percent increase in 
GDP; the average increases in export and import are 1.06 and 50, respectively. The 
main point of the D-8 countries is that the export elasticity to GDP is about one, while 
there was no import elasticity α2 > α3. This shows that D-8 member countries exports 
grew more rapidly than the imports. From 1983 to 1997, and 1997 to 2008, the market 
size coefficient was negative, an indication that the population of country I compared to 
increases in country j reduces the exports from country I. The reason being that the 
population growth increases the size of the local market; therefore, the country will 
become introverted resulting in more rival import industries. Alternatively, there will be 
a reduction in the exports of the country because the same industries are required to 
meet the needs of the population increase. The distance elasticity as a symbol of 
 291 
 
authority for transportation costs shows that, on average, when the distance increases to 
1%, exports reduce by 62%. D-8 member countries have common borders that show the 
positive export effects; a one kilometer increase at the border increases exports by 
1.06%. Linder, as expected from the theory, was negative, an indication that the greater 
the difference in per capita incomes of countries, the less intensely the countries will 
trade with one another, supporting the Linder theory. There was no impact of language 
on export because of the heterogeneity of languages for D-8 member countries. The 
econometric results for the D-8 member countries did not improve for bilateral trade. 
The gravity model approach was billed to independently define the flow of bilateral 
trade. The trade between the two countries was acclaimed to be proportional to their 
economic size, measured by the GDP, area, per-capita GDP and population and 
inversely proportional to the distance, cultural and geographical distance between them. 
There is no way to compare the bilateral trade of two countries using the gravity model. 
Moreover, the gravity model’s major assumption is that the flow of trade for 
independent bilateral trade is too extreme (James and Wincoop, 2003). The more 
resistant an economy is to other trading partners the more it is forced to trade with a 
given bilateral partner. This is known as “multilateral resistance”. Alternatively, 
Kazutaka (1977) stated that the intensity approach separates the determinants of 
international trade into two categories: those that impact the geographical distribution 
and those that influence the total import and export levels of the world countries. 
Therefore, it uses the world hypothesis, which is made up of countries with no 
geographical specification in international trade. In line with a country’s partner, world 
trade shows that the total trade of a country is distributed among countries. The trade 
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intensity index was used to explain the impact of commodity composition on D-8 
bilateral trade. 
The results show that Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan have an appreciable 
bilateral trade agreement with more benefits from the planned integration. However, 
Nigeria and Indonesia have a negative impact of trade on D-8. In 1997, the import and 
export trend showed a significant reduction between the two countries trade compared 
to other D-8 members. However, Egypt, Turkey and Iran do not have an appreciable 
bilateral trade; therefore, D-8 did not have any influence on the countries bilateral trade 
right from the start. According to the decomposition method of Drysdale (1967), the 
results show that the trade intensity index of 31 pairs of countries is more than 1;an 
indication that the share of trade between the countries is more than the proportion of 
their share of world trade. This shows that 31 out of 56 pairs of countries have a high 
bilateral trade tendency. According to the complementarity index for25 pairs of 
countries, it was thought that the export/import degree pattern of a country matches the 
import/export pattern of the other. The trade bias index for 27 pairs of countries shows 
that access to the markets of the countries was not restricted and that they could gain 
bilateral trade advantage and partnership facilities. 
The estimated results show that, not all the countries experience welfare gain 
under the free trade agreement. In the same manner, the economic sectors imports differ 
substantially across countries. 
The efficiency and competitiveness of industries in the region are increased by 
regional integration. Accordingly, it encourages and prepares these firms for harder 
competition at the international level. A critical look at this defines the efforts to 
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liberalize world trade for goods, investment and service within the context of the WTO 
through multilateral trade talks.  
Although world trade liberalization within the context of WTO, and increases in 
the regionalization efforts among the advanced countries, suggest a conflicting 
development, both are effective in helping support industries in the developing countries 
by pressuring them to improve their rate of competition. The desire to enhance 
competition by looking for ways to lower the cost of the production of goods and 
services leads to increasing research and development activities as well as new advances 
in technology. In the case of division amongst major economic powers, for example, the 
US and Japan, the member countries of D-8 should similarly do the same whilst 
engaging in multilateral trade talks within the context of WTO. They should also 
intensify efforts to strengthen commercial economic cooperation among member 
countries for the realization and establishment of an Islamic common market. 
6.2 Policy Options and Recommendations 
One of the main targets of D-8 countries is to address the low intra-regional trade 
volume and over dependence on industrialized economies. The removal of tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers for D-8 countries can expose some of the gains of intra-regional trade 
channels. Based on this finding the following policy remarks and recommendations are 
suggested for stronger trade agreements for D-8 member countries. 
Presently, due to interdependence and globalization, regional economic integration is 
one of the challenges Islamic countries face, especially D-8 members, to absorb 
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globalization pressure as well as prepare for gradual integration into the world 
economy.  
Member countries of the D-8 should take a fully active part in world trade, which is 
made up of APEC, the EU, WTO, ASEAN, and NAFTA, maximizing their link in intra 
D-8, and allowing the free transfer of goods, labor, capital and technology. They should 
further strengthen both forward and backward links in investment and production and 
gain economies of trade, which assists in regional and domestic market improvements.  
As a result of a country’s concern for national autonomy, which may result in the failure 
of the quest of political schemes for political union, it is better for D-8 member 
countries to give special attention to economic and functional cooperation, and 
integrative efforts that keep political ambitions at a distance. 
There is a need for regional economic integration initiation, which benefits from 
economies of scale, promotion of trade creation, and the extension of technical and 
scientific cooperation, export competitiveness and diversification, as well as enhanced 
bargaining power at the world level. 
The member countries of D-8 should make urgent efforts to diversify their exports, 
enhance their strengths for trading and the manufacture of non-traditional goods, and 
take measures that are supportive of improving regional and sub-regional trade and 
expand complementarities. 
Backward and forward linkages in investment and production should be strengthened to 
reap the economies of scale, regional markets, improve regional and domestic market 
and deal efficiently with ASEAN, the EU, APEC and NAFTA. 
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Improvement of financial cooperation for D-8 member countries through clearing union 
arrangements, payment union and export credit. 
As a result of OIC integration, the failure caused by inter alia OIC members 
heterogeneity, due to developmental and key international macroeconomic changes, 
establishment of first integrative macroeconomic changes, establishment of first core 
integration made up of Islamic countries differences, seems to be the most suitable 
method to start regional economic integration and for incorporating other Islamic 
countries in the near future. Our findings show that the most eligible D-8 members 
constitute major initial integration, which includes Malaysia, Iran, Turkey, Indonesia 
and Egypt. 
Follow up measures can be taken by these countries to achieve the benefits of regional 
economic integration.  These include: 
a). Encouragement of joint ventures, the gains of economies of scale can be used to 
create new competitive advantages, which, in turn, can fulfill domestic needs and 
extend intra-regional trade as well as improve competitiveness in the world market. 
b). Trade structural reforms should be considered by the countries directing their 
investments to more diversification with special interest in value added products. 
c). The countries should increase their intra-regional trade by affording preference to 
trade liberalization and trade facilitation including preferential tariffs. 
d). Trade barriers removal via measures including trade law facilitation, 
supplementation and regulation is required to encourage regional trade within member 
countries. 
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e). Technical and scientific cooperation extension among the countries will be helpful to 
grow scientific and technical infrastructure which improves value added products. 
f). Conducting of intra-regional trade research to identify the actual and potential needs, 
and capacities required. 
g). Special attention should be given to the establishment of an integrated trade data 
base, thereby providing businesses with the necessary information for the countries 
including trade laws and regulation. 
Due to the uniformity in religion, cultural cooperation is highly instrumental for solid 
intra-regional ties, which lead to facilitate and promote intra-regional trade. This policy 
implementation requires dynamic executives that are goal oriented, otherwise all these 
will result in failure. 
Good integrated planning from member countries is needed in order to move forward. 
The aim of setting up a common Islamic market or alternative regional economic 
integration group for OIC members may imply that OIC members either negotiate a 
treaty, which establishes the overall objectives of the economic institutions’ 
mechanisms, as well as the strategies that include different stages and time limits to 
establish the market (according to global market), or join both global and sectoral 
approaches within the same process. Whichever approach is adopted, it should be able 
to account for the mechanisms and cooperation of the OIC, especially the integration of 
the groups already formed within the OIC, and sub-regional groups (AMU, D-8, GCC, 
and ECO). It is worthy of note that a preliminary effort for the necessary harmonization, 
rationalization and revitalization should be exerted to stop overlapping groups and to 
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harmonize and revitalize the economic integration mechanism with a view to achieve 
the highest common denominator. 
In this context, a program of action may be drawn to: 
1). Encourage the establishment of strong relations within the groups. 
2). Broaden cooperation to avoid the tendencies confined within the groups and 
encourage their openness to gradually increase their complementarity and 
interdependence. 
Whichever approach is chosen, some leading principles should be respected to avoid 
experiencing disappointment in sub-regional integration: 
1). The Islamic common market should simultaneously try to achieve the objective of 
industrial and commercial integration; otherwise trade expansion will suffer in the near 
future. 
2). The Islamic common market should support the integration of financial and 
monetary policies in order to overcome problems associated with financing trade and 
inconvertible currencies. 
3). They should provide avenues for a mechanism to be set up that is capable of 
ensuring fair and equitable profit and loss.  LDCs should be allowed special status. 
4). Strategies for economic integration should be included in the strategies for 
development of the member countries 
A good number of policies can be implemented to further the cause of D-8. It would be 
better for D-8 members to be based in regions that are geographically close to each 
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other for trade, for more effective practical cooperation, and for smaller groups made up 
of countries with the same cultural, historical and political commonness. There is a need 
to expand the scope of D-8 member’s effectiveness by community participation via 
private business sector organizations and NGOs. 
It is imperative to promote a number of ministerial level conferences to cover important 
areas of statecraft. The economic cooperation process and independence should be 
given attention to achieve better integration. The economic system should drive all 
issues and efforts should be made for growth, and general agreement for an Islamic 
economic system that is relevant to modern times. The establishment of a desirable 
multi-disciplinary research body within member countries secretariat to ensure 
deliberate planning and policy making. The establishment of a D-8 information 
broadcast should be immediately instituted to project the views of the D-8 on 
contemporary political, economic and ideological issues. A global program for the 
promotion of peace for Muslims and all humanity should be consolidated and projected 
via the electronic media. A common market for Islamic countries should be a long term 
ideology and should be approached in stages with care. Far reaching initiatives should 
be taken for trade preferences, joint venture coordination and the harmonization of 
different sets of economic policies for regional schemes of financial and monetary 
cooperation. Regional integration schemes should be established, for example, linking 
the Gulf Cooperation Council for Economic Cooperation Organization to the others 
should be considered. This may constitute a solid foundation for the overall Islamic 
common market framework that comprises regional components. 
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APPENDIX A 
Dependent Variable: X   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)  
Date: 06/23/11   Time: 09:33   
Sample (adjusted): 1983 1997   
Periods included: 15   
Cross-sections included: 50   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 638  
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
White period standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Convergence achieved after 9 total coef iterations 
     
      Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -19.06263 5.620345 -3.391719 0.0007 
LOG(GDPJ) 0.570628 0.110588 5.159954 0.0000 
LOG(GDPI) 1.215348 0.178594 6.805083 0.0000 
LOG(POPI/POPJ) -0.246617 0.126596 -1.948058 0.0519 
LOG(DIJ) -0.973151 0.189514 -5.134977 0.0000 
COMBORDER 1.577207 0.510349 3.090446 0.0021 
LINDER -0.000939 0.020089 -0.046744 0.9627 
LANG -2.009441 0.863221 -2.327842 0.0202 
AR(1) 0.848785 0.018994 44.68635 0.0000 
     
      Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.885180     Mean dependent var 24.07165 
Adjusted R-squared 0.883719     S.D. dependent var 12.57346 
S.E. of regression 0.828377     Sum squared resid 431.6247 
F-statistic 606.1414     Durbin-Watson stat 2.244811 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.804268     Mean dependent var 16.61341 
Sum squared resid 451.7709     Durbin-Watson stat 2.457398 
     
     Inverted AR Roots       .85   
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Dependent Variable: X 
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights)  
Date: 06/23/11   Time: 09:34   
Sample (adjusted): 1983 2008   
Periods included: 26   
Cross-sections included: 53   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 1196  
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix 
White period standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
Convergence achieved after 13 total coef iterations 
     
     
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -17.38738 5.614563 -3.096835 0.0020 
LOG(GDPJ) 0.349316 0.097322 3.589269 0.0003 
LOG(GDPI) 1.273135 0.208222 6.114321 0.0000 
LOG(POPI/POPJ) -0.292999 0.220568 -1.328384 0.1843 
LOG(DIJ) -0.620765 0.327673 -1.894466 0.0584 
COMBORDER 1.063151 0.526475 2.019375 0.0437 
LINDER -0.019134 0.012592 -1.519580 0.1289 
LANG -1.005077 0.737688 -1.362470 0.1733 
AR(1) 0.907472 0.013993 64.85379 0.0000 
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.916479     Mean dependent var 23.26825 
Adjusted R-squared 0.915916     S.D. dependent var 11.26930 
S.E. of regression 0.708203     Sum squared resid 595.3409 
F-statistic 1628.129     Durbin-Watson stat 2.358163 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     
R-squared 0.862918     Mean dependent var 17.18698 
Sum squared resid 614.0427     Durbin-Watson stat 2.527404 
     
     
Inverted AR Roots       .91   
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Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test   
Series: X LOG(GDPJ) LOG(GDPI) LOG(POPI/POPJ) LINDER   
Date: 11/15/10   Time: 23:43   
Sample: 1983 2008    
Included observations: 1456   
Cross-sections included: 50 (6 dropped)  
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration   
Trend assumption: Deterministic intercept and trend  
Lag selection: Automatic SIC with max lag of 1 to 4  
Newey-West bandwidth selection with Bartlett kernel  
      
      
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension) 
    Weighted  
  Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Panel PP-Statistic -12.95300  0.0000 -14.93041  0.0000 
Panel ADF-Statistic -13.13704  0.0000 -15.30784  0.0000 
     
     
    
 
  
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-dimension) 
      
  Statistic Prob.   
Group rho-Statistic  11.44938  1.0000   
Group PP-Statistic -17.68383  0.0000   
Group ADF-Statistic -14.71646  0.0000   
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Kao Residual Cointegration test 
  
Series: X LOG(GDPJ) LOG(GDPI) LOG(POPI/POPJ) LINDER  
Date: 11/15/10   Time: 23:46   
Sample: 1983 2008   
Included observations: 1456   
Null Hypothesis: No cointegration  
Trend assumption: No deterministic trend  
Lag selection: Automatic no  lag by SIC with a max lag of 0 
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
     
     
 rho Prob. t-Statistic Prob. 
DF  3.584534  0.0002 -9.103521  0.0000 
DF*  5.438922  0.0000 -6.287611  0.0000 
     
     
Residual variance  0.559192  
HAC variance   0.343197  
     
     
     
     
Dickey-Fuller Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: D(RESID)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 11/15/10   Time: 23:46   
Sample (adjusted): 1984 2008   
Included observations: 1197 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
RESID(-1) -0.367546 0.021236 -17.30759 0.0000 
     
     
R-squared 0.200048    Mean dependent var 0.013103 
Adjusted R-squared 0.200048    S.D. dependent var 0.744793 
S.E. of regression 0.666144    Akaike info criterion 2.026212 
Sum squared resid 530.7216    Schwarz criterion 2.030462 
Log likelihood -1211.688    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.027813 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.176309    
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Johansen Fisher Panel Cointegration Test     
     
Series: X LOG(GDPJ) LOG(GDPI) LOG(POPI/POPJ) LINDER   
Date: 11/15/10   Time: 23:46   
Sample: 1983 2008     
Included observations: 1456   
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 1  
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace and Maximum Eigenvalue) 
      
      
Hypothesized Fisher Stat.*  Fisher Stat.*   
No. of CE(s) (from trace test) Prob. (from max-eigen test) Prob.  
      
      
None  1211.  0.0000  842.1  0.0000  
At most 1  605.8  0.0000  403.5  0.0000  
At most 2  288.3  0.0000  193.9  0.0000  
At most 3  173.1  0.0000  151.4  0.0001  
At most 4  137.4  0.0015  137.4  0.0015  
      
      
* Probabilities are computed using asymptotic 
Chi-square distribution.     
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
Panel unit root test   
Series:  GDPI   
Date: 11/15/10   Time: 23:53  
Sample: 1983 2008   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 4 
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
     
     
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  12.3348  1.0000  56  1344 
Breitung t-stat  19.4260  1.0000  56  1288 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   12.5629  1.0000  56  1344 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  58.4351  1.0000  56  1344 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  19.2189  1.0000  56  1400 
     
     
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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Series:  GDPJ   
Date: 11/15/10   Time: 23:54  
Sample: 1983 2008   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 3 
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
     
     
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  14.6702  1.0000  56  1379 
Breitung t-stat  19.9898  1.0000  56  1323 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   17.1549  1.0000  56  1379 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  36.8462  1.0000  56  1379 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  9.81650  1.0000  56  1400 
     
     
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
  
Series:  LINDER   
Date: 11/15/10   Time: 23:54  
Sample: 1983 2008   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 3 
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
     
     
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  0.98707  0.8382  56  1390 
Breitung t-stat  1.85780  0.9684  56  1334 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat   1.01743  0.8455  56  1390 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  111.458  0.4967  56  1390 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  89.7450  0.9398  56  1400 
     
     
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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Series:  POPIJ   
Date: 11/15/10   Time: 23:55  
Sample: 1983 2008   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 4 
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
     
     
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t*  1.93157  0.9733  56  1311 
Breitung t-stat  6.26152  1.0000  56  1255 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -2.06401  0.0195  56  1311 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  347.945  0.0000  56  1311 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  239.108  0.0000  56  1400 
     
     
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
  
Series:  X    
Date: 11/15/10   Time: 23:57  
Sample: 1983 2008   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects, individual linear trends 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 4 
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
     
     
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -10.4272  0.0000  52  1158 
Breitung t-stat -2.77251  0.0028  52  1106 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -7.19446  0.0000  52  1158 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  276.711  0.0000  52  1158 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  269.506  0.0000  52  1195 
     
     
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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APPENDIX B 
Main commodities of foreign trade of D-8 countries D-8 secretariat 2008  
Country 
Main Export Items Main Import Items 
Bangladesh Apparel, sea food 
Petroleum, Palm oil, Rice, Cotton fabrics, 
Transmission apparatus for radiotelephone 
or television, Motor cars and vehicles 
Egypt 
Petroleum oils, Hot roll iron/steel, Cement clinkers, Portland 
cement, Cotton, Apparel, Urea 
Butane, Aircraft and parts thereof, Food, 
Motor vehicles, Iron and steel, Machinery 
and mechanical appliances, Tobacco, Paper 
Indonesia 
Petroleum oils, Bituminous coal, Palm oil and its fractions, 
Technically specified natural rubber, Copper ores and concentrates, 
Natural gas, Plywood, Fuel oils, Parts & accessories of automatic 
data processing machines & units thereof 
Petroleum, Wheat, Transmission apparatus 
for radio-broadcasting or television, Motor 
vehicles, Cotton, Soya bean and oil, Iron 
and steel, Ethylene 
Iran 
Petroleum oils, Pistachios, Carpets of wool or fine animal hair, 
Propane, Butanes, Aluminum, Petroleum bitumen, Grapes, Benzene 
Motor vehicles, Machinery and mechanical 
appliances, Iron and Steel, Rice, Soya, 
Sugar, Transmission apparatus for radio-
broadcasting or television 
Malaysia 
Metal oxide semiconductors, Parts &accessories of automatic data 
processing machines & units thereof, Petroleum oils, Portable 
digital computers, Natural gas, Monolithic integrated circuits, 
Hybrid integrated circuits, Transmission apparatus for 
radiotelephone incorporating reception apparatus, Computer 
input/outputs, with/without storage 
Electrical machinery and equipment, 
Electronic circuits, Petroleum, Transport 
vehicles, Gold, Copper articles 
Nigeria 
Petroleum oils, Natural gas, Dredgers, Residues of petroleum oils, 
Floating docks and vessels, Textured yarn of polyester filaments, 
Electric lamps and lighting fittings, Sweet biscuits, waffles and 
wafers, Liquefied ethylene, propylene, butylenes and butadiene, 
Cargo vessels and other vessels for the transport of both persons 
&goods 
Valves, Floating vessels and platforms, 
Petroleum oils &oils obtained from 
bituminous minerals, Wheat, Portland 
cement, Sugar, Motor vehicles, salt, milk 
powder, Rubber, Iron and steel, cargo 
vessels 
Pakistan Textile and apparel, Rice, Carpets of wool or fine animal hair 
Transmission apparatus, Cotton, Tea, Rape 
and colza seeds, Motor vehicles, Transport 
equipments, Machines, Chemicals, Fabrics 
Turkey 
Apparel, Color television receivers, Diesel powered trucks Bars & 
rods of iron and non-alloy steel, Automobiles with reciprocating 
piston engine, Automobiles with diesel engine, Petroleum obtained 
from bituminous minerals, Articles of jewelry 
Iron and steel, Petroleum, Gold, 
Automobiles, Transport equipment, 
Vehicles, Chemicals, Electronic equipment 
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Major World Trade Partners of Individual "D-8" Member, Countries Center of Advanced Research and Studies on Islamic Common Market (CARSICM) 2004 
Country 
 
Major export trading partners Major import trading partners 
Major industrial Products Major agricultural products 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
Bangladesh 
USA (38.6) 
Germany  
(12.3) 
UK 
(10.1) 
China (18.0) 
Singapore 
(16.0) 
Korea Rp. 
(12.4) 
Jute manufacturing, cotton textiles, food processing, steel, fertilizer 
Rice, jute, tea, wheat, sugarcane, potatoes, beef, milk, 
poultry 
Egypt Italy (19.9) USA (19.2) 
UK 
(12.4) 
USA (23.9) Italy (8.4) 
Germany 
(8.2) 
Textiles, food  processing, tourism, chemicals, petroleum, construction, cement, 
metals 
Cotton, rice, corn, wheat, beans, fruits, vegetables, cattle, 
water buffalo, sheep, goats, annual fith catch about 140,000 
metric tons 
Indonesia 
Japan 
(26.1) 
USA (19.2) 
Korea 
Rp. (7.9) 
Japan (25.4) 
Korea Rp. 
(13.0) 
China 
(11.2) 
Petroleum & natural gas, textile, mining, cement, chemical fertilizers, plywood, 
food, rubber, tourism 
Rice, cassava (tapioca), peanuts, rubber, cocoa, coffee, palm 
oil, copra, other tropical products, poultry, beef, pork, eggs 
Iran 
Japan 
(26.2) 
China (12.6) 
Italy 
(11.0) 
Germany 
(12.6) 
France (9.2) Italy (7.8) 
Petroleum,   petrochemicals, textiles, cement and other construction materials, food 
processing (particularly sugar refining and vegetable oil production), metal 
fabricating, armaments 
Wheat, rice, other grains, sugar beets, fruits, nuts, cotton, 
dairy products, wool, caviar 
 
Malaysia USA (23.0) 
Singapore 
(20.0) 
Japan 
(12.8) 
Singapore 
(32.6) 
Japan (17.0) USA (13.2) 
Rubber and oil palm, light manufacturing electronics, tin mining and smelting, 
timber processing, petroleum, agriculture processing 
Natural rubber, palm oil, rice, timber, coconut, pepper 
Nigeria USA (48.8) Spain (10.2) 
Brazil 
(7.5) 
USA (10.1) China (9.7) UK (9.5) 
Crude oil, coal, tin, cotton, rubber, wood, hides and materials, footwear, chemicals, 
fertilizer, printing, ceramics, steel 
Cocoa, peanuts, palm oil, corn, rice, sorghum, millet, 
cassava (tapioca), yarns, rubber, cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, 
fishing 
Pakistan USA (28.5) UK (7.4) 
China 
(6.8) 
China (13.1) USA (8.6) Japan (8.1) 
Textiles, food processing, beverages, construction materials, clothing, paper 
products, shrimp 
Cotton, wheat, rice, sugarcane, fruits, vegetables, milk, beef, 
mutton, eggs 
Turkey 
Germany 
(21.4) 
USA (12.0) 
Italy 
(10.0) 
Germany 
(17.7) 
Italy (11.6) USA (10.4) 
Textiles, food processing, mining (coal, chromites, copper, boron), steel, 
petroleum, construction, lumber, paper 
Tobacco, cotton, grain, olives, sugar beets, pulses, citruses, 
livestock 
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Five major trade partners of each D-8 member countries Center of Advanced Research and Studies on Islamic Common Market (CARSICM) 2004 
 
 
 
 
COUNTRY 
Major Export Trading D-8 Countries Major Import Trading D-8 Countries 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Bangladesh 
IRAN 
(ISLM.R)(0.70) 
TURKEY(0.53) 
PAKISTAN 
(0.50) 
EGYPT(0.22) INDONESIA(0.13) INDONESIA(2.19) MALAYSIA(1.89) 
PAKISTAN(0.76) 
IRAN 
(ISLM.R)(0.13) 
TURKEY(0.13) 
Egypt TURKEY(1.19) PAKISTAN(0.52) 
INDONESIA(0.27) MALAYSIA(0.19) 
NIGERIA(0.10) TURKEY(1.43) MALAYSIA(1.23) INDONESIA(1.07) PAKISTAN(0.32) BANGLADESH(0.07) 
Indonesia 
MALAYSIA(3.55) 
NIGERIA(0.51) PAKISTAN(0.46) BANGLADESH(0.43) TURKEY(0.42) NIGERIA(3.69) MALAYSIA(3.31) PAKISTAN(0.25) 
IRAN 
(ISLM.R)(0.21) 
TURKEY(0.07) 
Iran 
TURKEY(3.28) PAKISTAN(0.75) 
MALAYSIA(0.47) INDONESIA(0.25) 
EGYPT(0.04) TURKEY(1.96) 
MALAYSIA(1.07) INDONESIA(0.67) 
PAKISTAN(0.22) 
BANGLADESH(0.20) 
Malaysia 
INDONESIA (1.64) 
PAKISTAN(0.50) 
EGYPT(0.24) 
TURKEY(0.23) 
IRAN (ISLM.R)(0.21) INDONESIA(3.00) 
IRAN 
(ISLM.R)(0.16) 
TURKEY(0.12) PAKISTAN(0.08) EGYPT(0.02) 
Nigeria 
INDONESIA(5.94) 
TURKEY(0.95) 
MALAYSIA(0.02) 
PAKISTAN(0.01) 
BANGLADESH(0.01) INDONESIA(2.58) MALAYSIA(0.61) 
TURKEY(0.55) PAKISTAN(0.37) EGYPT(0.06) 
Pakistan 
TURKEY(1 .11) 
BANGLADESH(1 
.05) 
INDONESIA(0.82) MALAYSIA(0.65) EGYPT(0.54) MALAYSIA(4.53) INDONESIA(2.56) 
IRAN 
(ISLM.R)(1.82) 
TURKEY(0.95) EGYPT(0.36) 
Turkey 
EGYPT(0.92) 
IRAN (ISLM.R) 
(0.86) 
MALAYSIA(0.32) 
NIGERIA(0.18) PAKISTAN(0.15) 
IRAN 
(ISLM.R)(1.81) 
INDONESIA(0.64) MALAYSIA(0.48) 
NIGERIA(0.36) EGYPT(0.23) 
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Macro Economic Data for D-8 Countries Heritage 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 
Overall 
Score 
Tariff Rate 
Income 
Tax Rate 
Corporate 
Tax Rate 
Population 
(millions) 
GDP 
(billions) 
GDP Per 
Capita 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Inflation 
Rate 
FDI Inflow 
(millions) 
Tax Burden 
% GDP 
Govt. Expenditure % 
GDP 
Bangladesh 51.1 11 25 45 160 213.5 1334 4.2 8.4 1100 8.4 14.3 
Egypt 59 8 20 20 81.5 441.6 5416 8.4 11.7 9500 15.3 29.8 
Indonesia 55.5 3.6 30 28 228.2 907.3 3975 8.4 9.8 7900 11.3 19.1 
Iran 43.4 17.4 35 25 72 839.4 11666 12.5 26 1.5 6.1 26.1 
Malaysia 64.8 3.1 27 25 27 383.7 14215 3.3 5.4 8100 14.8 25 
Nigeria 56.8 8.9 25 30 151.3 315 2082 4.9 11.2 20300 5.6 34.3 
Pakistan 55.2 9 25 35 166 439 2644 7.4 12 5400 10.2 19.3 
Turkey 63.8 1.8 35 20 73.9 1000 13920 9.4 10.4 18200 23.7 23.9 
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D-8 GNI per capita in PPP dollars World Bank 2010 
 
 
